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1. Introduction 
 
Les systèmes nucléaires innovants, notamment les systèmes dédiés à la transmutation des 
actinides mineurs, peuvent souffrir de la dégradation significative des paramètres  déterminant leur 
sûreté. Par exemple, la fraction de neutrons retardés peut diminuer considérablement par rapport aux 
réacteurs nucléaires conventionnels. Un autre problème qui peut apparaître dans de tels systèmes est 
la réduction des effets de contre-réaction, notamment de l’effet Doppler. Cette dégradation des 
paramètres de sûreté aboutit à rendre le pilotage de tels systèmes très délicat. Ainsi la sûreté accrue de 
systèmes innovants peut être indispensable pour leur  réalisation pratique.  
Les réacteurs à sel fondu, malgré quelques désavantages, sont reconnus pour être 
particulièrement favorables à la sûreté déterministe, appelée aussi intrinsèque ou inhérente. Ceci 
grâce à des propriétés intrinsèques, notamment la pression interne basse, de petites réserves de 
réactivité grâce au retraitement en ligne, etc. Cependant, quelques autres propriétés intrinsèques, 
comme un feedback positif du modérateur en graphite ou le petit effet Doppler ne sont pas toujours 
optimisées. De plus, une diminution de la fraction de neutrons retardés dûe à la circulation de 
combustible, l’insertion de la réactivité positive dans le cas d’arrêt de circulation et la solidification 
éventuelle du combustible peuvent poser des problèmes pour atteindre la sûreté déterministe.    
Une solution innovante qui vise à traiter ces problèmes pourrait être une amélioration 
« artificielle » de la neutronique des systèmes nucléaires : une source externe de neutrons ajoutée à un 
cœur permet à ce dernier de fonctionner dans un état sous-critique (réacteurs nucléaires hybrides). 
Cette criticité du cœur peut être utile au moins dans deux cas : si le bilan neutronique est « serré » ou 
pour l’amélioration de la sûreté quand les propriétés neutroniques, déterminant la sûreté de tels 
systèmes sont dégradées.  
En ce qui concerne l’amélioration de la sûreté, l’approche intrinsèque est un des moyens 
fondamentaux pour atteindre ce but. Dans le cadre de l’approche déterministe il est considéré que tous 
les accidents provoqués par un impact externe doivent être exclus en utilisant des propriétés 
intrinsèques des composants du réacteur.   
Dans ce contexte, l’objectif principale de cette étude est d’examiner le rôle de la sous-criticité en 
tant que moyen d’améliorer la sûreté des réacteurs nucléaires innovants, notamment des réacteurs à 
sel fondu, dédiés à la production d’énergie et à la transmutation/incinération des déchets nucléaires. 
La sûreté intrinsèque est considérée comme but ultime de cette amélioration. Les aspects suivants 
seront examinés dans ce travail de thèse : 
I. Des études antérieures ont montré que la sous-criticité est un moyen utile d’améliorer la 
sûreté. Cependant ces études étaient souvent concentrées sur l’analyse de systèmes particuliers sans 
porter l'accent sur la sous-criticité en tant qu’une nouvelle option dans la conception des réacteurs 
nucléaires qui permet atteindre cet objectif. Dans notre étude nous allons essayer de montrer  « Ce 
que » et « Comment » la sous-criticité peut apporter pour l’amélioration de la sûreté. 
II. Il y a divers régimes de fonctionnement d’un cœur sous-critique avec une source externe : la 
source de neutrons peut être soit indépendante de la puissance du coeur soit couplée à la production de 
neutrons dans le cœur. Les conséquences pour la sûreté seront différentes pour ces deux types de 
couplage. Dans ce travail nous allons effectuer une comparaison directe de ces deux modes de 
fonctionnement. Outre cela, nous proposerons un moyen de combiner leurs avantages inhérents. 
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III. Pour atteindre l’objectif d’amélioration de la sûreté, la source externe de neutrons dans un 
système sous-critique doit être suffisamment performante ; cela suscite des contraintes économiques et 
technologiques. Dans ce contexte une analyse des différentes sources de neutrons (photo-nucléaires, 
thermonucléaire) est effectuée.        
IV. L’extension de l’approche déterministe à des systèmes hybrides. (Cette approche, initialement 
proposée pour l’analyse de réacteurs critiques, ne prend pas en compte les nouvelles opportunités 
offertes par les systèmes hybrides).  
V. L’interférence entre les exigences pour les paramètres du cœur et celles pour les paramètres de 
la source externe de neutrons : l’identification des cœurs qui permettent d’atteindre la sûreté 
déterministe dans le contexte des aspects I à IV. (Même si la sous-criticité est un moyen utile 
d’améliorer de la sûreté, son rôle reste auxiliaire. Ainsi, pour répondre aux exigences de la sûreté 
intrinsèque, les propriétés du cœur doivent être adoptés). 
Ce travail est organisé de la façon suivante : chaque chapitre commence par une introduction 
indépendante suivie d’une description de la méthodologie utilisée et éventuellement de la description 
d’un modèle. Après cela, les résultats principaux et leurs analyses seront présentés. Enfin, des 
conclusions sont formulées soit à la fin de chaque section (partie)  ou/et à la fin de chaque chapitre. 
En outre, chaque chapitre peut être considéré comme une étude indépendante dont les objectifs et les 
résultats sont à chaque fois présentés. Cependant, les sujets couverts par ce travail appartiennent bien 
à une seule thématique : cette étude présente une analyse du potentiel de la sûreté déterministe des 
systèmes critiques et sous-critiques, notamment des réacteurs nucléaires à sel fondu, ayant pour 
l’objectif l’estimation du rôle de l’amélioration artificielle de la neutronique. 
 
1.1. Challenges facing nuclear power 
The current stagnation of the Nuclear Power (NP) is evident, but one may anticipate 
that this tendency has temporal character. Indeed, actually there is still no real alternative for 
replacement of traditional fuels, principally hydrocarbons, which will be exhausted in the near 
future (Bauquis, 2004). Moreover, pollution of the environment by combustion products of fossil 
fuels, mainly by CO2, becomes extremely menacing for the global-scale ecological equilibrium.  
Even in these “favorable” conditions, the future nuclear technology has to meet some 
exigent requirements to be publicly acceptable and to take its own place in the pattern of the 
world’s energy production. Nowadays these requirements are the subject of the consensus of NP 
specialists all over the World. These requirements for the future nuclear technology (so-called 
nuclear reactors of the 4-th generation) are explicitly formulated in the framework of the 
International Generation IV Forum (U.S. DOE, 2000) and Russian BREST reactor conceptions 
(Adamov, Orlov et al. 2001). To qualify for this role such a technology has to conform the 
following criteria:  
(I) Safety/reliability. The future reactor design has to supply inherent safety and fault 
tolerance. It is imperative to exclude severe accidents with large radiation releases under 
conditions of any equipment failure, external impact or human error by using natural properties 
in nuclear reactor and their components.  
(II) Long term sustainability. A quasi-unlimited availability of fuel resources may be 
achieved due to the use of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel, through efficient use of natural 
17 
uranium and, subsequently, thorium. The plant is to be designed to deliver a maximum possible 
amount of useful energy. 
(III) Minimal nuclear waste. The radiotoxicity of the waste issued from nuclear industry 
has to be minimized, ideally to the level comparable with the natural radiotoxicity of the 
extracted uranium/thorium (principle of preserving of the natural radiation balance).  
(IV) Economic competitiveness. It should be economically effective when compared with 
other competitors, in terms of low costs and fuel availability (e.g., fuel breeding), high efficiency 
of thermodynamic cycle, etc.  
(V) Proliferation resistance. Future fuel cycles should aim to minimizing the inventories 
and accessibility of weapon-useable materials.  
 
Above issues are extremely interconnected and, consequently, have to be treated taking 
into account complexity of the entire structure of the future NP. In this study we focus our 
attention on safety aspect as the enhanced safety remains one of the decisive and desirable 
properties of prospective NP. So-called inherent safety is one of the fundamental approaches to 
achieve this goal (Wade, 2000). 
1.2. Inherent safety approach and deterministic safety 
analysis 
1.2.1. Inherent safety 
Strategies of minimization of risks related to nuclear energy production have been 
developed and refined over many years for conventional (critical) reactors. The release of 
radioactivity caused by reactor core disruptions is considered as the most significant among all 
other risks.  
Traditionally, minimization of risks is based on the defense in depth (DID) safety 
principle such that any single failure will not defeat the strategies for meeting basic safety 
functionsa. Multiple barriers (fuel cladding, primary coolant boundary and reactor containment 
building) are used to prevent a radiation release even in accidental conditions (e.g. Ref. 
Libmann, 1996). Highly reliable, diverse and redundant systems for controlling and terminating 
the chain reaction and for fission and/or decay heat removal are provided. Finally, rigorous 
maintenance, training and certification of in-plant personnel are used to minimize the possibility 
of human errors.  
This traditional approach is able to minimize risks, nevertheless, it can not, generally, 
eliminate them, what particularly concerns the most severe unacceptable accidents which 
probability remains non-zeroed and very uncertain due to the reasons discussed below. 
 
a These functions include (Wade, 2000): the containment of the radioactive materials within controlled space to 
protect humans from radiation damage; the reliable heat evacuation from the fissioning medium as well as decay heat 
evacuation from the fission products and transuranics in the fuel for all times subsequent to the fission event; the 
maintain of a balance of neutron production and destruction rate in the fissioning fuel, etc. 
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As for heavy accidents, the damage related to these events could be unacceptably high. 
Therefore, their risk has to be either precisely defined and accepted or, even better, it has to be 
zeroed. In this case, all depends on the safety means being used for reactor safety. When only 
“active engineering” and organizing safety means are used then the problem of their reliability 
becomes a decisive one. In practice, for the quantitative assessment of risks the Probabilistic 
Safety Analysis (PSA) is the only suitable instrument to be used. However, being applied to 
reactor accident analysis, the PSA has an important shortcoming in assessment of real risks: as 
discussed in Refs. (Slessarev, 1992; Adamov, Orlov et al. 2001; Slessarev et al., 2004) there is 
neither sufficient operating experience nor convincing theoretical data to support it. This 
becomes particularly dangerous if NP is going to be widely used in the future. 
Therefore, it seems that the large-scale NP may not include those reactor concepts which 
safety (particularly, protection against severe accidents) is based only on the PSA. Nowadays an 
alternative deterministic (also, inherent or natural) safety approach is proposed (Orlov and 
Slessarev, 1988; Slessarev, 1992). According to this approach declared by A. Weinberg (1984) 
just after the Three-Mile-Island accident, the intrinsic safety principle is one of fundamental 
means to build the deterministically safe NP: all severe accidents (e.g., prompt criticality 
excursion, loss of coolant, fires, steam and hydrogen explosions) “should be deterministically 
excluded under conditions of any human errors, failures of or damage to equipment and safety 
barriers, by the use of intrinsic physical and chemical properties and behavior of the fuel, coolant 
and other reactor components” (from Ref.: Adamov, Orlov et al., 2001, p. 21). In other words, 
the safety functions have to be achieved by exploiting the natural laws of physics and inherent 
characteristics of the nuclear installation (Wade, 2000).  
Only those designs where all unprotected heavy accidents do not cause unacceptable core 
damages could be considered deterministically safe. The deterministic level of safety seems to be 
ideal (maximal) respecting safety certainty to be achieved. 
In this paradigm the above approaches may be considered as complementary means: the 
deterministic safety approach has to be applied to exclude severe accidents, whereas DID has to 
be used to minimize the residual risks, which may be evaluated applying the PSA methods.  
1.2.2. Deterministic safety analysis 
The deterministic safety requirement implies that all potential accidents in natural safe 
reactor caused both by internal and external impacts are treated as Design-Basis Accidentsb
(DBA). The Ultimate Design-Basis Accidentc (UDBA) should not lead to fuel failure and 
radioactive releases such that would require evacuation of people from the territory around the 
plant (Adamov, Orlov et al., 2001). 
 
b Design Basis Accidents (DBA) are postulated accidents to which a nuclear plant, its systems, structures and 
components must be designed and built to withstand loads during accident conditions without releasing the harmful 
amounts of radioactive materials to the outside environment. 
c Ultimate Design-Basis Accident (UDBA) is the accident which covers any event resulting from human errors or 
multiple failures of equipment, including loss of forced cooling, failure of the scram function, insertion of full reactivity 
margin, damage to outer barriers (containment and reactor vessel). 
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In other words, deterministic safety analysis is based on study of all possible (with 
respect to nature laws) unprotected events independently on their probability, as well as their 
multiple combinations. All severe accident scenarios has to be considered as unprotected events 
where failure of all active safety means and all possible human errors does not cause the reactor 
core disruption. 
Therefore, the approval of the required safety is somewhat simplified (when compared 
with conventional PSA techniques) as an analysis might be limited (Slessarev, 1992) by 
consideration of: 
 all important and technically possible initiators of accidents (including human errors); 
 the deterministic analysis of only principal accident scenarios, which might lead to core 
disruption; there is no needs to consider the “post-disruption events” – they have to be 
deterministically excluded – this leads to important economy in R&D. 
Finally, analysis of hypothetical (non-credible) accidents is an optional job performed to 
obtain ultimate estimates (Adamov, Orlov et al., 2001).  
A system is considered to be deterministically safe if all unprotected events do not break 
through the “domain” of the acceptable parameters (or the domain of viability). It means that 
temperatures, pressures, etc. during transients will not lead to the destruction of the system. 
1.2.3. Ways to achieve the deterministic safety 
To achieve the deterministic safety the system has to be designed in an appropriate way 
using the intrinsic safety features: fuel, coolant, structure materials with the sufficiently large 
margins to loose their basic properties; passive safety means based on nature laws and 
corresponding designs. Some measures, aiming to reach this goal are formulated, for example, in 
Refs. (Wade, 1986; Slessarev, 1992; Adamov, Wade, 2000; Orlov et. al., 2001). They include 
(among others) the following recommendations:  
 favorable inherent reactivity feedbacks to keep heat production and removal in balance; 
 large margins to damage temperatures (i.e. large viability domain); 
 passive control and cooling features, feedbacks governed by a large negative temperature 
coefficient and a high level of natural circulation of the coolant to prevent dangerous 
temperature growth under off-normal conditions; 
 minimal reactivity margin (reactivity reserves necessary to compensate in-core reactivity 
effects), ideally smaller than the fraction of delayed neutrons; this excludes a fast runaway of 
reactor power under condition of any erroneous actions or failures in the reactivity control 
system;  
 minimal accumulated non-nuclear energy: excluded possibility of fires and of explosions, a 
chemically inert coolant with high boiling temperature, low internal pressure. 
 
The above recommendations were proposed for traditional (critical) reactors. The use of 
so-called hybrid reactor systems, where a subcritical core is associated with an external intensive 
neutron source (e.g. Accelerator-Driven Systems, fusion-fission hybrids), may offer a new 
opportunity to reach deterministic safety even for the systems for which the inherent safety-
related drawbacks do not permit to attain this goal in critical configuration.  
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1.3. Hybrid (subcritical) Systems  
1.3.1. Artificially enhanced neutronics and core subcriticality 
Many problems of the current NP could be solved if more neutrons were available per 
every fission taking place in the reactor fuel or if one might affect the temporal characteristic of 
the fission neutron yield. A supplementary neutron yield per fission would allow the use of 
natural fuels with “tight” neutronics such as natural uranium (U) and thorium (Th) without 
isotopic enrichment. It would also simplify or eliminate the necessity of fuel reprocessing, expand 
fuel reserves enormously and improve resistance to proliferation (Salvatores et al., 1999). Safety 
could also be enhanced with the help of supplementary neutrons, if these neutrons were delayed 
with respect to prompt fission neutrons (Salvatores et al., 1995, Gandini et al., 1999; Slessarev et 
al., 1999; Gandini et al., 2000). Taking into account that the fraction of delayed neutrons in a 
critical reactor, and particularly in actinide transmutors, is small, some supplementary delayed 
neutrons would be sufficient to enhance safety drastically.  
Hybrid reactor systems offer some promising options in resolving the current problems of 
nuclear power: long-lived radioactive wastes, safety enhancement etc. In these hybrid concepts 
the subcritical core may play either principal or subsidiary role. Thus in the case of the fusion-
fission hybrids a subcritical blanket is foreseen for utilization on fusion neutrons and therefore its 
role may be considered as an auxiliary; whereas in the case of the ADS the external neutron 
source plays supporting role. In this context Slessarev and Bokov (2004) introduced the notion 
of so-called systems with ARTificially Enhanced Neutronics (ARTEN) as the category of hybrids 
where the external neutron source is foreseen with the objective to artificially improve the 
neutron yield and/or its characteristics (e.g. time and energy spectra).
ARTEN systems are quite attractive with respect to fuel cycle simplification, expanding 
fuel reserves, non-proliferation and long-lived waste reduction. Preliminary studies (Slessarev et 
al., 1999; Slessarev et al., 2004) have demonstrated that a NP park, based on ARTEN-type 
systems, could be developed according to the required rate of energy production. In addition, it 
would last for thousands of years until all reserves of plutonium (Pu), uranium (U) and natural 
thorium (Th) will be exhausted. The subsequent “shrinkage” stage of NP will require fuel 
reprocessing and it will lead to some limited amount of wastes with acceptable radiotoxicity. On 
the other hand, the safety potential of such ARTEN systems is not sufficiently known.  
ARTEN-systems can be considered as potentially capable resolving many of the principal 
issues associated with prospective NP. A production of supplementary neutrons can be made in 
hybrid systems where fission reactions take place in a subcritical core simultaneously with 
supplementary external neutron production via spallation reactions, thermo-nuclear fusion or 
photonuclear reactions, etc. Certainly, the net energy output in ARTEN-type system will 
decrease, however, it still might be acceptable, in particular, when the supplementary neutrons 
provide this system with some improved properties (e.g., deterministic safety). 
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As will be demonstrated in present work, from the point of view of safety issues in the 
framework of the deterministic safety approach, ARTEN-type systems may be divided into two 
categories based either  
 on an independent external neutron source or  
 on a “dependent” external neutron source, i.e. coupled with the core neutronics.  
The term “independent external neutron source” in our considerations means that there 
is no intrinsic and imminent dependence of the neutron production in the external neutron 
source on fission rate in the subcritical blanket (though the intensity of the external source may 
be eventually corrected depending on core power, for example, to assure constant reactor 
power), whereas the term “coupled system” signifies an inverse situation, i.e. that the intensity 
of the external neutron source depends intrinsically on the core power.  
Below we discuss particularities of each system in detail. 
1.3.2. Critical reactor 
In the present study critical cores with its parameters (dimensions, nominal power, 
coolant flow etc.) and properties (in-core feedbacks, heat capacity etc.) will play the role of 
reference and of starting point for our analysis. Moreover, the critical core may be considered as 
a limit case of the subcritical system, where the subcriticality level is quite small (quantitatively, 
when compared to delayed neutron fraction  ). Indeed, it is known that commercial critical 
reactors are also supported by a very small (not intense) external neutron source. The difference 
between critical reactors and hybrid systems lies in the intensity of the source, i.e. its capability 
to drive the system power, and in particularity of “driving mechanisms”. In contrast to ARTEN 
systems, in critical reactors a small, independent and time-constant neutron source is unable to 
drive/affect the core power.  
One may explain the distinction of different realizations of ARTEN systems from 
corresponding critical system utilizing an energy transfer diagram schematically presented 
schematically in Figure 1. The thermal energy outthE , generated in the reactor core is transmitted 
by the heat transfer system to the electric energy production device (in our studies it is assumed 
that there is no heat losses in the heat transfer system). The energy production device (e.g., 
turbine) transforms the heat to electricity with some transformation efficiency e and generated 
electric energy out oute e thE E= goes to the power grid.
In the neutron multiplying blanket of the critical reactor the self-sustaining chain 
reaction takes place. Consequently, this system needs no external energy supply to maintain this 
reaction, except some energy necessary to keep reactor running (i.e. to feed heat transfer system, 
safety system etc.). One may take into account the decrease of net energy output by introducing 
the entire reactor efficiency  
( ) ( )1criticalR e R  =  , (1.1) 
where the factor R denotes the ratio of the energy, necessary to satisfy the inherent reactor 
energy consumption needs, to the total produced electrical energy. Obviously, in the steady state 
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conditions we may pass on from energy to power: out oute eE P ,
out out
th thE P ,
out out
e e thP P= , i.e. 
formulate above considerations in terms of steady-state power outP .
Figure 1. Energy (power) transfer diagram for the critical system. 
1.3.3. Systems with independent external neutron source. Accelerator Driven 
Systems 
Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS) may be one of realistic types of subcritical ARTEN 
systems (see Refs.: Takahashi, 1995; Rubbia et al., 1995; Bowman, 1995). In definition by Wade 
(2000), “the term ADS comprehensively includes all non-self sustaining fissioning neutron 
multiplying assemblies, which are driven by external neutron source provided by a charged 
particle accelerator and a neutron production target”. The ADS concepts connive that the power 
feeding the external neutron source, namely the proton accelerator, originates from the external 
power grid. Therefore, Accelerator-Driven System may be considered as a particular case of 
ARTEN system with “independent-source”. 
The energy transfer diagram for ADS is evidently different from this one for the critical 
system (see Figure 2). As noted above, in this case the reactor core is subcritical, consequently 
the self-sustained chain reaction is not possible. Therefore the subcritical reactor blanket 
operates as neutron and energy amplifier: the output thermal energy outthE of the core is the 
energy bE of the charged particle beam, originated from an accelerator, times the energy 
amplification coefficient bG . The energy ineE , needed for accelerator to create and to accelerate 
charged particles, is issued from the power grid. This energy depends on the accelerator 
efficiency a : /ine b aE E = . Finally, one can introduce the fraction f of produced electrical 
energy serving to feed the accelerator:  
1ine
out
e e a b
E
f
E G 
= = . (1.2) 
Apparently, the entire reactor efficiency decreases, when compared with corresponding 
critical reactor, down to the value: 
( )1ADSR e R f  =   . (1.3) 
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In coming Chapters we will return to the Eq. (1.2), namely we will write the explicit 
expression for the energy amplification coefficient bG .
Figure 2. Energy transfer diagram for an Accelerator-Driven System (ADS). 
As for the safety of the ADS, a large subcriticality level ( 0.95 0.97effk 	 ÷ ) mitigates the 
negative consequences of the degradation of safety parameters. However, such significant 
subcriticality level requires powerful and expensive particle accelerator. Moreover, a large 
subcriticality decreases the beneficial influence of the in-core thermal feedbacks. Hence, a choice 
of the core subcriticality level becomes the compromise between the benefits offered by the 
subcriticality and the possible drawbacks that this subcriticality may yield.  
1.3.4. Coupled Subcritical Systems 
1.3.4.1. Delayed Enhanced Neutronics (DEN) systems 
Another way, oriented to artificial delayed neutron production (Delayed Enhanced 
Neutronics concept or briefly DEN), may be realized by the direct transformation of part of the 
fission energy into electricity and, finally, to external neutrons using a special neutron 
production mechanism (spallation, bremsstrahlung-photonuclear, nuclear fusion, etc.). These 
supplementary neutrons can be naturally or artificially “delayed” when compared with prompt 
neutrons of fission. Such a system with subcritical core operates with increased total fraction of 
delayed neutrons. This fraction consists of the delayed neutrons of two kinds: 
 originating from fission product decay (so-called “natural” delayed neutrons as in 
conventional critical reactors) and  
 originating from a supplementary neutron production mechanism with their particular 
neutron spectrum and spatial characteristics. Unlike the first kind, their delay depends on 
the engineering design of the installation and can be optimized by the designer. These 
neutrons can be considered as a group of “artificially” created delayed neutrons.  
Without these supplementary neutrons, reactor core would remain subcritical. Together 
with these neutrons, cores become critical, i.e. the external neutron source produces a quantity 
of neutrons, necessary to sustain the chain reaction in the core. Hence, a DEN-system (Slessarev 
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and Bokov, 2004) can be referred to “coupled” ARTEN systems, operating in a critical/self-
sustainingd mode and therefore achieving both goals discussed earlier in this work: increasing the 
total neutron yield per one fission as well as the delayed neutron yield. The physical background 
of this concept is rather simple: an intermediate process “hides” neutrons (of some neutron 
generation) temporarily to recover them later. This allows the neutron life time be artificially 
increased and, in this way slowing-down dangerous transients. 
This particular property of the DEN system, if compared with the conventional critical 
reactors, can improve the reactor dynamics significantly. Moreover, the DEN system operates in 
a critical mode and consequently unlike the ADS, it takes advantage of favorable temperature 
feedbacks, existing in these systems. 
The dynamics peculiarity of the DEN-systems (Slessarev et al., 1999) is the following: the 
supplementary neutron production depends upon reactor thermo-hydraulics. The spallation 
neutron delay would have similar time-characteristics as the thermo-hydraulic processes in a 
nuclear power plant. Hence, in the case of a thermo-hydraulic unprotected transient or any 
failure of the heat removal mechanism, DEN self-regulates the power level in similar rates as the 
thermo-hydraulic processes. Unlike DEN, ADS power is much less sensitive to the thermo-
hydraulic transients and power “shut-down” via proton-beam cut-off is the only mechanism to 
protect against these accidents. 
Below we discuss in detail one of possible realizations of the DEN concept – so-called 
Accelerator Coupled System (ACS). 
1.3.4.2. Accelerator Coupled Systems  
Gandini et al. (2000) proposed to use a fraction f of the output reactor power to feed 
the external neutron source (accelerator) with the goal to increase the coupling between ADS 
neutronics and thermal-hydraulics. This fraction is fixed at any instant of time and may be 
adjusted in order to compensate the possible reactivity swing. Here we may note that in 
comparison to a critical reactor a new opportunity appears: the reactor power may be controlled 
not only by control rods, but also (via external neutron source) by the fraction f . This 
particularity is also addressed in the present study. 
As proposed by Gandini et al. (2000), the practical realization of this ACS-coupling 
would consist in the splitting of the secondary coolant loop into production one and the coupling 
one, generating the electricity feeding the external neutron source (see Figure 3). In this case the 
neutron production in the core and in the external source becomes intrinsically coupled.
The energy transfer diagram for ACS is similar to this one for the ADS (see Figure 2). 
The only difference is that the power feeding the accelerator does not originate from independent 
power grid, but from the energy producing system of the same reactor. Obviously, Eqs. (1.2)-
(1.3) remain valid in the case of ACS.  
 
d The common agreed terminology does not exist yet. The term “self-sustaining” is preferable, as the term “critical” is 
reserved for the reactor blankets with self-sustaining fission reaction. But we would like to stress the similarity 
between conventional critical reactors and DEN-systems. For that reason we make use of notation “operates in critical 
mode” to characterize DEN. 
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Figure 3. Energy transfer diagram for an Accelerator Coupled System. 
1.3.4.3. DENNY concept  
In this work we will discuss one more type of coupled systems – so-called DENNY-system 
(Delayed Enhanced Neutronics with Non-linear neutron Yield), proposed in Refs. (Bokov et. al.,
2004a,b). The DENNY system is a further development of the ACS concept. This concept aims 
to fusion the inherent safety-related advantages of Accelerator-Driven Systems and of 
Accelerator Coupled Systems. As ACS, DENNY operates in the critical regime with subcritical 
core, but the mode of coupling is changed – it is proposed to apply energy of incident charged 
particles as the coupling parameter instead of the beam current. Details and advantages (from 
the point of view of reactor safety) of such a coupling are discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
As will be demonstrated in subsequent Chapters, the core subcriticality is an attractive 
option for the safety amelioration. Nevertheless, to achieve the deterministic safety level, the 
reactor core properties have to be suitable, i.e. the system has to meet as good as possible the 
conditions, mentioned in Subsection 1.2.3. Among others, molten salt reactors are good 
candidates to achieve this goal. In the next section we discuss this kind of nuclear systems in 
more detail. 
1.4. Molten Salt Systems 
Some radically innovative concepts of prospective NP (Gat, 1987; Slessarev et al., 2001; 
Lecarpentier, 2001; Nuttin, 2002 and many earlier works) use mobile (circulating) fuel. Mobile 
fuel is rather attractive to be applied in conventional critical cores; however, sometimes its 
deterministic safety potential is limited.  
1.4.1. Safety-related properties of molten-salt reactors 
As is demonstrated by many authors, the Molten Salt Reactors (MSR) have the 
extraordinary potential to reach natural safety (Blinkin and Novikov, 1978; Gat, 1987; Novikov 
and Ignatiev, 1990; Gat and Dodds, 1997). Indeed, many recommendations listed in Section 
1.2.3 may be easily realized in Molten Salt Systems due to their inherent properties. Let us 
identify and summarize these safety-related properties of MSR.  
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In general, low non-nuclear energy is present in the molten salt reactors, i.e., low internal 
pressure in the reactor core as well as chemical inertness of the salt with respect to air or 
moisture results in absence of fire hazard or of explosion hazard.  
As the molten salt fuel is in the same time the heat carrier, the Loss Of Coolant 
Accident (LOCA) has no sense; nevertheless, some means for the residual heat evacuation have 
to be foreseen in the reactor design. 
Excess reactivity and reactivity margin may be quite low, given that the reactivity swing 
due to burn-up may be minimized due to breading and fuel (quasi-) continues reprocessing. 
The possibility of the emergency fuel draining may be foreseen in design. In the case of 
accident the fuel may be drained by gravity into dump tanks that are assured to retain 
subcriticality and have sufficient natural cooling to assure cooling of the fuel (Gat and Dodds, 
1997; Lecarpentier, 2001).   
As fuel is molten in MSR, hence the core melting accident has no sense. The safety 
criteria are no more based on, for example, fuel melting, but on the salt properties. Nevertheless, 
the main danger of this kind of accident in solid-fuel systems is a potential re-criticality. This 
menace would be excluded in MSR if the salt remained homogeneous in any circumstances. It 
means that the chemical stability of the salt has to be guaranteed in all range of functioning and 
accident conditions.  
Despite above beneficial properties of MSRs, there are some concerns with respect of 
their safety. Hereafter we mention the most pertinent of them. 
A drawback of mobile fuel system is partial loss of delayed neutrons. Since fuel circulates 
and spends some time beyond active core region, as a consequence, precursors of delayed 
neutrons decay partially outside of core without contributing to neutron balance. In addition, 
any fuel stop or even decrease of its flow in the core leads to the reactivity insertion. Therefore, 
this particularity of mobile fuel systems is twice penalizing for their safety.  
Distinctiveness of mobile fuel reactors and, in particular, molten salt reactors is the 
absence of the first containment barrier (fuel cladding). This can be considered as a 
disadvantage of these reactors in respect to safety requirements. However, another inherit 
property of liquid fuel system – on-line reprocessing – is able (to some extent) to compensate 
this drawback. In fact, the on-line reprocessing removes the gaseous and volatile part of the 
source term being the inventory of radioisotopes in the reactor and potentially available for 
dispersion to the environment. This part of radioactive isotopes is most likely to be dispersed to 
atmosphere when there is breach of containment. Anyway, multiple barriers can by designed to 
compensate for this lack of first safety barrier. 
Finally, in some cases, MSR cores may have an unacceptable from the safety point of 
view positive feedback, mainly due to contribution of the graphite moderator component. 
(Lecarpentier, 2001; Lecarpentier et al., 2003). In this case such a reactor is unstable with 
respect to power fluctuations, and therefore its control becomes problematic.  
Subcritical (hybrid) MSR might be one of potential solutions to above safety-related 
problems, especially if it does not require cumbersome design and if it does lead to high 
economic penalties.  
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1.4.2. Molten salt cores utilized for safety study 
In the present study diverse molten salt reactor cores have been chosen as reference for 
analysis. They cover different strategies for fuel cycles and correspond to both fast and thermal 
spectrum systems. Fast spectrum versions of molten salt homogeneous cores are similar to the 
concepts WISE (Slessarev et al., 2001), TASSE (Salvatores et al., 1999) and REBUS (Mourogov 
and Bokov, 2004). Thermal spectrum molten salt cores with graphite moderator are similar to 
the concepts: AMSTER (Vergnes et al., 2000; Lecarpentier, 2001), TASSE (Salvatores et al.,
1999) or TIER (Bowman, 1999), RSF (Nuttin, 2002). 
1.5. Subjects of the present study  
Now we may summarize all above aspects in order to formulate the problems under 
consideration, the goals and the subjects of the present study (see Figure 4 for detail).  
It is known, that advanced nuclear systems and, in particular, systems devoted to the 
Minor Actinide (MA) transmutation, may suffer from the significant degradation of safety 
characteristics. For example, such important parameter as fraction of delayed neutrons may 
decrease by several times compared to the conventional nuclear reactors. Another serious 
problem, arising in such systems, is the reduction of in-core feedbacks effects, namely Doppler-
effect - the fastest and the most important temperature feedback effect in the reactor core. This 
degradation of safety properties makes the control of such systems rather delicate. Therefore, the 
ensuring of the safe operation of these innovative systems may become crucial for the practical 
realization of these novel concepts. 
The molten salt reactors, despite some safety-related drawbacks, are recognized to be 
particularly convenient for the natural safety due to its intrinsic properties, namely low internal 
pressure, low fuel-coolant inflammability, small reactivity margin due to on-line reprocessing, 
etc. However, other inherent properties, such as a positive feedback effect of the graphite 
components of core and a small Doppler-effect, are not yet optimized. Besides, a number of 
other physical properties, in particular, a partial loss of the delayed neutron fraction due to fuel 
circulation, a positive reactivity insertion in the case of circulation stop and the fuel 
solidification, may raise some problems on the way to the deterministic safety. The insertion of 
some quantities of MA in the core definitely would degrade the situation further.  
A novel solution aiming to handle the above problem may be the artificial enhancement 
of system neutronics: an external neutron source added to the core permits the system to 
operate with subcritical core (so-called hybrid nuclear reactors). Core subcriticality can be 
helpful at least in two cases: either for neutronics enhancement of cores when neutron balance is 
too tight or/and for safety improvement purposes when feedback effects or other physical 
parameters are degraded.  
When the safety amelioration is discussed, the intrinsic safety principle is one of the 
fundamental means to reach it. In the framework of the deterministic safety approach is 
assumed that, all potential accidents provoked by either external or internal impact must be 
excluded utilizing inherent properties of reactor components.   
28 
In this context, the principal goal of this study is to investigate the role of core 
subcriticality for safety enhancement of advanced nuclear systems, in particular molten salt 
reactors, devoted to both energy production and waste incineration/transmutation. The 
inherent safety is considered as ultimate goal of this safety enhancement.
The following aspects are addressed in the present work. 
I. Earlier studies have demonstrated that the subcriticality is a helpful mean of safety 
amelioration. However, these studies were often focused on analysis of a particular system 
without marking out the core subcriticality as new option in reactor design allowing to reach 
this objective. In the present study we will try to qualify «What» and «How» the core 
subcriticality may bring to safety improvement.
II. There are diverse regimes of operation of subcritical core with external neutron source: 
this neutron source may be either independent on core power (e.g. ADS) or coupled to the 
neutron production in the core (e.g. ACS). It is obvious that safety issues vary for these 
different regimes. In the present work we carry out a direct inter-comparison of subcritical 
systems operating in different regimes. Moreover, we will propose the way to combine their 
inherent advantages. 
III. To qualify for this role of a safety enhancement tool, the external neutron source has 
to be suitably efficient, what leads to some constraints of both economical and technological 
nature. Hence, an analysis of the external neutron source characteristics is addressed in this 
context.
Finally, other important problems are also discussed in the present work, however 
additional studies are necessary in these cases (see below): 
IV. Expansion of the deterministic safety approach to hybrid systems (this approach was 
initially proposed for analysis of critical reactors, but it did not take into account new 
opportunities offered by hybrid systems); 
V. Interference of the requirements on core parameters with parameters of the external 
neutron source, i.e. identification of the class of reactor cores for which the core subcriticality 
permits to attain the deterministic safety level in the context of above aspects I-IV (Even if 
subcriticality is a helpful tool of safety amelioration, its role remains auxiliary. Hence, to meet 
the deterministic safety requirements, the core properties have also to be convenient).  
This thesis work is organized as follows. Each chapter starts with an independent 
introduction, which is followed by a required methodology and model description. Further, the 
major results and their analysis are provided. Finally, some conclusions are drawn either at the 
end of some sub-sections or at the very end of the chapter. Therefore, each chapter can be 
viewed as an independent study with its problem formulation, goals and results.  
On the other hand, the subjects covered in this work can be well described by a single 
thematic. In brief, this study presents an analysis of the deterministic safety potential of critical 
and ARTEN systems, in particular systems with molten salt fuel, with the goal to assess the role 
of artificially enhanced neutronics.  
29 
APPROACH
SUBCRITICALITY AS A MEAN 
OF SAFETY ENHANCEMENT
molten salt reactors
inherent properties 
properties of reactor cores, allowing attain 
the inherent safety; role of subcriticality 
good candidate for the 
inherent safety,
but
natural (inherent) safety
modes of coupling
‘core-source’ 
expansion of deterministic 
safety approach to hybrid 
systems
hybrid systems
subcriticality
improved neutron balance 
transmutation/incineration of nuclear waste
degradation of safety parameters
low fraction of delayed neutrons unfavourable in-core feedbacks
decreased 
reactor period
increased risk of 
prompt criticality 
unstabilty with respect to 
power fluctuations
fuel modification 
control of system is delicate
mitigation of
consequences of safety 
degradation
deterministic safety analysis
characteristics of 
external neutron source 
role of core subcriticality 
for safety improvement
PROBLEM FORMULATION
MOLTEN SALT REACTORS
GOAL
SUBJECT OF 
RESEARCH
PROSPECTIVES
some safety-related problems 
Figure 4. A schematic presentation of the problem formulation, the goals, the subjects of research and the 
approaches applied in the present study. 
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2. Dynamics of subcritical systems. Simulation of 
unprotected transients in advanced MSRs 
 
Résumé – Dans ce Chapitre une analyse comparative du potentiel de sûreté 
déterministe des systèmes à sel fondus innovants avec des cœurs critiques et sous-
critiques est présentée pour des systèmes  rapides et thermiques. Cette analyse inclut 
deux aspects : le choix du niveau initial de sous-criticité et l'étude des transitoires non 
protégés qui ont été simulés à l’aide d’un schéma couplant la cinétique point et la 
thermo-hydraulique. Une étude des systèmes hybrides avec un cœur à sel fondu support 
thorium (coefficient de contre-réaction légèrement positif) et support uranium (coefficient 
de contre-réaction négatif) est effectuée. Cette étude inclut une analyse des réserves de 
réactivité dans ce système, la simulation de transitoires non protégés pour différents 
niveaux de sous-criticité (y compris le niveau de sous-criticité égal à zéro – système 
critique). Cette étude a démontré que la sous-criticité permet d’adoucir les transitoires, 
d’augmenter le délai de grâce, même si le coefficient de contre-réaction est défavorable. 
Les résultats montrent que même un petit niveau de sous-criticité (2-3 dollars) peut 
significativement améliorer la sûreté. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This Chapter is devoted to simulation and analysis of unprotected transients in the 
critical and corresponding subcritical systems (both for ADS and for the DEN-systems). The 
goal of this study is to identify and to illustrate the principal features of the dynamics of 
subcritical systems as well as the role of the core subcriticality. It is worth to stress from the 
very beginning that the study, carried in this Chapter, has the objective not to prove the safety 
of particular MSR concepts, but to demonstrate general tendencies related to subcriticality.  
MSRs with both fast and thermal spectra are considered. The “generalized” cores chosen 
for analysis correspond to fast spectrum version of molten-salt homogeneous cores similar to the 
concepts WISE (Slessarev et al., 2001; Slessarev et al., 2004) and TASSE (Salvatores et al.,
1999) and thermal spectrum molten salt cores with graphite moderator similar to the concepts 
AMSTER (Vergnes et al., 2000; Lecarpentier, 2001), TASSE (Salvatores et al., 1999) or TIER 
(Bowman, 1999). The integral parameters (dimensions, feedback coefficients, etc.) of these 
systems were addressed for transient simulation.  
Several configurations will be studied in this section: critical reactors (it will be denoted 
“CRT”); subcritical cores with an independent neutron source (ADS); subcritical cores with 
coupled fission-spallation processes (DEN); and a combined system, where a part of the external 
neutron source has an independent energy source and another part is coupled with fission 
32 
(denoted in this Chapter as “HYB”). A HYB-system realizes, in fact, a combination of ADS and 
DEN. 
A base model of the reactor is chosen and a simple mathematical model describing 
physical processes in the reactor is introduced in next Sections.  
2.2. Mathematical model for transient simulation 
2.2.1. Reactor model 
Point-kinetic approximation of core neutronics and the simplified “two-point” thermo-
hydraulics in the cooling/energy generating circuit have been chosen as a simplified model 
(Slessarev and Bokov, 2004). The so-called “external cooling” scheme for reactor is assumed. 
The external cooling signifies that the molten salt, being simultaneously a fuel and a heat 
carrier, circulates in the primary loop passing through the heat exchanger where it transmits 
accumulated heat to the secondary loop (see Figure 5). The thermo-hydraulic model of the first 
cooling circuit includes two spatially separated elements: the core and the heat-exchanger 
connected by the tubes of lengths hl and cl correspondingly. Note that these parameters may 
affect reactor dynamics and, especially in the case of the DEN-system, since the DEN core 
supplies an accelerator with energy and the delay of energy delivery depends upon parameters of 
a system (geometry, salt flow rate, etc.).  
Core thermal power, core and heat-exchanger linear dimensions, fuel flow velocities and 
other parameters of the systems under consideration are summarized in Table I. They are 
coordinated in the way to obtain the nominal temperatures at the core and at the heat-
exchanger. It is assumed in the present study that there is no heat loss through the tubes. 
 
Figure 5. The simplified “two-point” thermo-hydraulics in the cooling/energy generating circuit. 
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Table I. Thermo-hydraulic parameters for the fast spectrum and the thermal spectrum systems. 
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2.2.2. Reactor neutronics 
The mathematical model describing physical phenomena in the system consists of the 
coupled system of simplified point kinetic equations with one group of delayed neutrons, 
reactivity feedback effects, thermo-hydraulic equations and corresponding initial conditions.  
The point kinetic equation of a subcritical hybrid system can be written as the ordinary 
differential, time-dependent equation for core power (e.g. Refs. Hetrick, 1971; Ash, 1979; Waltar 
and Reynolds, 1981; Rozon, 1992): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),P t t P t W t S t
t
  	
 = + +
 
(2.1) 
where P is the core power; ( )1 /eff effk k =  is the reactivity of core ( effk is the neutron 
multiplication factor); / effk =  is the prompt neutron generation time (  is the prompt 
neutron lifetime); * is the corrected fraction of delayed neutrons, this correction takes into 
account decay of delayed neutron precursors outside the core (see explanation below); W
describes a contribution of delayed neutron precursors to core power (value proportional the 
concentration of delayed neutrons); 	 is the one-group decay constant of the precursors. 
Equation (2.1) has to be combined with the equation of the evolution of the delayed 
neutron precursors. One of the specific features of a core with circulating fuel is a reduced 
concentration of the delayed neutron precursors inside the core. In mobile fuel systems, delayed 
neutron precursors leave the core and return back partially decayed after passing through heat 
exchangers and reprocessing lines (if the reprocessing is foreseen). Hence, the kinetic equation for 
precursors of delayed neutron ( )W t has to be corrected to take into account this particularity. 
This equation could be expressed in the one-group approximation for delayed neutrons in the 
following way: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) exp ( ) ( ) ( )out out
core
W t D t
W t W t t t P t W t
t V
 	 	  +    =   
, (2.2) 
where  is the total fraction of delayed neutrons appearing due to precursors decay with the 
corresponding decay constant 	 ; out is the time that circulating fuel spends out of core. At the 
nominal ( 0t t ) condition, this leads to reduction of the concentration of delayed neutrons when 
compared with non-circulating fuel as well as to reduction of the delayed neutron fraction:  
0 
 = , (2.3) 
where a correcting factor 0 1  is introduced:  
( )
1
,0
0
,0
1 exp
1
out
core
	

	
         = +    
. (2.4)  
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Note, that here and later the subscript “0” denotes initial or nominal value of the corresponding 
parameter. 
In Eq. (2.1) the term S describes the contribution of the external neutron source. The 
explicit expression for this term depends on the realization of the hybrid system (coupled or 
independent source). Thus, for ADS, one can assume (after normalization to the nominal reactor 
power 0P ):  
( ) ( )
( )
0
ADS r tS t P=

, where  ( ) ( )0 TOCr t r t= + . (2.5) 
In Eq. (2.5) the parameter ( )0 0 ,0 ,01 /eff effr k k=  =  is the nominal subcriticality level,
whereas the term TOC describes the perturbation of the external neutron source due to 
variations of the proton beam current.  
Note, that the use of the subcriticality level, which has positive values in subcritical 
systems instead of the reactivity (negative parameter for subcritical systems), is more convenient 
for analysis. In present work, we will often apply both notations.   
In the DEN-systems the intensity of the external neutron source is proportional to the 
output power ( ) ( ) ( )DEN outS t P t . In our study it is supposed that electric energy is produced 
immediately after the first cooling loop. As it will follow from consequent results and 
corresponding analysis, this simplification leads to some underestimation of the safety potential 
of the DEN-system. Newton cooling model is used for description of the heat exchange with the 
environment. This yields (after normalization to nominal parameters, corresponding subscript ‘0’ 
applied): 
( )
( )
( )0 ,0
( )h kout
h k
T t T
P t P
T T

=

, (2.6) 
where hT is the temperature of salt in the heat-exchanger and kT is the temperature of the heat 
sink (e.g. the temperature of steam in a condenser). 
Hence, one may write the explicit expression for the contribution of the external neutron 
source in the DEN-system in the following way: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )0 ,0
( )h kDEN
h k
T t Tr tS P
T T

=
 
. (2.7) 
In addition to the systems with net independent external source (ADS) and coupled 
source (DEN) one may also imagine intermediate case, i.e. a system where a part of energy 
needed to feed the external neutron source arrives from the power grid and the rest is the energy 
produced by the same installation. It is of interest to analyze the behavior of such ADS-DEN 
hybrid. In this case the reactor power due to the external (spallation) neutrons is expressed as 
( ) ( ) ( )( )0 ,0
( )
( ) 1 h kind ind
h k
T t Tr t
S t P
T T
 
  = +     
(2.8) 
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Here, ind is the fraction of the independent external source. If 1ind = , the source is 
independent of core power (ADS). On the contrary if 0ind = , the system source is coupled 
completely (DEN). An intermediate case corresponds to the combination of ADS and DEN 
denoted above as HYB.  
Finally, the time-dependent total reactivity  is the sum of the initial subcriticality level 
[see also Eq. (2.5)], the reactivity perturbations TOP , and reactivity changes due to thermal 
feedback effects feedback , i.e.  
0 TOP( ) ( ) ( )feedbackt r t t  = + + . (2.9) 
To describe explicitly the in-core feedbacks as well as dependence of the external neutron 
source for the DEN-system [Eq. (2.7)], a model of heat transfer in the reactor is necessary. 
Below we introduce separately two slightly different models for heat transfer and for thermal 
feedbacks (for fast-spectrum and thermal-spectrum configuration), which will be utilized for 
transient simulations.  
2.2.3. Thermo-hydraulics and feedbacks. Fast spectrum system 
In fast spectrum systems under consideration the reactivity variation due to thermal 
feedbacks includes only the Doppler-effect (due to great core dimensions, and in the absence of 
any internal core structure other feedback effects are negligible), which is equal to 
0
0
0
0
( )
( ) ( ) ln
T
Doppler D
feedback D
T
K T TT dT K T
T T

   = =     . (2.10) 
where DK is the Doppler constant, T is the fuel temperature and 0T is the fuel temperature at 
nominal conditions. 
The time-dependent core temperature T and the heat-exchanger temperature hT are 
described by the following system of thermo-hydraulic equations: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( );s sp c h h c
core
T t D t
c M T t T t t P t
t V
 
    +   = !   " #
(2.11) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
0
,0
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ,h ks s hp h h c h
h h k
T t TT t D t
c M T t T t t P
t V T T
 
     +   =  !    " #
(2.12) 
where ( )spc is the fuel specific heat capacity; 
( )s
c coreM V=  and 
( )s
h hM V=  are the fuel masses in 
the core and in the heat-exchanger correspondingly; coreV and hV are volumes of salt in the core 
and in the heat-exchanger,  is the density of salt; c h  and h c  are the time intervals, 
required the fuel to be delivered from one device (c – “core” or h – “heat exchanger”) to 
another. In this study is assumed that these tubes have equal dimensions (i.e. lengths and cross-
sections), hence one may take that h c c h tube   = $ .
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Note, that the delays ( )c t , ( )h t as well as the parameter ( )out t [see Eq.(2.2)] can be 
determined from the following implicit equations:  
( )
( ) 0
x
t
x
t t
V D t dt

 = , where ' ', ' ', ' 'x core out tube= , (2.13) 
where tubeV is the volume of salt in a tube and 2out h tubeV V V= + is the volume of salt out of core. 
Note, that in our study we assume that the fuel flow ( )D t is a definite function of time.  
The initial conditions for Eqs. (2.1) - (2.13) include: the nominal thermal power 0P ; the 
nominal temperature of the core 0T ; the nominal subcriticality level 0r ; the nominal fuel flow 
0D ; the effective fraction of delayed neutrons, 0 
 = with the correcting factor 0 defined by 
Eq. (2.4) where ( ),0 0/ ' ', ' ', ' 'x xV D x core out tube = = ; the initial concentration of precursors of 
delayed neutrons 
0 0
0
PW 
	
=

; (2.14) 
the steady-state temperature of the heat-exchanger  
0
,0 ,0 ( )
0
h c s
p
PT T
c D
= 

. (2.15) 
Other parameters may be evaluated from technical parameters of the system: device 
dimensions, fuel velocity distributions etc., presented in Table I, taking into account the 
equation of the mass conservation for the liquid fuel: 
,0 ,0 ,0
0
core c h h tube tube
c h tube
V v V v V v
D
L L l
= = = , (2.16) 
where ,0cv , ,0hv , ,0tubev are nominal velocities of salt in the core, in the heat-exchanger, and in the 
tubes correspondingly; and cL , hL and tubel are linear dimensions of these components.  
2.2.4. Thermo-hydraulics and feedbacks. Thermal-spectrum system 
In comparison with the fast reactor concept, the thermal spectrum system contains 
significant masses of graphite within the core region which absorbs a part of released heat and 
slows down the transients. All equations concerning power, precursors of delayed neutrons as 
well as the equation of mass conservation remain valid.  
For the thermal-spectrum system the above thermo-hydraulic equations can be rewritten 
in the following way: 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ;s sp c h c sg g
core
T t D t
c M T t T t t P t H T t T t
t V

      +   =   !     " #
( ) ( ) [ ]
[ ]
( )
0
0
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ;
( )
h ks s h
p h h h
h h k
T t TT t D t
c M T t T t t P
t V T t T

     +   = !    " #
(2.17) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,gg gp sg g
T t
c M H T t T t
t
  =  
where sgH is the heat transfer coefficient between the salt and the graphite; 
( )gM and ( )gpc are 
the mass and the specific heat capacity of the graphite respectively (see also Table I).  
The total thermal feedback effect in this case is a sum of the Doppler-effect Dopplerfeedback as 
well as the salt saltfeedback and graphite 
graphite
feedback thermal expansion effects (Lecarpentier, 2001):  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Doppler salt graphitefeedback feedback feedback feedbackt t t t    =  + + . (2.18) 
In the system with thermal spectrum, the reactivity variation due to the Doppler-effect 
can be evaluated in accordance with the following expression:  
 ( )
0
0 0 0( ) ( ) 2 ( )
T
Doppler
feedback D D
T
dT
T K T K T T T
T
 = =   . (2.19) 
The thermal expansion feedback for the molten salt and the graphite is supposed to be 
linear with the coefficients expansion and graphite correspondingly in accordance with Ref. 
(Lecarpentier, 2001): 
( )0( ) ( )saltfeedback expansiont T t T  =  , ( ),0( ) ( )graphitefeedback g graphite g gT T t T  =  . (2.20) 
In this subsection we suppose that there is no heat release in graphite, hence the initial 
condition for the graphite temperature is ,0 0gT T= .
2.3. Tool of transient simulation  
As we can see from Eqs. (2.1)-(2.20), the dynamics of the reactors is described by a 
coupled system of nonlinear Delayed-argument Differential Equations (DDE). This system of 
DDE may be resolved numerically. The Runge-Kutta  method (Korn and Korn, 1967) slightly 
modified to take into account particularities of DDE was applied as the numerical 
implementation. As some of above kinetic differential equations are so-called stiff differential 
equation (because of the small parameter  being the prompt neutron generation time) a special 
attention was paid to guarantee and to verify stability of the numerical scheme.  
A special computational code was created for transient simulation. For this Fortran-90 
programming language was utilized. Finally, the numerical scheme and the code were verified, 
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utilizing exact (analytical) solutions in some idealized problem statements, admitting analytical 
solutions. 
 
2.4. Choice of the subcriticality level  
The choice of initial subcriticality level 0r is very important with respect to economics as 
well as to the technological feasibility of a system: the smaller subcriticality the better economics 
of a hybrid system and feasibility of the external neutron source (accelerator + target). There 
are two roles of core subcriticality to be considered in this Chapter:  
(i) the safety improvement keeping in mind the deterministic safety as an ultimate goal;  
(ii) the “tight” reactor neutronics enhancement if it is required.  
These two cases will be analyzed below. 
2.4.1. The subcriticality level aiming to achieve the deterministic safety 
It is evident that the level of subcriticality has a significant influence on transients. As it 
will be shown below, in the majority of unprotected transients, subcriticality reduces both power 
oscillations and the increase of core temperatures. In addition, this favorable effect expands the 
grace time depending on feedback effects and on anticipated reactivity insertions. If unprotected 
transients do not menace core integrity during significant time, then one can use the term 
“temporarily limited” deterministic safety. With this term, subcriticality can be considered as an 
important factor to achieve the temporarily limited deterministic safety. If the total feedback 
reactivity effect is positive, cores eventually leave the domain of acceptable parameters 
(temperatures, power, pressures, etc.) earlier or later, depending on the initial subcriticality 
level. In such cases, the added subcriticality is only able to delay the core disintegration. On the 
other hand, a negative reactivity feedback effect (even a small one) allows expanding the grace 
time considerably if subcriticality is applied. Moreover, as it will be shown later, DEN has a 
potential to keep its core inside of the domain of acceptable parameters asymptotically achieving 
the so-called “time unlimited deterministic safety level”. 
If all reactivity related transients were sufficiently slow, a significant improvement of the 
safety potential would be expected in terms of the extended grace time. The subcriticality would 
have such a potential if the following basic choice of the subcriticality level is applied: the total 
sum of absolute values of all independent in-core reactivity effects ( tot ) including their 
uncertainties plus the maximum reactivity insertions maxTOP does not exceed the nominal level of 
subcriticality ( )0 ,0 ,01 /eff effr k k=  , i.e.  
max
0 TOPtotr  > + . (2.21) 
Such a choice does not guarantee unlimited deterministic safety of the core. However, it 
defines the conditions when transients are slow. The examples of such choices for different 
molten salt cores under consideration are presented in Tables II-IV. They include the traditional 
list of phenomena leading to reactivity variation (corrected to take into account particularities of 
MSRs): 
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 Doppler reactivity feedback effects;  
 Temperature effects of all core components;  
 Neptunium (Np) or/and Protactinium (Pa) effects;  
 Fuel mass variations in cores in the case when fuel circulation fails or on-line fuel 
reprocessing results in a reactivity insertion. 
 Other reactivity effects play a less important role in the case of MSR. 
2.4.2. Unprotected transients 
When the preliminary choice of the subcriticality level is done, the study of the safety 
potential requires simulation of anticipated unprotected transients caused by different realistic 
transient initiators, such as failures of cooling systems, reactivity insertion, etc. as well as their 
combinations. 
Among these transients (see Tables II-IV), the Unprotected Transient Over Power 
(UTOP) and/or the Unprotected Transient Over Current (UTOC) are the most dangerous. The 
reasons of such potential events are multiple reactivity and/or beam current “reserves” 
(necessary for the normal operation) which could be released as unexpected control rod actions 
or/and proton beam current intensity variations in the case of subcritical systems. Fortunately, 
at the nominal regime, many of these reserves become exhausted and it minimizes the value of 
inserted reactivity. Besides, there are uncertainties related to the spallation neutron production 
(total neutron yield, energy spectra and angular distribution of neutrons, contribution of 
secondary reactions, etc.) and these uncertainties also have to be taken into account with 
respect to the peculiarities of a given system. 
The control of subcritical systems has the following peculiarity – these systems can use 
either special mechanical rods which change reactivity, or the proton current variation 
mechanisms. In both cases, different failures could provoke some transients. The presence of 
control rods requires the subcriticality level correction, while the use of proton current correction 
does not cause the reactivity change and the subcriticality level 0r is allowed to be smaller.  
The study has to include other potentially dangerous events such as Unprotected Lost Of 
Flow (ULOF), Unprotected Lost Of Heat Sink (ULOHS), Unprotected core Over-Cooling 
(UOVC) or core overheating (if positive feedback effects are dominating), Unprotected Gain of 
Flow (UGOF), in-core fuel mass oscillations, the Np/Pa reactivity effects, etc. Moreover, non-
nominal regimes have to be also examined. However, this requires to know the detailed design of 
the installation (it is worth to remind that a “generalized” model systems are considered in this 
Chapter) and therefore we will restrict our study to the most important events. Thus, for 
example, reactivity transients caused by the Np/Pa effects as well as core fuel mass fluctuations 
are very slow and have not been analyzed, supposing that these phenomena may be 
compensated by continuous adjustment of the fuel content. 
Following the logic of the deterministic safety approach, during our simulations we 
looked for the most dangerous conditions for transients. For example, different characteristic 
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times for the pumps halt (this event leads to ULOF transient) in order to find the most 
menacing situation. These “most pessimistic” conditions will be utilized below for analysis. 
Finally, the following recommendation of Lecarpentier (2001) the salt boiling 
temperature of 1300°C was chosen as the disruption criterion for the molten salt systems, i.e. 
† 1300°CT = is assumed to be the maximal limit of acceptable core temperature. The lower 
limit of acceptable parameters is the temperature of fuel solidification of 450°C. 
2.4.3. Subcriticality caused by necessity of the tight neutronics enhancement 
In this situation, a large subcriticality plays an important role in improving of the 
neutron balance. For example, in the Th-fuelled core of the WISE concept (Slessarev et al.,
2001, Slessarev et al., 2004), one is obliged to keep 0r as high as 20 25÷ . Here again the safety 
can be improved much more easily due to the larger margin to the core criticality.  
 
2.5. Reference cores for transient simulation 
A model core with a fast-spectrum (in two configurations) and two thermal-spectrum 
cores with graphite moderator were utilized for transient simulations. The fast spectrum core 
corresponds, in fact, to a “generalized” fast-spectrum option of the WISE-concept core 
(Slessarev et al., 2001, Slessarev et al., 2004), whereas thermal spectrum models correspond to 
the thermal-spectrum options of the WISE-concept and to the “TRU-incinerator with support-
uranium” and “self-generator with support-thorium” core options of the AMSTER concept 
(Vergnes et al., 2000; Lecarpentier, 2001). 
2.5.1. Fast-spectrum core 
The parameters of systems under consideration are given in Table I. Configurations “1” 
and “2” correspond to two different cases: with a low condenser temperature ( 20kT = °C) and 
an elevated ( 400kT = °C) temperature to prevent fuel from solidification. 
The total temperature feedback effect in the core has a negative value and, hence, core 
cooling inserts the dangerous positive reactivity starting with the nominal regime (see Table II). 
The Doppler coefficient of reactivity DK , Np/Pa reactivity effects and the fraction of delayed 
neutrons  (see Table V for detail) have been evaluated in accordance with Refs. (Slessarev and 
Tchistiakov, 1997; Adamov, Orlov et al., 1997). Then, following the recommendations of Section 
2.4.1, the subcriticality levels both for ADS and DEN (Table II) has to be approximately chosen: 
0 2.1r = if the reactivity reserves are preserved on control rods; 0 1.4r = (or 0.995effk = ) if 
all reactivity reserves are replaced by the proton current variation TOP/TOC ( (0.75 1)÷ .
Therefore, the subcriticality value 0 2r = has been chosen for analysis of unprotected 
transients. 
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2.5.2. Thermal-spectrum cores 
2.5.2.1. AMSTER-WISE-type option, Th-fuel 
In this case the total temperature effect in the core has a positive value and, hence, core 
heating inserts a positive reactivity (see Table V). The Doppler constant of reactivity DK ,
Np/Pa reactivity effects, and the fraction of delayed neutrons  have been evaluated in 
accordance with Refs. (Slessarev et al., 1999; Lecarpentier, 2001). Then, following the 
recommendations of Section 2.4.1, the subcriticality level both for ADS and DEN (see Table III) 
is chosen as follows: 0 4.8r = if all reactivity reserves on control rods are foreseen; 0 3.8r ( if 
all reactivity reserves are replaced by the proton current variation. The mean value of the 
subcriticality level (to be considered as pessimistic) 0 4r = has been chosen for analysis of the 
TOP/TOC transients. The range of the postulated maximum reactivity insertion has been 
chosen to be TOP/TOC  ( .
2.5.2.2. AMSTER-WISE-type option, U+TRU-fuel 
In this case the total temperature reactivity effect of the core is negative (see  
Table V). The Doppler coefficient of reactivity DK , the Np reactivity effects and the 
fraction of delayed neutrons  (see Table V) have been evaluated in accordance with Refs. 
(Slessarev et al., 1999; Lecarpentier, 2001). Then, in accordance with the recommendations of 
Section 2.4.1, the subcriticality level for both ADS and DEN (see Table IV) have been chosen in 
the following way: 0 3.4r ( if all reactivity reserves are preserved on control rods; 0 2.4r ( if 
the proton current variation is foreseen. The subcriticality value: 0 3r = has been chosen for 
analysis of the TOP/TOC transients, while the range of the postulated maximum reactivity 
insertion is TOP/TOC  ( .
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Table II. In-core reactivity effects and reactivity reserves in the fast spectrum system (core nominal 
average temperature: 605°C; the low temperature limit is 450°C). 
In-core reactivity effects/Reserve at nominal 
conditions 
 (pcm) TOP/TOC (pcm) 
Homogeneous core cooling ( 878K 723 K )
– Doppler-effect  
100a 0
Fuel mass fluctuations ±150 150 
Fuel stop ( / 2( ) 200 0 
Np/Pa effects (reduced flux) 10/150 0 
Uncertainties un 50 —
Uncertainties related to spallation sp — 100 
Operational reserve — 50 
Total total  = ) 510/650  (1.25/1.6 1.4 ( )
300 
( 0.75( )
a Empty at nominal regime 
 
Table III. In-core reactivity effects and reactivity reserves in the Th-fuelled thermal spectrum system (core 
nominal average temperature is 630°C; lower and upper limits for the fuel temperature are 450°C and 
1300°C correspondingly). 
In-core reactivity effects/Reserve at nominal 
conditions 
 (pcm) TOP/TOC (pcm) 
Homogeneous core heating ( 903K 1573K )
Doppler-effect -1350a —
fuel expansion 1306a —
graphite 804a —
Total temperature effect of core cooling 760a 0
Fuel mass fluctuations ±200 200 
Fuel stop ( / 2( ) 175 0 
Pa effect (reduced flux) 50 0 
Uncertainties un 150 —
Uncertainties related to spallation sp — 100 
Operational reserve — 50 
Total total  = ) 1335  ( 3.8( ) 350  ( 1( )
a Empty at nominal regime 
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Table IV. In-core reactivity effects and reactivity margins in the U+TRU-fuelled thermal spectrum system 
(core nominal average temperature is 630°C; lower and upper limits for the fuel temperature are 450°C 
and 1300°C correspondingly). 
In-core reactivity effects/Reserve at nominal 
conditions 
 (pcm) TOP/TOC (pcm) 
Homogeneous core cooling ( 903K 723K )
Doppler-effect 556a —
fuel expansion -261a —
graphite 216a —
Total temperature effect of core cooling 511a 0
Fuel mass fluctuations ±250 250 
Fuel stop ( / 2( ) 225 0 
Np effect (reduced flux) 50 0 
Uncertainties un 50 —
Uncertainties related to spallation sp — 100 
Operational reserve — 50 
Total total  = ) 1086 ( 2.4  ) 400 ( 1  )
a Empty at nominal regime 
 
Table V. Integral parameters characterizing the safety physics of the molten salt cores (from Refs.: 
Slessarev and Tchistiakov, 1997; Adamov, Orlov et al., 1997; Slessarev et al., 1999; Lecarpentier, 2001). 
Spectrum Fast Thermal 
Configuration “1” “2” Th fuel U+TRU fuel 
Doppler coefficient DK -5×10
-3 -5×10-3 -7×10-4 -8.8×10-4 
Salt expansion coefficient expansion ,°C-1 — — 1.95×10-5 1.45×10-5 
Graphite expansion coefficient graphite ,°C-1 — — 1.2×10-5 -1.2×10-5 
Delayed neutron fraction  4×10-3 4×10-3 3.5×10-3 4.46×10-3 
Precursors decay constant 	 , s-1 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Prompt neutron generation time  , s 1×10-6 1×10-6 4×10-4 4×10-4 
Subcriticality level 0r 8×10
-3 8×10-3 1.4×10-2 1.35×10-2 
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2.6. Unprotected transients in the fast-spectrum systems 
2.6.1. Unprotected Transients Over Power/Transients Over proton Current  
Insertion of the reserve of reactivity, foreseen for the compensation of multiple reactivity 
effects, is the reason of transients with a considerable and rapid increase of core power (UTOP). 
These unprotected transients could be finally terminated without reactor damage if there are 
sufficient prompt negative feedback effects due to, for example, core heating. For UTOP/UTOC 
studies, the corresponding transients were simulated by the linear insertion of the total reserve 
of reactivity/current in the period of 1 s (see Figure 6). In Figure 6 (on the right), upper curves 
correspond to the core outlet temperatures, while the lower ones correspond to the core inlet 
temperatures. The same notation will be used in all figures (Figure 6 to Figure 25).  
In critical systems (CRT) with unprotected TOP, there is a narrow and significant power 
jump with the maximum amplitude higher by factor of 30 in the magnitude compared with the 
nominal power followed, by a mellow power oscillations for 300 s after the reactivity insertion. 
Finally, an asymptotic power at the end of the transient is achieved if the total feedback 
temperature effect is negative. The behaviour of the core temperature is similar but with wider 
oscillations. The maximum core temperature (~2200°C) exceeds the upper temperature limit 
( † 1300°CT = ) considerably. The asymptotic core temperature depends directly upon the 
Doppler-effect value and this temperature is expected to be too high (~1800°C) for the core. It 
means that this accident will lead to core disruption and it is not acceptable in terms of 
deterministic safety criteria. Moreover, strictly speaking, the curves, after the salt temperature 
exceeds 1300°C, have no physical meaning. 
TOP-behavior of the ADS is much smoother: both the asymptotic power and the core 
temperature are weakly dependent on feedback effects and are defined by the reactivity jump 
value. For this particular case, the maximum power jump amplitude does not exceed the factor 
of 2 of the nominal power without power oscillations. The asymptotic power is about 1.5 of the 
nominal power, while the maximum core temperature does not exceed 1000°C. All these 
parameters do not challenge core integrity and can be considered as acceptable. 
DEN behavior takes an intermediate position between critical reactors and ADS: similar 
to ADS, there is a small power jump. Neither power nor temperature oscillations are observed. 
DEN eliminates short but dangerous fluctuations of power and of the core temperature in the 
beginning of transients. Meanwhile, DEN works in a “critical mode”. As a result both the 
asymptotic power and the core temperature follow the asymptotic parameters of the 
corresponding critical core: their values are defined also by the Doppler feedback effect. The 
difference is evident: DEN transients slow down due to the delay of spallation neutrons. 
However, later during the transient, asymptotic parameters become dangerous as in the case of 
critical reactors. 
Hence, one can conclude that unprotected TOP behavior is the most favorable for ADS,
less favorable for DEN (non-acceptable after 300 s of the transient) and unacceptable for this 
critical reactor. 
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Figure 6. Unprotected TOP ( TOP  = in the period of 1 s) transient in fast-spectrum systems (Th-
fuelled).  
The direct inter-comparison between UTOP and UTOC for subcritical core systems (see 
Figure 7) outlines advantages of hybrids controlled by proton current variation. It also confirms 
that transients of UTOC-type are less dangerous compared with UTOP at the same 
subcriticality level. For example, it leads to a supplementary core temperature reduction in 
DEN: about 200°C in 10 minutes after the UTOC has started. 
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Figure 7. Inter-comparison of unprotected TOP/TOC transient ( TOP/TOC  = in the period of 1 s; Th-
fuelled; fast-spectrum systems; 0r has the constant value).  
Similarly as in the case of UTOP, UTOC transients in DEN-systems are expected to be 
slower compared with critical reactors (case of UTOP). However, the asymptotic values of power 
for both critical system and DEN will remain similar. 
ADS demonstrate the safer behavior regarding TOC transients. As for DEN, the interval 
of the acceptable response is sufficiently large, up to 500 s after the reactivity insertion. Despite 
the significant reduction of the transient temperatures and the increase of the grace time for 
DEN, the deterministic safety conditions are fulfilled only for ADS. 
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2.6.2. Unprotected Loss Of fuel Flow  
Loss Of fuel Flow (ULOF) accidents were simulated by significant flow reduction from 
the nominal value down to 10% of nominal value in the period of 10 s supposing that remaining 
flow can be continuously supported later on due to the fuel natural circulation (see Figure 8). 
The following effects take place because of fuel flow slowing down:  
(i) the increase of delayed neutron fraction in the core and, hence, the insertion of reactivity;  
(ii) core overheating followed by consequent feedback effects. 
Within the models considered in this chapter, one obtains the following results.  
In critical reactor there are important oscillations of power (factor of 1.4 in the power 
amplitude during the first 30 seconds) and of fuel temperature (a rise up to 1050°C). There is 
the danger that the heat-exchanger will become overcooled for both low (20°C) and elevated 
(350°C) “heat sink temperatures” Tk. However, this threat can be avoided by further elevation 
of heat sink temperature, say, up to 400°C. 
ADS itself (without beam halt) is unable  to reduce its power sufficiently (feedback 
effects do not play such important role as it does in critical reactors) and there is an 
“asymptotical” growth of the core temperature which can exceed finally (in approximately 10 
minutes) the temperature limit. 
The behavior of power and temperatures is more favorable in the case of DEN. As one 
could expect, due to the reduction of accelerator power, core power is significantly reduced by 
40 % of the nominal level. Finally, the increase of core temperature up to 900°C still keeps the 
system away from the limiting conditions. 
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Figure 8. Unprotected LOF (pump power fall of 90 % in the period of 10 s) transient in the fast spectrum 
system (configuration 1).  
2.6.3. Unprotected Gain Of fuel Flow transients 
Overcooling of cores can also provoke transients followed by significant power and 
temperature changes. The corresponding case can be simulated by the rapid increase of the flow 
if the pump power increases suddenly. Figure 9 presents Unprotected Gain Of fuel Flow 
(UGOF) transients when the fuel flow rate is doubled linearly in the period of 30 s. 
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During UGOF critical reactors exhibit important oscillations of power while subcritical 
system transients (both ADS and DEN) are negligible when compared to the critical ones. In 
addition, temperature transients will not produce serious troubles for any systems. With respect 
to UGOF, the mobile fuel system seems to have the unlimited grace time. 
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Figure 9. Unprotected GOF (pump power jump by 100 % in the period of 30 s) transient in the fast 
spectrum system (configuration 1).  
2.6.4. Unprotected Loss Of Heat Sink transients 
These transients have been simulated by the “linear” (in the period of 3 s) stop of the 
heat transfer through the heat-exchanger causing the rapid core overheat (see Figure 10). As 
was mentioned earlier in this work, feedbacks of critical reactor reduce core power rapidly, while 
the core temperature, after a negligible growth, returns back close to the nominal level in about 
500 s. 
ADS is not able to reduce sufficiently its power (feedback effects are not effective for 
ADS). This leads to high temperatures: one observes the continuous increase of the core 
temperature and, after 5 minutes, it exceeds the limit of the viability. 
Unlike ADS, DEN behaviour is again more favourable compared with others due to the 
prompt reduction of accelerator power thanks to the coupling and, hence, of total power which 
approaches to about 10 % of its nominal value. Core and heat-exchanger temperatures remain 
around the nominal core temperature level. 
Hence, DEN exhibits the most favorable and deterministically safe behavior (critical 
system behavior is also acceptable), however ADS transients are dangerous. 
2.6.5. Combination of unprotected accidents: ULOF followed by UTOP/TOC 
The deterministic safety study has to include the analysis of all possible combinations of 
unprotected accidents. Let us consider the most severe of them in the following new conditions: 
we assume the elevated temperature (up to 400°C) of the heat sink in order to avoid fuel 
solidification. 
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Figure 10. ULOHS transient (heat sink falls by 90 % in the period of 3 s) in the fast spectrum system 
(configuration 1). 
One of the most severe combinations of transients could be realized according to the 
following scenario: ULOF started at 1t = s leading to a reactivity insertion due to the fuel 
slowing down (see Figure 11). This reactivity insertion reaches its maximum at 30 s after ULOF 
started. At this time, UTOP (for critical reactor) or corresponding UTOC (for subcritical 
systems) leads to the insertion of the maximum reactivity of 0.75 . Corresponding transient 
curves are presented in the Figure 11. 
Analysis shows that the power of the critical reactor, manifesting significant oscillations, 
exceeds the nominal power by a factor of 10, while its core temperature exceeds the limiting 
value of 1300°C even at the beginning of UTOP. Asymptotic temperatures also exceed the 
limiting temperature. 
ADS has much smoother power behavior, however, its core temperature exceeds the 
limiting value in about 100 s after the beginning of ULOF. On the other hand, DEN will not 
exceed the temperature limit at least during the first 10 minutes of this transient as shown in 
the same Figure 11. 
2.6.6. Combinations of unprotected accidents: UGOF followed by ULOF and, 
later on, by UTOP/UTOC 
Three sequential accident initiators are simulating the following possible events: at 
1t = s, the pumps are doubling linearly their power in the period of 10 s and later, because of 
their failure, the fuel flow decreases significantly (down to 10%) initiating a ULOF. At the most 
dangerous time ( 200t ( s) of ULOF it is followed by UTOP/UTOC. The corresponding curves 
of power and temperatures are presented in Figure 12. 
Conclusions are very similar to the previous cases: DEN demonstrates the best safety 
behavior for at least the first 10 min. 
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Figure 11. Combined ULOF (pump power falls: by 90 % in the period of 10 s starting at 1t = s) with 
UTOP/UTOC in the fast spectrum system (configuration 2). Reactivity TOP/TOC 0.75  = is inserted in 
the period of 1 s at 30t = s.  
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Figure 12. Combined unprotected transient in the fast spectrum system (configuration 2): GOF (salt flow 
increases from 100 % to 200 % in the period of 10 s) followed by LOF (pump power falls from 100 % to 
10 % in the period of 10 s at 140t = s) and finally TOP/TOC occurs with TOP/TOC 0.75  = for 1 s at 
200t = s.  
2.6.7. Combinations of unprotected accidents. ULOHS followed by ULOF and, 
later on, by UTOP/UTOC 
This paragraph presents the simulation of the following aggravated events: ULOHS calls 
the temperature increase with its maximum in the vicinity of 100t = s (see Figure 10); at this 
moment, ULOF starts with maximum reactivity insertion around 125t = s (see Figure 8) and, 
right at this moment, UTOP/UTOC stars. 
Figure 13 shows that the critical reactor is unable to resist the temperature jump which 
is far above of the limiting value †T . In addition, the core power exhibits large oscillations. 
ADS, retaining a high level of the core power, has an unacceptable temperature growth and 
within 200 s it overcomes the limiting temperature of 1300°C. DEN is able to retain its suitable 
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power and temperature regimes during longer time (at least, more than 10 minutes from the 
moment when transients have been initiated).  
Similar situations have been verified with different sequences of the “most severe” 
UTOC, ULOF, ULOHS events: unfavorable UTOC+ULOF (see Figure 14) and UTOC+ 
ULOF+ULOHS (see Figure 15). 
These studies indicate that DEN “behaves” in a more acceptable manner than its 
competitors: the effect of smoothing the thermo-hydraulic transients (the benefit of the fission-
spallation coupling) leads to the reduction of the maximum temperature in the core. 
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Figure 13. Combined unprotected transient in the fast-spectrum system (configuration 2): LOHS (heat 
sink fall: by 90 % in the period of 3 s) followed by LOF (pump power fall from 100 % to 10 % in the 
period of 10 s) at 100t = s and finally TOP/TOC occurs with TOP/TOC 0.75  = in the period of 1 s at 
125t = s. 
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Figure 14. Combined unprotected transient in the fast spectrum-system (configuration 2): TOC 
( TOP/TOC 0.75  = is inserted in the period of 1 s) followed by LOF (pump power fall from 100 % down 
to 10 % in the period of 10 s) at 50t = s. 
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Figure 15. Combined unprotected transient in the fast-spectrum system (configuration 2): TOC 
( TOC 0.75  = is inserted in the period of 1 s) followed by LOF (pump power falls from 100 % down to 
10 % in the period of 10 s) at 50t = s and LOHS (heat sink fall: 90 % in the period of 3 s) at 100t = s.  
2.7. Unprotected transients in the thermal-spectrum 
thorium-feed systems 
Unlike for the fast-spectrum systems, the safety features of some designs of conventional 
thermal molten salt system with graphite moderators (both Th and U fuelled) are (Lecarpentier, 
2001) insufficient to achieve the deterministic level. At least, as it will be shown hereafter, the 
deterministic safety could be attained only temporarily. The following analysis will supply us 
with the information about the most dangerous anticipated unprotected events. 
As it was indicated, significant positive feedback effects require some prudence with 
respect to the choice of the subcriticality margin. Hereafter, the subcriticality level of about 
0 4r = has been chosen for transient studies (see Table IV).  
2.7.1. Unprotected TOP/TOC transients 
Similarly as for fast spectrum systems, ADS demonstrates the safest behavior despite 
insertion of a considerable proton current reserve (see Figure 16 for details). 
Critical reactor (CRT) power has an unlimited prompt jump and the core temperature 
exceeds the limit of an acceptable temperature in less than a few seconds (when 1 in the 
period of 1 s is inserted) despite the thermal inertia effect related to a significant thermal 
capacity of graphite. Hence, this concept is fully unacceptable with respect to UTOP. DEN, due 
to an important delay of spallation neutrons, resists to UTOC for much longer time (more than 
one hour). However, later during the transient, the core boiling becomes possible. Hybrid of 
ADS and DEN (with 50%ind = ) exhibits even better resistance to this type of transient. 
In conclusion, all systems, except CRT, have a significant (more than 1 hour) grace time 
with respect to UTOP/UTOC as clearly seen from Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. UTOP/UTOC transients in the thermal (Th-fuelled) spectrum systems. 
2.7.2. Unprotected LOF transients 
The reactivity insertion caused by the increase of the delayed neutron fraction, combined 
with the positive feedback effect, leads to a rapid power jump for the critical system (Figure 17). 
In about 100 s (when the fuel flow falls from 100% down to 10% in the period of 10 s), the core 
temperature exceeds its limit. On the contrary, power behavior of all subcritical core systems is 
much smoother (e.g. the core temperature increases gradually by 200°C/hour in DEN). The best 
(the most favorable) behavior is inherent to DEN, while it is more dangerous – for ADS due to 
somewhat higher power level. 
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Figure 17. ULOF transients in the thermal-spectrum (Th-fuelled) systems. 
It seems that positive feedback-effects do not allow realization of the deterministic safety 
behavior during infinite time. Nevertheless, subcritical core systems have much longer grace 
times (at least, tens of minutes). 
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2.7.3. Unprotected LOHS transients 
The character of curves after unprotected loss of heat sink is similar to that of ULOF: 
the behavior of DEN is more preferable regarding others, because this tranient almost 
terminates the accelerator feeding. In the case of the critical reactor the core temperature 
exceeds the temperature limit already after approximately 400 s (after when ULOHS has 
started) and the ADS temperature – only after 65 minutes, while the DEN core temperature 
remains acceptable all the time (see Figure 18).  
2.7.4. Unprotected GOF transients 
In this case our calculations demonstrated that the temperature characteristics of all 
systems will not exceed the corresponding limits and, therefore, this transient is acceptable for 
all systems. 
2.7.5. Summary for the thermal-spectrum Th-fuelled system 
With respect to all unprotected anticipated transients discussed above, unfavorable 
positive feedback effects are the most important reason for the degradation of the safety features 
of both critical and subcritical thermal-spectrum Th-fuelled systems. Certainly, inherent 
properties of subcritical core systems slow-down discussed unprotected transients.  
DEN or combined DEN+ADS hybrids demonstrated the potential of a self-protection 
allowing a comfortable grace time without the necessity of any manual intervention.  
It can be concluded that these unfavorable feedback effects would not lead to the 
deterministic safety asymptotically even by choosing some low subcriticality level. It is also clear 
that an increase of subcriticality margin is favorable with respect to the UTOC transients; 
however, this can be unfavorable regarding the ULOF or ULOHS transients. 
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Figure 18. ULOHS transients in the thermal (Th-fuelled) spectrum systems. 
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2.7.6. Unprotected transients in the systems with large margin of subcriticality 
(“tight” neutronics enhancement) 
According to the deterministic route of safety analysis (see Section 2.3.1), let us try to 
increase the subcriticality level in order to enhance the safety potential. As an extreme case one 
can choose 0 20r = as the largest value that can be realistic if the Th-fuelled system would be 
used in the prospective NP (Slessarev et al., 2001) because of its “tight” neutronics. The 
corresponding transients can be compared directly with those which have been obtained for the 
lower subcriticality level: 0 4r = .
Unprotected TOC transients (with the same reserve inserted) are rather flat both for 
power and temperatures despite the significant positive feedback effects (see Figure 19). ADS 
behavior is preferable, while DEN temperatures are continuously (although very slowly) 
increasing. Within one hour after TOC started, they remain far away from the temperature 
limit. This is much better compared with excursion-type transients in a critical reactor.  
As for the ULOF transients, the reactivity insertion due to the fuel flow reduction does 
not play an important role for subcritical systems. Now, the ADS behavior is less preferable 
taking into account the increase of core temperature due to positive temperature feedbacks (see 
Figure 20). At the same time, a positive feedback effect is not able to overcome the large initial 
subcriticality level and the temperature increases slowly: in one hour after the ULOF started, 
the core temperature does not exceed 900°C. The DEN-system decreases the spallation neutron 
intensity by reduction of the accelerator power. As a result both the core power and 
temperatures are very stable. 
ULOHS behavior of the ADS is more threatening (however, to much smaller extent when 
compared with critical reactors) than the DEN behavior due to similar reasons: the power 
increases (although slowly) this leading to a continuous temperature increase followed by the 
insertion of supplementary reactivity (see Figure 21).  
 
One concludes that subcritical systems are safe even in the case of positive feedbacks if 
the level of subcriticality is sufficiently large. 
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Figure 19. UTOC transients in the thermal spectrum (Th-fuelled) systems with a large subcriticality level 
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Figure 20. ULOF transients in the thermal spectrum (Th-fuelled) systems with large subcriticality level. 
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Figure 21. ULOHS transients in the thermal spectrum (Th-fuelled) systems with a large subcriticality 
level. 
2.8. Unprotected transients in the thermal-spectrum 
uranium- and transuranics-fuelled systems 
Analysis of these systems is interesting because feedback effects are much more favorable 
compared with the Th-fuelled option, analyzed in the previous Section. Their characteristics 
allow choosing the “standard” recommendation (see Section 2.3.1) for the subcriticality level, 
namely: 0 2.4r = .
2.8.1. Unprotected TOP/TOC transients 
Figure 22 represents the behavior of the core power and core temperatures in the all 
systems with the maximal reactivity margin insertions. Note, that in the present Section the 
temperatures of both fuel and graphite are presented in figures. 
In critical systems, a significant Doppler-effect leads to a large core power and 
temperatures despite the large thermal capacity of the core (due to the presence of graphite). 
The maximal temperature of fuel is achieved quickly (in a few seconds) and this situation lasts 
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for a long time (about 200 s). This high temperature level is aggravated by the subsequent 
oscillations. It means that critical reactor is not capable for the self-protection. On the other 
hand, the asymptotic temperature level is not too high (due to the significant negative feedback 
effects) and this gives a chance for DEN system to survive (as usually, UTOC is the weakest 
point of DEN). This analysis has shown that all subcritical systems have a remarkable 
deterministic safety potential during the UTOC events. 
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Figure 22. Unprotected TOP/TOC transients in the thermal (U+TRU-fuelled) spectrum systems; 
TOP/TOC  = , 0 2.4r = .
2.8.2. Unprotected LOF transients 
ULOF events for the critical system demonstrate undesirable oscillations of power. On 
the other hand, the temperature regimes for all systems (including critical system) are 
acceptable with respect to the deterministic safety requirements as seen from Figure 23. 
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Figure 23. Unprotected LOF (pump power fall from 100% to 10% in the period of 10 s) transients in the 
thermal (U+TRU-fuelled) spectrum systems. The subcriticality level 0 2.4r = was used. 
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2.8.3. Unprotected LOHS transients 
Despite the “specific” character of the power transient in the critical reactor (cooling of 
the graphite moderator causes some oscillations), all regimes of the critical mode seems to be 
acceptable (see Figure 24). On the other hand, the ADS behaviour is not without some 
important doubts: the core temperature increases monotonically. Behavior of the DEN system is 
the most preferable with respect to the deterministic safety requirements as shown in the same 
Figure 24. 
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Figure 24. Unprotected LOHS (loss by 90% in the period of 3 s) transients in the thermal (U+TRU-
fuelled) spectrum systems; subcriticality level 0 2.4r = was used. 
2.8.4. Unprotected GOF transients 
Our results show that the UGOF events do not lead to serious consequences for any of 
the above systems, i.e. both the critical and sub-critical ones. Although, some power oscillations 
take place in the case of critical system the core temperatures behave smoothly for all systems.  
2.8.5. Unprotected Over-Cooling (UOVC) transients 
As it was shown above, the temperature level kT in the condenser plays an important 
role in preventing the molten salt from solidification during different transients. To avoid salt 
solidification it was proposed to increase kT from 20°C to 400°C. At these new conditions, a 
rapid decrease of kT would lead to the core cooling and eventually to the unprotected UOVC 
transients. Figure 25 presents these transients in the case of the U+TRU fuelled systems. It can 
be seen that the subcriticality leads to a decrease of the power oscillations, which are inherent to 
critical systems. Moreover, the DEN-system supplies the temperature regime with an important 
stability and still far from the fuel solidification point. 
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Figure 25. Unprotected overcooling (decreasing of heat exchanger temperature down to 20°C in the period 
of 10 s) transients in thermal (U+TRU-fuelled) systems. 
2.9. Discussion 
For the first time, a comparative analysis of the dynamics of different types (ADS and 
ACS/DEN) of hybrid systems was carried out. The above analysis of multiple unprotected 
events yields some general conclusions with respect to the possibility of achieving the 
deterministic level of safety both for fast and thermal spectra systems.  
Despite the very favorable safety physics potential of the molten salt critical cores (small 
reactivity margins, the limited change of reactivity, etc.), critical systems have the limited 
potential in achieving the deterministic safety level, particularly, when the combinations of 
reactivity insertions and fuel circulation stop are assumed. Significant oscillations of power and 
fuel temperatures are the main drawbacks of unprotected transients even with favorable 
negative reactivity feedback effects. In the cases of positive feedback effects and of significant 
Doppler-effect degradation, deterministic safety of critical systems is generally not achievable. 
The subcritical regime (both ADS and DEN) improves the safety potential significantly, 
leading to the considerable increase of the grace time up to dozens of minutes in the case of 
“degraded” feedback effects and up to several hours in the case of the “standard” negative 
feedback effects. This effect is observed even for small subcriticality levels of 1-3 dollars.  
One of the most important safety effects of subcritical systems is the suppression of 
power and fuel temperature oscillations during unprotected transients. This significant 
enhancement of safety could play an important role for long-lived waste transmutation 
(degraded safety properties). 
The weakest point of ADS in respect to the deterministic safety is thermo-hydraulic 
unprotected transients which exhibit a continuous increase of temperatures despite favorable 
feedback effects. It means that ADS are unable to present the “unlimited” grace time. 
Unlike ADS, DEN demonstrate acceptable behavior with respect to most unprotected 
transients (ULOF, ULOHS, UGOF, UOVC), while the TOP/TOC transients remain a point of 
concern. The DEN systems inherit the best safety features of both critical reactors and ADS. 
For that, the total feedback reactivity effect has to be negative. 
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As demonstrated, even a very small subcriticality level improves significantly the safety 
of the system. Therefore, the economics of subcritical systems should not be penalized 
significantly when compared with critical reactors due to the small consumption of energy for 
proton acceleration: neither powerful accelerators, nor large energy consumption are required for 
spallation. According to the pessimistic assessment, about 0.002-0.003 mA of proton current per 
MW(th) of system total power is expected to be sufficient. 
 
The results that we presented above are a good illustration of the quite diverse inherent 
dynamic behavior of the critical- and different kinds of subcritical systems. In the next Chapter 
we will pass on from the direct problem formulation (how does dynamics change in presence of 
subcriticality) to the inverse one: i.e. how the core subcriticality may be used for safety 
improvement. 
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3. Core subcriticality as a tool of safety enhancement 
 
Résumé – Dans ce Chapitre nous montrerons que la sous-criticité du cœur peut 
jouer un rôle important pour l’amélioration de la sûreté d'un système nucléaire si c’est 
nécessaire. C'est le cas lors de la dégradation d'effets de contre-réaction ou/et de la 
réduction significative de la fraction des neutrons retardés causée par les actinide 
soumis à la transmutation. Deux types de réalisation d’un système sous-critique : l’ADS 
et l’DEN (système sous-critique avec couplage entre le taux de fission et l’intensité de la 
source externe de neutrons) sont étudié dans ce contexte. Il est montré que tous les deux 
peuvent améliorer la sûreté. Deux moyens : une optimisation thermo-hydraulique et la 
sous-criticité peuvent compenser la dégradation de l’effet Doppler et la réduction de la 
fraction des neutrons retardés. De plus, dans un DEN le couplage thermo-hydraulique 
entre un cœur sous-critique et une source de neutron de spallation produit un groupe 
complémentaire de neutrons retardés.  
 
3.1. Foreword 
The results of the safety analysis, reported in the previous Chapter prove that a core 
subcriticality can play an important role if the safety enhancement of a nuclear system is 
necessary. In the present Chapter we demonstrate that core subcriticality together with a 
thermo-hydraulics optimization can compensate the possible degradation of the Doppler-effect 
and the reduction of the delayed neutron fraction. A number of quantitative examples are 
provided in this context. In this Chapter the problems are formulated in the way to demonstrate 
how the core subcriticality can “cure” these particular safety problems.  
After comparison of the kinetic features of different kinds of subcritical systems (Chapter 
2), it became obvious that the response of these systems on the external perturbation is 
intrinsically different. Moreover, as mentioned above, the control of these systems may differ as 
well. Consequently, it is imperative to treat DEN and ADS separately. Moreover, it seems that 
the entire safety analysis for each system has to be built in a different way. 
3.2. Study of a DEN-system based on the AMSTER core 
3.2.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 2 we analyzed a number of “hypothetic” systems. Let us apply a similar 
approach to a reactor with somewhat more developed concept. This will allow us to reduce 
uncertainties and to carry out more detailed investigation in the different stages of study: from 
the analysis of phenomena causing reactivity variations to transient simulations. The molten salt 
AMSTER core is taken as a reference in our study. 
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The DEN system has demonstrated the more promising potential (when compared with 
ADS) on the way to reach deterministic safety. For that reason we concentrate our attention on 
the DEN systems. In contrast to Chapter 2, where the subcriticality level was fixed, in the 
present Section we will monitor the evolution of the system’s behavior with increase of the 
subcriticality level.  
This Section aims determining the safety potentials of the subcritical MSR coupled to the 
external neutron source. Critical and subcritical MSR with different subcriticality levels are 
examined in a comparative way. A set of unprotected transients as UTOP, ULOF, ULOHS, 
UTOC and their combinations are then evaluated in so-called “source dominated” (deeply sub-
critical system) and “feedback dominated” (slightly sub-critical system) regime (see Ref. [5] for 
details). Finally, an inter-comparison between critical and coupled sub-critical systems is carried 
out with core sub-criticality level being a free parameter.  
 
A simplified point model of the core kinetics is adopted for safety analysis. The 
mathematical model, analogous to this one applied in previous Chapter, includes also a 
description of the thermo-hydraulics of the circulated fuel as well as feedback effects in the core. 
3.2.2. Major parameters of the reference molten salt cores 
The thermal-spectrum molten salt reactor AMSTER (after Actinides Molten Salt 
TransmutER) is chosen as a reference MSR. Two different AMSTER cores (see Refs. Vergnes et 
al., 2000; Lecarpentier, 2001) have been selected for our analysis. The first one is the TRU-
incinerator core with support-uranium and the second one is the self-generator core with 
support-thorium. Table VI and Table VII summarize feedback effects and delayed neutron 
characteristics in both cases. We note the major difference between two systems considered is 
negative and slightly positive total feedback in the case of uranium and thorium based cores 
respectively (see Table VI). 
Table VI. Feedback effects in the reference cores (from Ref.: Lecarpentier, 2001). 
coefficient, pcm/°C support-uranium support-thorium 
Doppler - 3.01 - 2.40 
density + 1.45 + 1.95 
salt - 1.57 - 0.45 
graphite - 1.20 + 1.20 
feedback - 2.45 + 0.75 
A discussed earlier, a particular feature of systems with circulating fuel is a partial loss of 
delayed neutrons during its circulation outside the core region. In the case of AMSTER-like 
configuration this delayed neutron decrease is as much as ~30% (compare  and * in Table 
VII). Indeed, in the support-uranium core the delayed neutron fraction falls from 446 = pcm 
down to * 336 = pcm, and for support-thorium core it decreases from 350 = pcm down to 
* 256 = pcm. It is interesting to note that delayed neutron fraction in AMSTER-like cores is 
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considerably smaller if compared to industrial Pressurized Water Reactors - PWR (typically of 
the order 650 pcm), but comparable to the  of a fast breeder reactor. It should be also stressed 
that the delayed neutron precursors with the longest life-times ( 1i	 < s-1) decay more than the 
others out of core, what is not advantageous at all for the reactor control (compare  and *
for all six groups in Table VII). 
To quantify further the delayed neutron decrease we will estimate a so called one-group 
decay parameter in the case of mobile and immobile fuels. Generally, the one-group decay 
parameter is expressed as follows (Hetrick, 1971):    
6 6
1 1
1 1
i i i
i i
	  	  
= =
=) ) . (3.1) 
In the mobile fuel core we have to replace i by 
*
i . Thus, for the support-uranium core 
this parameter equals 1 10.7	 = s (12.85 s for immobile salt), and for support-thorium core - 
1 14.8	 = s (16.42 s for immobile salt). Another important kinetic parameter, which is also used 
in our study, is the prompt neutron generation time  . Its value is of the order of 44 10+ s for 
both the support-uranium core and for the support-thorium core (Lecarpentier, 2001). 
Table VII. Delayed neutron fractions in the AMSTER cores with support-uranium and support-thorium 
(from Ref.: Lecarpentier, 2001). Also see the text. 
i , pcm 
*
i , pcm Group i	 , s-1 
support-uranium support-thorium support-uranium support-thorium 
1 0.013 12 23 8 15 
2 0.032 102 93 66 60 
3 0.128 85 79 60 55 
4 0.304 170 114 130 88 
5 1.349 63 27 58 25 
6 3.629 14 13 14 13 
Total  446 350 336 256 
3.2.3. Reactivity variations in the reference MSR 
A complete safety analysis requires simulating the multitude of all accidental situations 
permitted by physical laws. In this Section we continue to analyze a limited set of unprotected 
accidents: Unprotected Transient Over Power (UTOP) – accidental insertion of all reactivity 
reserve or physical process leading to change of core reactivity; Unprotected Loss Of fuel Flow 
(ULOF) accident – failure of first loop pumps; Unprotected Loss Of Heat Sink (ULOHS) from 
the first loop. Another restriction of our approach is that only accidents in a nominal regime are 
considered. 
To simulate accidental reactivity growth in the system and to give some 
recommendations on the choice of subcriticality level, let us analyze possible causes of reactivity 
insertion. The data collected in the Table VIII are evaluated-extracted from Refs. (Blinkin and 
64 
Novikov, 1978; Lecarpentier, 2001; Nuttin, 2002). In this table we distinguish two groups of 
reactivity change. The first one is so called “fast reactivities”, i.e. reactivities that can be 
inserted rather quickly (either by physical processes or control rods devoted for their 
compensation). The second group contains rather slow physical processes, what in principle can 
be improved by continuous fuel reprocessing (see Ref. [Nuttin, 2002] for details), and therefore 
no control rod reactivity reserve has to be anticipated for their compensation. 
Table VIII. Physical processes leading to the reactivity variation and corresponding reactivity values in 
the reference cores (from Refs.: Blinkin and Novikov, 1978; Lecarpentier, 2001; Nuttin, 2002). 
reason for reactivity variation support U support Th 
reactivities, compensated by control rods (“fast reactivities”), pcm 
homogenous core heating    
 450°C to 562°C 
 562°C to 705°C 
 705°C to 1300°C 
 
- 275a
- 350a
–
+ 84b
+ 107 
 + 446a,b 
Total - 625a +191 (+ 637b)
135Xe poisoning (Blinkin and Novikov, 1978) - 32 - 32 
fuel stop + 110 + 94 
decompression (Blinkin and Novikov, 1978) + 100 + 100 
total (“fast reactivities”) 
 nominal regime  
 start-up regime 
 maximum 
 
242 
409 
867 
 
333 
226 
943 
reactivities, compensated by adjustment of fuel composition (“slow reactivities”), pcm 
239Np/233Pa – effect (Nuttin, 2002; Adamov et al., 2001) + 50 + 1600 (2.5 pcm/h) 
fluctuation of fissile isotopes concentration (Nuttin, 2002) + 400 (180 pcm/h) + 400 (180 pcm/h) 
Total (“slow reactivities”) 450 2000 
Total (“fast + slow”) 1317 2943 
a Empty at nominal regime. 
b Supplementary margin which may be introduced for account of positive feedback effect. 
In our analysis we will search for the hardest conditions of accident development in terms 
of system’s safety. Technically this can be achieved by inserting all reactivity reserves 
simultaneously. 
As is mentioned above, the ULOF accident is particularly dangerous in mobile fuel 
systems. It does not only fail to remove the heat from the core but it also causes reactivity 
growth by the value  
( )*precursors   = 
due to all precursors decay in the core. In this study it is supposed that the fuel flow decreases 
by 90 % of its nominal value (the remaining 10% is believed to be assured by natural 
convection). In our simulation of the UTOP accident alone we do not include precursors into 
65 
TOP (this is equivalent to assumption that no reactivity reserves are foreseen to compensate 
this effect). However, when we simulate superposition of UTOP and ULOF, both precursors and 
TOP are taken into account, what corresponds to the situation when potentially maximal 
reactivity can be inserted. The particularity of the LOHS-accident in ACS (DEN) is that the 
loss of heat transfer to the energy generation device switches off external neutron source, what is 
favourable for system inherent safety in the case of this accident.   
3.2.4. Simulation of Unprotected Transients 
Here we provide just a brief description of the model. A complete description of the 
mathematical formulation used for accident simulations is nearly identical to this one utilized in 
Chapter 2. The only difference is that now 6 groups of delayed neutrons are introduced and the 
heat release in the graphite (about 8 % of the total thermal power; after Ref. Blinkin and 
Novikov, 1978) is taken into account. Neutronics of the nuclear system is described by the point-
wise model of a core filled by homogeneous molten salt and graphite. The thermo-hydraulic 
model of the first cooling loop includes two spatially separated elements: the core and the heat-
exchanger connected by tubes of finite dimensions. Our mathematical model contains a coupled 
system of point reactor kinetics equations with six groups of delayed neutrons, salt and graphite 
reactivity feedback effects, thermo-hydraulic equations and initial conditions (for nominal 
regime). The intensity of an external neutron source is proportional to the output energy. Since 
no parameters of the 2nd loop and energy production system are available by now in the 
AMSTER project (Lecarpentier, 2001), there are no 2nd and 3rd loops included in our model. It is 
supposed that electric energy is produced immediately after the 1st loop, what results in the 
underestimation of the subcritical system safety. An environment temperature of 450°C is 
chosen to avoid eventual salt solidification. Newton cooling model is used for description of heat 
exchange with this environment. It is supposed that the maximal acceptable temperature during 
accidents is the temperature of salt boiling (~1300°C) as it was proposed by Lecarpentier (2001). 
In our work we carry out a parametric study of subcriticality impact on the MSR safety. 
Four different levels of subcriticality 0r have been chosen for simulation:  
(i) 100 pcm being the maximal limit for the industrial hybrid MSR in the case of electron 
accelerator driver (see discussions in Ref. (Bokov et al., 2003) as well as in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis work for further explanations);  
(ii) 350 pcm being a level, corresponding to  -compensation up to the value typical for 
industrial nuclear reactors (600-700 pcm);  
(ii) 700 pcm being the value comparable with the fraction of delayed neutrons in industrial 
nuclear reactors;  
(iv) 1050 pcm being close to the maximal limit for the prototype hybrid MSR based on the 
electron accelerator driver (see Chapter 6).   
In the TRU incinerator system (support uranium) maximal reactivity insertion 
132ext = pcm is simulated according to Table VIII. Obtained results are summarized in 
Table IX in terms of the maximal temperature increase and the corresponding time (in 
parenthesis) to reach this temperature. After detailed analysis of the obtained results we can 
formulate the following findings (also see Figure 26):  
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 all accidents in all systems (including critical one with 0 0r = pcm) do not lead to dangerous 
temperature growth; 
 nevertheless, added subcriticality improves the behavior of system during transient; 
 this improvement is not only quantitative, but it is also qualitative: one can see that most of 
the transients become slower, smoother (no oscillations) and monotonous (asymptotic value 
is also the maximal value) with increasing subcriticality;  
 artificial feedback caused by the core-accelerator coupling changes the behavior of system 
during complex accidents; e.g., contrary to a critical system, in the case of a subcritical 
system (1050 pcm) the superposition of ULOF and UTOP accidents is less dangerous than 
single UTOP. 
We conclude that in the case of the TRU incinerator core (support uranium) the added 
subcriticality is not indispensable to enhance its safety, simply because the system has got its 
inherent safety potential from the very beginning (e.g., 2.45feedback =  pcm/°C from Table VI). 
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that qualitative improvements on the system’s response to 
different unprotected transients are observed already at subcriticality level around 350 pcm. 
Table IX. Maximal temperature reached in the support uranium TRU incinerator core, and the 
corresponding time needed to reach this value (given in parenthesis) for different unprotected transients. 
0r , pcm UTOP ULOF UTOP + ULOF    ULOHS 
critical 771°C  (16 s) 782°C  (22 s) 844°C (18 s) 761°C  (30 s) 
100 759°C  (28 s) 766°C  (18 s) 810°C (19 s) 741°C  (34 s) 
350 751°C  (145 s) 750°C  (12 s) 769°C (15 s) 721°C  (47 s) 
700 751°C  (350 s) 744°C  (10 s) 753°C (11 s) 712°C  (47 s) 
1050 751°C  (350 s) 742°C  (10 s) 747°C  (10 s) 710°C  (52 s) 
Figure 26. Simulation of a complex accident in the support-uranium TRU incinerator system: the UTOP 
accident (insertion of 132 pcmext = ) with the simultaneous ULOF accident (reduce of salt flow by 
90 % in the period of 10 s). 
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A particularity of the self generator system (support thorium) is its negative salt 
feedback effect and a strong positive feedback effect of graphite (see Table VI for details) 
resulting in a slightly positive total feedback in the case of a homogeneous core heating.  
The maximal TOP-reactivity insertion is 239ext = pcm (see Table VIII), what is 
slightly smaller compared to * 256 = pcm for this system. Taking into account eventual 
reactivity growth due to the fuel stop (~94 pcm), a prompt criticality is probable. The positive 
total feedback effect, as it is described above, can not any longer prevent a possible core power 
excursion. Let us study a subcriticality role for safety enhancement of this particular system.  
As in the previous case, we chose subcriticality levels of 100 pcm, 350 pcm, 700 pcm, and 
1050 pcm for unprotected accident simulations. A supplementary level of 2000 pcm is also tried 
to study system behavior in a so-called “source dominated domain” or deep subcriticality 
regime. Results of our simulation are presented in Table X and Figure 27. Below we summarize 
our major findings: 
 due to the positive total feedback unprotected transients in all cases lead to salt temperature 
raise up to the temperature † 1300°CT = of salt boiling, what is considered as a 
disintegration criterion of the system (Lecarpentier, 2001); 
 added subcriticality increases core vitality period (time from the beginning of an accident to 
salt boiling): approximately 10 s per 100 pcm in the “feedback dominated” region up to 
approximately 25 s per 100 pcm in the “source-dominated” region; 
 similarly like for the support-uranium system, subcriticality level higher than ~100 pcm 
results in UTOP and ULOF accident superposition less dangerous than UTOP taken alone. 
Table X. Time necessary to reach the boiling temperature (1300°C) of salt in the case of different 
unprotected transients in the support-thorium self generator system. 
0r , pcm UTOP ULOF UTOP+ULOF ULOHS 
critical 10 s 67 s 7.5 s 112 s 
100 20 s 137 s 17.5 s 457 s 
350 59 s 707 s 82 s 6580 s 
700 136 s 1964 s 389 s > 2 h 
1050 228 s 3324 s 853 s > 2 h 
2000 506 s > 1 h 2232 s > 2 h 
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Figure 27. Simulation of complex accident in the support-thorium self generator system: the UTOP 
accident (insertion of 239pcm = ) followed by the ULOF accident (reduce of salt flow by 90 % in the 
period of 10 s). 
We found it interesting to compare directly the influence of subcriticality with an 
improved feedback effect in the case of critical system. The question can be formulated as 
follows: what subcriticality level would give the same result for system vitality persistence as 
feedback effect improvement? In order to answer this question a set of supplementary 
simulations were carried out.  
We start our analysis by comparing two ways of feedback optimization:  
(i) of graphite graphite , and  
(ii) of salt salt expansion Doppler  = + ,
giving the same value of feedback .
We note separately that in our study we use linear model of feedback, so the variation of 
either Doppler-effect or salt expansion effect gives the same final result. A purpose of this 
comparison is to verify which parameter is more favorable for safety enhancement. The 
simulation of transients in the critical system with modified (ameliorated) feedbacks showed that 
it is preferable to optimize salt because it is faster and, therefore, more effective than graphite 
feedback effect.  
Afterwards, we carried out a parametrical study of sensibility of critical system behavior 
due to the variation of Doppler-effect. We simulated the increase of Doppler by 10 % and 20 % 
with respect to the initial reference value. In Table XI we present system vitality time for 
different unprotected transients. By comparing these results with the ones, presented in Table 
X, and with the help of some interpolations, we conclude that  
(a) 10 % amelioration of the Doppler-effect would be comparable with approximately 150 pcm of  
the additional core subcriticality;  
(b) 20 % improvement of the salt feedback effect would be comparable with approximately 
320 pcm of the additional core subcriticality.  
1 10 100 1000
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
co
re
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
,°
C
time, s
r 0 = 0 pcm 
r 0 = 100  pcm
r 0 = 350  pcm 
r 0 = 700  pcm
r 0 = 1050  pcm
1 10 100 1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
r 0 = 0 pcm 
r
0
= 100  pcm
r 0 = 350  pcm 
r
0
= 700  pcm
r 0 = 1050  pcm
 
p o
w
e r
, M
W
( t h
)
time, s
69 
Table XI. Time necessary to reach the boiling temperature (1300°C) of salt in the case of different 
unprotected transients in the support-thorium self generator system as a function of different Doppler 
coefficients and for a critical system only.  
Doppler, pcm/°C UTOP ULOF UTOP+ ULOF  ULOHS 
Ref.    -2.40  10 s 67 s 7.5 s 112 s 
-2.64  31 s 111 s 23 s 196 s 
-2.88  71 s 195 s 53 s 425 s 
3.2.5. Conclusions 
This Section aimed in determining the safety potentials of the subcritical MSR 
(AMSTER-like core) coupled (DEN-type coupling) to the external neutron source.  A direct 
comparison between critical and sub-critical systems was done by simulating a number of 
unprotected transients. A point kinetics model of the core was adopted for safety analysis. The 
mathematical model included a description of the thermo-hydraulics of the circulated fuel as well 
as feedback effects in the core.  
Two different AMSTER-like systems were chosen for our analysis. The first one was the 
TRU incinerator core with support-uranium and the second one was the self generator core with 
support-thorium. The major difference between them was the negative and slightly positive total 
feedback effects respectively. Different levels of sub-criticality were tried in order to improve 
safety of the system and, at the same time, to define the required intensity of an external 
neutron source in each case.  
The following conclusions can be drawn after our investigations on both systems 
mentioned above: 
Support-uranium core. The added sub-criticality is not indispensable to enhance its 
safety, simply because the system seems to have its inherent safety potential from the very 
beginning. In other words, all simulated accidents did not lead to dangerous temperature 
growth. Nevertheless, qualitative improvements on the system response to different unprotected 
transients are observed already at sub-criticality level around 350 pcm: most of the transients 
become slower, smoother and monotonous with increasing sub-criticality.
Support-thorium core. The positive total feedback effect of the system in this case can 
not any longer prevent a possible core power excursion. As a result, unprotected transients in all 
cases led to salt temperature raise up to the boiling temperature † 1300°CT = , what was 
considered as a disintegration criterion of the system. Added subcriticality increased the grace 
time from approximately 10 s per 100 pcm in the “feedback dominated” regime up to 
approximately 25 s per 100 pcm in the “source-dominated” regime. In terms of an absolute 
value, a considerable expansion of the grace time (by a factor of 10) was achieved even if a very 
low subcriticality level (350-700 pcm) is applied. 
Summarizing above results, the following preliminary recommendations for subcriticality 
application (in the framework of the DEN concept) may be done: 
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 in cores with a “good” feedback an added subcriticality may be utilized to make unprotected 
transients smoother and to eliminate the potential overheating (above the asymptotic 
temperature level) of the core; 
 In cases of the DEN-system with a “bad” feedback the deterministic safety is apparently not 
achievable. However, as in the case of ADS (see Ref. Schikorr, 2001 for detail), the large 
subcriticality level allows decrease the sensibility of the system on this unfavorable feedback. 
As demonstrated, it may lead to increase of the grace time up to several hours. 
3.3. Kinetics of DEN-systems 
3.3.1. Introduction 
In some cases critical systems may suffer from the decrease of the delayed neutron 
fraction due to the specific fuel properties (e.g., in actinide transmuter cores, in systems with 
circulating fuels, etc.). It may lead to undesirable acceleration of transients, consequently to the 
necessity of the limitation of admissible reactivity variation and, finally, to the significant 
deterioration of safety. As already discussed in previous Sections, the fraction of delayed 
neutrons may be artificially increased with the help of the external neutron source, namely in 
the framework of the ACS- and DEN-concepts (Slessarev et al., 1999; Gandini et al., 2000; 
Bokov et al., 2003; Slessarev and Bokov, 2004) or “beta-compensated” reactor concept 
(Bernardin et al., 2001; Ridikas et al., 2002).  
Nevertheless, despite the “obvious” intuitive significance of the DEN-concept approach, a 
clear understanding of the kinetic and dynamic issues of such a coupling is not achieved yet. The 
studies by Slessarev et al. (1999), Gandini et al., (2000), D’Angelo et al. (2001), Slessarev and 
Bokov (2004) were pioneer works in this way. 
The objective of the study presented in this Section is to characterize the appearance of a 
supplementary group of delayed neutrons within the framework of the ACS (DEN) concept. 
Another goal is to characterize the kinetics of the DEN-system (in absence of in-core feedbacks) 
and, in particular, its response to variation of the efficiency of the external neutron source. The 
Accelerator Coupled System (ACS) is taken as example, although this analysis may be expanded 
to other types of the coupled subcritical systems. Within the framework of a simple 
mathematical model of coupled system, an interpretation of the external neutron source as a 
supplementary group of delayed neutrons is given. An auxiliary quantity – ‘source reactivity’ is 
introduced for convenience and a modified inhour equation for coupled systems is deduced. 
Analytical solution of the modified inhour equation is obtained in approximation of one group of 
delayed neutrons.  
The principal conclusion resulting from this analysis is as follows: the response of the 
coupled system to “source reactivity” variation is intrinsically different from the response to core 
reactivity variation. Namely, there is no equivalent of prompt criticality (accompanied by 
drastic decrease of the reactor period) in the case of ‘source reactivity’ variation.  
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3.3.2. New kinetic features of coupled hybrid systems 
Operating in the critical mode with the subcritical core and coupled in a way discussed 
above, the hybrid system becomes similar to the critical reactor from the point of view of its 
dynamics (Gandini et al., 2000; D’Angelo et al., 2001). In this context, the fraction f of 
produced energy, feeding the external neutron source, plays an essential role in the reactor 
kinetics: a proper choice of its nominal value 0f guarantees the self-sustainability of the system 
with respect to the entire neutron balance (comprising fission neutrons and external neutrons). 
Any mismatch of this parameter to the value, necessary to maintain chain reaction in the core, 
would lead either to reactor runaway or to gradual attenuation of chain reaction in the absence 
of thermal feedbacks. That is why the parameter f may be considered as an analogue of 
reactivity ( )1 /eff effk k =  for the ‘external’ contribution to neutron balance in the core.  
Gandini et al. (2000) assumed that parameter f is fixed at any time and can be slowly 
adjusted during burn-up to follow the subcriticality level evolution. One may anticipate that in 
practical situations f may vary from its nominal value. This can be due to uncertainties, 
technical failures, human errors, variation of energy production efficiency, etc. For this reason, 
and in view of the role played by f in the neutron balance, it becomes quite important to study 
kinetic or/and dynamic responses of a coupled hybrid system to fluctuations of f , and to 
compare the resulting response with this one due to reactivity fluctuations.  
Nevertheless, one may expect that this response to an equivalente perturbation of the 
parameter f would be intrinsically different. Preliminary considerations for such a statement 
are as follows. Indeed, the above analogy of f to reactivity is valid only in the case of the quasi-
static variation of the reactor power. If the subcriticality level is chosen to be sufficiently large, 
the reactor core remains subcritical at any instant. This means that a self-sustaining nuclear 
reaction in the core remains impossible. On the other hand, any response of the external source 
on reactor power perturbation is delayed in time: the external neutron source “waits” for the 
arrival of fission energy. As a result, any perturbation of the fraction f results in a prompt 
reactor response only in the very beginning of the transient. After that a slow transient takes 
place, limited by the inertia of heat transfer in the reactor. 
Summarizing the above considerations, one may conclude that the fraction f would be 
analogous to  from the point of view of a quasi-static neutron multiplication factor, but its role 
for the kinetics of coupled system would be quantitatively and qualitatively different.
Below we elucidate and qualify these differences.  
3.3.3. On “artificial” group of delayed neutrons and its delay time 
We introduce a simple mathematical model, describing a coupled hybrid system, what 
permits us to carry out a complete analytical study as well as to reveal and illustrate the most 
significant kinetic features of the system under consideration. Moreover, it permits us to realize 
a direct comparison with conventional point kinetics of a critical reactor. 
 
e See explanation below. 
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The equations of point kinetics for a coupled system can be presented in the “classical” 
form (Waltar, Reynolds, 1981): 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
,
, 1, .
gN
i i
i
i
i i i g
d tP t P t W t S t
dt
d W t P t W t i N
dt
  	
 	
=
  = + +   =  = "
)
(3.2) 
where ( ) ( )0t r t =  + is the core reactivity, ( )0 00 1 /eff effr k k=  is the nominal subcriticality 
level and ( )t is the eventual reactivity variation; P is the reactor specific power; the term 
iW describes the contribution of delayed neutron precursors of the 
thi -group with the fraction 
i and the corresponding decay constant i	 ;
1
gN
i
i
 
=
=) is the total fraction of delayed 
neutrons;  is the neutron generation time; the term ( )S t describes an external source of 
neutrons. 
It is generally assumed (see Refs. Slessarev et al., 1999; Gandini et al., 2000; D’Angelo et 
al., 2001; Slessarev and Bokov, 2004) that the intensity of the external neutron source ( )S t is 
proportional to the output power ( )outP t of the reactor in coupled hybrid systems. Let us denote 
by f the fraction of produced power feeding the external source. Then one may express the 
intensity of the external source: ( ) ( )outsS t fP t= , where s is the corresponding normalization 
coefficient. For neutron self-sustainability, in nominal conditions the external source has to be 
equal to 0 0 0 /S r P=  (where 0 0
outP P= , i.e. in its steady state the system has to evacuate all 
generated heat). Therefore, we find that ( )0 0/s r f =  and, therefore for the external neutron 
source:  
( ) 0
0
( ) ( )out
rf tS t P t
f
  =     
. (3.3) 
The nominal fraction 0f of produced power, devoted to feed the external neutron source, 
depends on the peculiarities and the performance of the specific neutron production mechanism. 
In general, it may be deduced from neutron economy:  
0
0 *
n
e f
r zf 
 
=

. (3.4) 
In this notation e is the reactor electric efficiency, f is the energy released per fission,  is the 
mean number of fission neutrons, * is the importance of the source neutrons, nc is the electric 
energy cost of neutron production, i.e. the electric energy consumed to generate one source 
neutron.  
The following remark has to be made. From Eqs. (3.3)-(3.4) one finds that 
( )*/e nS f z  , i.e. the intensity of the external source in the coupled hybrid system depends 
also on the reactor electric efficiency ( e ) and on the neutron production performance (
*
nz  ) of
the external source. In general, these factors may vary and their perturbation acts in a similar 
way to a perturbation of the fraction of produced power, feeding the external source 
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( 0f f f =  ). In the present study we assume that 
* 0e nz  = = = . However, our approach 
may be easily generalized by the simple substitution:  
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )*
e
n
t f t
f t
z t t


 . (3.5) 
For this reason, in our considerations below for the parameter f we utilize the term “source 
efficiency”, assuming in such a way a broadened interpretation of this parameter as implicitly 
incorporating all the scope of above factors. 
Let us introduce an auxiliary parameter – source reactivity:
( )0 0/r r f f$ , (3.6) 
i.e. a value proportional to the normalized fraction f and to the nominal subcriticality level 0r .
Introduced in such a way, the parameter r determines the steady-state neutron multiplication 
of the system in the same manner as the core reactivity ( )1 /eff effk k =  . Indeed, one can 
demonstrate that steady states (P , iW ) of the coupled system meet the conditions  
( ) 0r P + = , ii
i
PW 
	
=

. (3.7) 
Introducing the “total” neutron multiplication factor of the system effm by analogy with 
core neutron multiplication factor effk
1eff
eff
m
r
m


= + , (3.8) 
we may express similarly the condition of  neutron self-sustainability (analogue of criticality 
with regard to the entire neutron balance) for a coupled hybrid system:  
1effm = . (3.9) 
Furthermore, as will be demonstrated below, the parameter r determines the kinetic 
response of the coupled hybrid system to perturbation of the source efficiency like reactivity 
determines the kinetic response of critical reactors on variation of the core neutron 
multiplication factor.  
Now, let us return to Eqs. (3.2)-(3.3). To take into account the explicit dependence of 
outP on t , one needs to describe the transfer of fission energy from the core to the electric 
energy producing mechanism. The simplest one-point thermo-hydraulic scheme of such a heat 
transfer can be presented by the Newton cooling model (Murray, 1957; Hetrick, 1971) 
( )
( ) ( )outp
dT tC P t P t
dt
=  , (3.10) 
74 
where T is the core temperature and pC is the heat capacity of the core. The first term on the 
right-hand side of Eq. (3.10) describes the rate of energy production (i.e. thermal power of the 
core) and the second describes the rate of thermal energy evacuation. The latter is assumed to 
be proportional to the temperature drop ( ( ) ( ) kt T t T
 $  ) to the surroundings (condenser), 
which may be considered as an infinite reservoir (Murray, 1957), i.e.  
( ) ( )outP t H t
= , (3.11) 
while H is the corresponding coefficient.  
Now, the source term in Eq. (3.2) can be rewritten as follows: 
( )
( )
( )r tS t H t
=

. (3.12) 
The following remark has to be made with regard to Eq. (3.12). Within the framework of 
the above model there are, in principle, other ways to perturb the reactor equilibrium, related to 
the external neutron source. For example, external impact may manifest itself either in the form 
of a perturbation of the heat-transfer coefficient H or via perturbation of the environment 
(condenser) temperature kT . Both these events are of interest as they lead to corresponding 
transients in the hybrid system, but, in the absence of in-core feedback effects, they do not 
corrupt the entire neutron multiplication factor of the system. Therefore, in the present work it 
is assumed that 0H = and 0kT = .
Let us denote the variable component of the source reactivity for convenience as 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )0 0 1 rr t r r t r t = + = + , (3.13) 
where ( ) 0/
r r r = is the source reactivity variation expressed in values of initial subcriticality 
level.  With the notations  
0 prCW

+ $

, 0,r
+ $
p
H
C
	+ $ , (3.14) 
and from Eqs. (3.2), (3.8), (3.12) and (3.13) one obtains the following system of coupled 
equations: 
( ) ( )( )
1
1 ;
, 1, ;
.
gN
r
i i
i
i
i i i g
d P P W W
dt
d W P W i N
dt
d W P W
dt
  
	  	
 	
 	
+
+ +
=
+
+ + +
   + = + + +  =  =   =  "
)
(3.15) 
One may note that in Eqs. (3.15) the external source imitates the evolution of delayed 
neutron precursors, i.e. the external source plays the role of a supplementary (artificial) group of  
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delayed neutrons (Refs. Gandini et al., 2000, D’Angelo et al., 2001; Slessarev and Bokov, 2004). 
The parameters W + and 	+ may be interpreted as the effective concentration and the effective 
decay constant respectively. The subcriticality level plays the role of the fraction + of the 
“artificial” delayed neutrons.  
Despite the above analogy, the artificial group of delayed neutrons provides some unique 
properties from the point of view of reactor kinetics, namely:  
 in contrast to the “natural” groups of delayed neutrons, there is an ability (to some extent) 
to “design” both the effective “decay constant” 	+ and the fraction + ;
 moreover, as discussed above, an external impact may perturb both 	+ and W + ;
 a perturbation of the external source efficiency may lead to a mismatch between a decay of 
the “artificial” delayed neutron group [term W	+ + in Eqs. (3.15)] and of its contribution 
to the neutron balance [term ( )( )1 r W 	+ ++ ]. It should be stressed that a limited analogy to 
this phenomenon may be flow variation event in the circulating fuel systems; 
 for this group of delayed neutrons there is no undesirable growth of reactivity during loss of 
flow events in systems with circulating fuels; 
 penalties related to the supplementary neutron production can be relatively modest because 
a small level of core sub-criticality, consequently, a rather weak intensity of the external 
neutron source (when compared with conventional ADS) would be sufficient. 
Finally, this consideration shows a way to “repair” the degraded fraction of delayed 
neutrons. In addition, the relations given by Eqs. (3.14) - (3.15) allow characterizing the 
supplementary artificial group of delayed neutrons in traditional terms of the effective 
concentration of delayed neutron precursors, their effective decay constant and the effective 
fraction.  
Obviously, these relations were different if another model of heat transfer would be 
chosen. In the next subsection we will discuss this aspect in more detail.   
3.3.4. “Heat removal” model versus “delayed argument” model 
We note, that the interpretation of the coupled external source as a supplementary group 
of delayed neutrons is not novel. For example, in Refs. (Slessarev et al., 1999; Gandini et al.,
2000) the authors discussed this problematic within the framework of the “delayed-argument” 
model, i.e., they supposed that ( )out SPP P t t=  . In our work the more adequate “heat-removal 
model” is applied and, as a result, another interpretation for the parameters 	+ and C + is 
given. 
Our model simulates the heat transfer inertia due to thermal resistance of the heat 
transfer system. This effect leads to the non-simultaneity of the core power P (i.e., fission rate) 
and of the reactor output power outP . Another physical mechanism leading to non-simultaneity, 
namely the time delay SPt , arising physically from the transport of the coolant from the core to 
the turbine, is not included. Hence, our model is valid for the systems, where the thermal inertia 
prevails. The issues of the “delayed-argument” model (i.e. [ ]out SPP P t t=  ) are discussed by 
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Gandini et al. (2000) and D’Angelo et al. (2001). This delay was equally taken into account (via 
parameters , ,tube c h h c    ) in our simulations, presented, in Chapter 2.   
These differences in the description of the coupling between the core power and the 
source intensity yield to the important issues for the core dynamic behavior. For example, the 
“delayed power model” by Gandini et al. (2000) may lead to oscillations of core power in the 
case of a sharp power increase due to reactivity insertion, while the “heat-removal model” 
predicts a smooth and monotonous behavior of the transient. Indeed, taking into account Eqs. 
(3.10)-(3.12), the explicit expression for the dependence of the external neutron source S on the 
core power can be written in the following way: 
( )( ) ( )exp
t
S t P t t t dt	  	
+ +
+
,
 - - -=      . (3.16) 
As a matter of fact, the artificial neutron production in the DEN-system depends on the 
thermal energy, accumulated in the core [time integral of core power as presented in Eq. (3.16)], 
as well as on particularities of the heat transfer in the system (parameter 	+ ). In other words, 
the artificial neutron production, caused by a single fission event at any point in time t , will not 
be only delayed by some characteristic time SPt , but it will be also distributed over the whole 
period following this event. 
This detail was observed during the preliminary simulations in the framework of study 
presented in Chapter 2. It turned out that for the systems under consideration the variations of 
the time delay related to fuel circulation (parameters , ,tube c h h c    ) do not affect significantly 
the transients. It appears that for these systems the heat transfer inertia due to thermal 
resistance of the heat transfer system is the most important factor. 
In the next section we will use the mathematical model for the coupled hybrid system in 
the form of Eqs. (3.15) in order to explore its kinetic properties. 
3.3.5. Kinetic response to variation of source efficiency in the one-group 
approximation 
The objective of the present study is to demonstrate the difference between kinetic 
responses of the coupled hybrid system to variation of core reactivity ( )ext and “source” 
reactivity ( )r , in particular, to inter-compare asymptotic reactor periods for these two cases. 
It is well known that an asymptotic period  of the reactor kinetic response to reactivity 
perturbation is described by the characteristic equation, called the inhour equation or Nordheim 
equation (Refs. Hetrick, 1971; Ash, 1979; Rozon, 1992). The inhour equation for the coupled 
hybrid systems has to be modified in order to take into account new features appearing in these 
systems. In Appendix we discuss in detail the characteristic equation which is derived from the 
model describing hybrid system kinetics in the form of Eqs. (3.15). There we demonstrate that 
the structure of obtained modified inhour equation differs qualitatively from this one of the 
“ordinary” inhour equation for a critical reactor.  
The response to the reactivity insertion ( )ext is well known in the literature (e.g. Refs. 
Hetrick, 1971; Ash, 1979; Rozon, 1992; Reuss, 2003) and may be directly used for the inter-
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comparison. Therefore, in the following analysis we assume no reactivity variation ( 0ext = )
and we focus our attention on the kinetic response of the coupled hybrid system to the source 
reactivity variation. Despite this simplification, the problem [in the form of Eqs. (3.15)] remains 
difficult to resolve and demands some cumbersome evaluations. For this reason we apply a so-
called one-group approximation for delayed neutrons. In the case of coupled hybrid system this 
approximation (an usual procedure in kinetic analysis of critical reactors) is particularly justified 
since in most practical situations the artificial groups of delayed neutrons will prevail over 
natural groups (see discussion in Appendix).  
In this one-group formulation, the problem may be easily solved. In Appendix an exact 
solution of one-group kinetic equation is obtained, applying the Laplace Transforms method. It 
is shown that a perturbation of the source reactivity ( )( ) /r r  .=  leads to the power transient 
( ) ( )( )
2
( )
0
1
( ) , expr rj j
j
P t P u t 
=
= /)  , (3.17) 
where the factors ( )rj are the roots of the modified inhour equation (in one-group 
approximation), given by  
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the coefficients ( )( )1,2 , ru /  are assigned by the expressions: 
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where the function ( ) ( )2( ) ( ), 1 4r rR u u u = + +   is introduced for convenience and the 
superscript ‘( )r ’ over 1,2 denotes the solution for source reactivity variation.  
In Eqs. (3.18)-(3.19) ( ) . and ( )	 . are the fraction of delayed neutrons and the one-group 
decay constant for effective precursors of delayed neutrons, correspondingly. The parameter 
( ) ( )/u 	 . .$  is introduced for convenience. Our estimates show that in all cases, interesting 
for eventual applications, the factor u may be considered as small ( 1u  ). The prompt 
neutron life-time can vary by a few orders of magnitude: from 710 ( s in fast-spectrum cores 
to 310 ( s in thermal spectrum cores (Ref. Rozon 1992), i.e. one can suppose in further 
estimations that it does not exceed the value max 310 ( s. The fraction of the supplementary 
group of delayed neutrons (subcriticality level) can vary from 350+ = pcm in the case of 
“beta-compensated” systems up to 5000+ = pcm or, eventually, greater. Hence, it would be 
meaningful to assume that ( ) 700 . 1 pcm. A value of 	+ is, as the subcriticality level + , an
object of optimization and so it can be, to some extent, chosen arbitrarily. A reasonable 
assessment for 	+ and, therefore, for  ( )	 . would be 2 010 10 ÷ s-1. Hence, we obtain the upper 
and the lower limits for the parameter u : 8 110 10u < < , i.e. 1u  .
One may consider in accordance with above estimates, that conditions 1u  and 
( )2 1r u  are fulfilled in any practical circumstance. In this situation the above solution for 
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reactor power [Eqs. (21)-(22)] can be simplified. Thus, expanding ( )( ), rR u  in a Taylor series up 
to the 1st order in u :
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 2, 1 1 2r rR u u O u = + + +  (3.20) 
one obtains for the roots of the characteristic equation 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
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( )
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( ) ( ) 2
1
( ) 1 ( ) 2
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r r
r r
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(3.21) 
Similar simplification for the coefficients ( )( )1,2 , ru /  yields:   
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )1 , 1 1 2r r ru u  / ( +    , ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )2 , 1 2 1r r ru u  / (   +   . (3.22) 
Hence, we obtain the following approximate (at 0u  ) expression: 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0( ) 1 exp exp
r r rP t P t t  	 
.
.
   = +         
   . (3.23) 
We complete these asymptotic analytical results with numerical illustrations calculated 
in accordance with Eqs. (3.18)-(3.19). Dependences of the dimensionless roots ( )( )1,2 1,2 /
r 	 .2 $
and of the coefficients 1,2/ on 
( )r for different values of parameter u are presented in Figure 28 
and Figure 29. These calculations were performed for ( )1 10r   and cover the range of all 
possible values of the parameter u (see above estimates).  
It follows from Figure 28 and from Eq. (3.21) that the first root ( )1 0
r > corresponds to 
a solution increasing with time (an asymptotic gradual growth), whereas the second root 
( )
2 0
r < describes a prompt jump of reactor power (a term, rapidly decreasing with time). As 
long as quantitative results for the dependences ( )( )1,2 , ru 2  are concerned, one may establish, 
that at 310u  , all curves of 12 collapse to only one, i.e. dependence on this parameter 
disappears when 0u  . In this case (i.e. at 310u  ) the second root 22 does not depend on 
( )r and may be approximately assumed to be 2 1/u2 = . A particularity of the curves for 
( )( )1 , ru 2  , compared with similar calculation for the reactivity insertion in a critical reactor, is 
their monotony. Thus, for ( ) 1r = , i.e. for the value which would lead to criticality on prompt 
neutrons if effk were modified, one obtains 1 12 ( (i.e. 
( )( )
1
r 	 .( ). Even if ( ) 10r = , the 
parameter 12 increases only by a factor of 6 10÷ . Summarizing the above considerations, we 
conclude that if the source reactivity varies, the asymptotic reactor period ( )r will be of the 
order of the inverse effective decay constant ( )	 . in any circumstances.  
Hence, if the total neutron multiplication factor of the system effm is modified by means 
of the source reactivity r , there is no analogue to prompt criticality (with consequent drastic 
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decrease of the reactor period), typical for the conventional critical reactor when reactivity 
  > is inserted. In the next Section we discus this particularity in detail. 
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Figure 28. Dependence of the dimensionless roots 12 (a) and 22 (b) of the modified inhour equation on 
the source efficiency variation ( )r at different values of parameter u .
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
	
1
 (r)
u < 1 x10-3 
u = 1 x10-2 
u = 1 x10-1 
(a)
0 2 4 6 8 10
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
	
2
 (r)
u < 1 x10-3
u = 1 x10-2 
u = 1 x10-1 
(b)
 
Figure 29. Dependence of the coefficients 1/ (a) and 2/ (b) on the source efficiency variation 
( )r for 
different values of the parameter u .
Now let us return to Eqs. (3.19), (3.23). Figure 29 demonstrates that coefficients 1,2/
have nearly linear dependence on ( )r when 0u  . One can note that if 310u  they collapse, 
in accordance with Eq. (3.22), to asymptotes ( )( ) ( )10lim , 1
r r
u
u  

/ = +  and ( )( ) ( )20lim ,
r r
u
u  

/ =   ,
correspondingly. This permits us to estimate the magnitude of the prompt power jump (after the 
second term in Eq. (3.23) has disappeared):   
( )( ) ( )0 1 01r rpromptP P P ( /  (  , (3.24) 
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i.e. it is proportional to perturbation of the source efficiency. 
3.3.6. Discussion. Comparison with the case of reactivity insertion 
In contrast to conventional critical reactors, in coupled hybrid systems there are two 
ways to affect the total neutron multiplication factor: either by means of reactivity insertion 
( )ext or by means of modification of the source efficiency. Introduction of the source reactivity 
r gives us an easy-to-use tool making it possible to inter-compare these two modes, since this 
parameter has exactly the same meaning from the point of view of the steady neutron 
multiplication factor as the core reactivity ( )1 /eff effk k =  . However, as was mentioned above, 
transients (as a response to an equivalent multiplication factor perturbation r  =  ) can also 
be different. To quantify this eventual difference let us compare the important kinetic 
characteristics: roots of the inhour equation in both cases. Particular attention is paid to the 
inter-comparison of the asymptotic periods ( )r and ( ) for these two cases. A solution in the 
case of r -variation was obtained in a previous Section [Eqs. (3.18)-(3.24)].  
For case of step-wise reactivity insertion, there exists a vast literature, from which a 
solution could be taken (e.g. Refs. Hetrick, 1971; Ash, 1979; Rozon, 1992; Reuss, 2003). Thus, 
supposing ( ) ( )/ 	. . and having introduced parameter ( )( ) /   .$  we can write the 
solution for this case in the following way: 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
0 ( ) ( ) ( )
1 exp exp 1
1 1 1
P t P t t
 

  
  	 
  
.
.
        =                
. (3.25) 
Two ultimate limits are considered in our analysis:  
 
1. Small reactivities: ( )  .  .
In this case a reactivity insertion leads to the following roots of the characteristic 
equation: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
1
 	   	 	 
  
.
. .
. .
 = ( =

,
( ) ( )
( )
2
   
. . = ( 
 
, (3.26) 
where ( )( ) / 1   .$  . A comparison with the result for source variations [Eq. (3.21)] 
demonstrates that for small perturbations of neutron multiplication factor ( ) ( ) 1r  = = 
one finds: ( ) ( )1 1
r = and ( ) ( )2 2
r = . Consequently, the asymptotic reactor period in both cases 
would be identical ( )( ) 1( ) ( ) ( )r   	 . =  = . In addition, this period is rather large when 
compared with the effective generation time of precursors of delayed neutrons ( ) ( ) ( )ln 2 / 	. .= .
We can also compare the prompt power jumps in these two cases. In the case of 
reactivity insertion we obtain from Eq. (3.25): ( )( ) ( ) ( )0 / 1promptP P    =  . Hence, the ratio of 
prompt jumps in equivalent circumstances ( )( ) ( )r  = = is:  
( ) ( )/ 1rprompt promptP P
   =  . (3.27) 
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i.e. the case of the source reactivity variation is more advantageous when compared with core 
reactivity variation. Indeed, in the case of positive reactivity insertion ( )0 > it results in lesser 
prompt power jump.   
 
2. Large reactivities: ( )1.5  . > ( )( ) 1.5 >
In this case the reactor becomes super critical on prompt neutrons and an analysis of the 
inhour equation yields in the well known result: 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )1 1 0    
. . = (  >
 
,
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
2 ( ) 01



	  	
   
. .
. .
   = (  <    
. (3.28) 
As one may remark, the positive root ( )1
 of the characteristic equation, governing the 
rate of power growth, increases drastically when compared with Eq. (3.26), while Eqs. (3.21) 
remain valid for variation of the source reactivity. Let us assess the ratio ( ) ( )1 1/
r  for the 
equivalent perturbation of the neutron multiplication factor ( ) ( ) 1r  = = > :
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
1
( ) ( )
1
1 1 1r r u
   
 	  	
. .
. .

( ( =
 


. (3.29) 
The asymptotic period for the case of variation of the source efficiency becomes much 
greater than the asymptotic period in the case when the reactivity is inserted 
( ) ( ) 1/ 1r u   =  . In addition, its value remains comparable with the effective generation 
time of precursors of delayed neutrons ( ) ( )1/r 	 .  .
One can note that behavior of the coupled system is essentially different in the case of 
source reactivity variation. The explanation is rather simple: in this case the core remains 
subcritical and works in the mode of “energy amplifier”. If some perturbation of the external 
source effectiveness leads to a prompt change in the core power, development of the consequent 
transient will be limited by the rate of energy transfer from the core to the neutron production 
mechanism (e.g. proton accelerator).  
The above result can be reformulated in the following way: the change in the neutron 
multiplication factor of the coupled hybrid system through the effectiveness of the external 
source does not affect essentially its asymptotic period. This result leads to an important 
conclusion concerning the operation of these systems: from the point of view of reactor kinetics, 
it is preferable to regulate the neutron multiplication factor by means of the source reactivity.  
These results allow us to give another practical recommendation: it is preferable to 
envisage reactivity reserves (e.g. devoted to compensate eventual reactivity swing) in the form of 
the source reactivity. In this case an erroneous insertion of these reserves will not lead to drastic 
decrease of the reactor period.
3.3.7. Conclusions 
In the present Section we have proposed an approach, which allows elucidating the role 
of the source efficiency in kinetics of the coupled system. The total neutron multiplication factor 
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effm and the source reactivity r are introduced by analogy with core neutron multiplication 
factor effk and core reactivity  . The source reactivity r becomes a valuable tool to compare 
variation of the source effectiveness with reactivity insertion.   
With the support of a simple mathematical model, describing the coupling of the 
subcritical core and of the external neutron source, we demonstrate that the latter may be 
treated as a supplementary group of delayed neutrons. As was shown, this similarity between 
“natural” and “artificial” delayed neutrons is not absolute: some new opportunities arise and 
they have to be taken into account when the kinetics of the coupled hybrid system is considered.  
The modified inhour equation, which takes into account the ability to modify source 
reactivity, is deduced and an analysis of its roots is performed. An asymptotic reactor period, in 
the case of source reactivity variation, is obtained as a solution of this modified inhour equation.   
From the above analysis we conclude that the kinetic response of the coupled hybrid 
system to “source reactivity” variation is intrinsically different from that to core reactivity, in 
particular, when large (when compared with the effective fraction of delayed neutrons) reactivity 
is introduced. Namely, there is no equivalent of prompt criticality (accompanied by drastic 
decrease of the reactor period) for “source reactivity”. These results allow us to give the 
following practical recommendation: it is preferable to have reactivity reserves in the form of the 
source reactivity from the point of view of reactor kinetics, since in this case an erroneous 
insertion of these reserves will not lead to drastic decrease of the reactor period. 
3.4. On behavior of ADS when feedback effects are degraded  
3.4.1. Subcriticality level, necessary to compensate feedback degradation 
Let us imagine that a degradation of safety characteristics of a critical core leads to 
decrease (down to zero-level) of the negative Doppler-effect (or a similar rapid negative feedback 
effect) which usually plays the most important stabilization role in the standard safety-related 
situations. One could ask if a reasonably chosen sub-criticality level in the case of ADS could 
compensate the degraded Doppler-effect so that the asymptotic power ( )ADSP after insertion of the 
positive reactivity 0ext > would be equal to the asymptotic power 
( )CRTP of the “non-
degraded” critical core.
The answer to the above question depends, in principle, on the particularities of a 
system. For our simplified analysis we may employ either the reactor model utilized in Chapter 
2 [Eqs. (2.1), (2.11)-(2.12)] or the simplified model of the reactor as in previous Section [Eqs. 
(3.2) and (3.10)]. In both cases, the source term ( )S t is described by Eq. (2.5).  
For a detailed analysis of the safety potential of any nuclear system, one is obliged to 
take into account all important feedbacks inherent to this system. However, for illustration of 
particularities of new feedbacks, it seems sufficient to use the model with only one “generalized” 
traditional feedback as it is presented below, characterized by the feedback coefficient 
0feedback < .
Let us compare the asymptotic power levels after reactivity ext insertion in two 
systems: in the critical system with “normal” thermal feedback ( feedback ) and in the ADS with 
degraded feedback ( feedback- ), where ( ) ( )0 0 ,feedback feedback -<   feedback feedback -> . Here a 
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linear model of feedback effects is assumed, i.e. reactivity variations due to feedback in the 
standard and degraded core are given by: 
feedbackfeedback
feedbackfeedback
T


         =  !  !-   -   " # " #
. (3.30) 
The stationary solution for the reactor power can be obtained from Eqs. (2.1), (2.11)-
(2.12) with zero time derivatives. In the case of ADS the following expression describes the 
asymptotic value of power variations: 
( ) ( ) ( )20 0 0 42
ADS
ext ext ext
P
P r r   - - - =  +  + +  +   -  
A A AA , (3.31) 
where the following notations are introduced:  
0 / ;feedback totP H- -$ A ( )( )
11 1
0
s
tot pH H c D
 $ +  . (3.32) 
In this context the physical meaning of above parameters is evident: the parameter totH
describes the effective thermal resistance of the heat transfer system and the parameter A is the 
normalized power feedback coefficient taken with “minus” sign in order to obtain a positive-
value parameter (we remind, that feedback- is assumed to be small but negative), given by: 
( )0
0
0
feedbackd PP
dP
  =     
A . (3.33) 
In the case of a critical system with a “non-degraded” feedback ( 0 /feedback totP H= A )
the asymptotic response of the system to a reactivity insertion is given by 
( ) 0CRT
ext
PP  = A . (3.34) 
Comparing Eq. (3.31) with Eq. (3.34) one can evaluate the subcriticality level, necessary 
to reach the same asymptotic power level in both cases: 
( )0 1 extr 
 -=  +  
A AA , (3.35) 
which, in the case of a total loss of feedback effects ( 0feedback- -= =A ), becomes 
0 extr = +A (3.36) 
Therefore, the subcriticality level, required to compensate the degraded feedback effect is 
defined by Eq. (3.35). In the limit case of complete absence of the in-core feedback it consists of 
two parts [Eq. (3.36)]: the first one compensates the positive reactivity, which would appear due 
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to the core cooling from the temperature T to kT , and the second compensates the inserted 
reactivity ext .
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Figure 30. Unprotected TOP transients in the critical reactor with the standard feedback effect and in the 
corresponding subcritical system (ADS) with fully degraded feedback effect. 
The following example illustrates these evaluations. Figure 30 presents transients of core 
power (a) and of core temperature (b) in the critical molten salt thermal reactor (analogous to 
AMSTER concept) with the “standard” feedback coefficient 1.95 pcm/°Cfeedback = 
( 487.5 pcm=A , 0 / 250totP H = °C), and the inserted reactivity 175 pcmext = . This result 
can be compared with the corresponding “fully degraded” subcritical system ( 0feedback- -= =A ,
0 665pcmr = ), where subcriticality level was chosen in accordance with Eq. (3.36). Transients 
for the critical system as well as for ADS are calculated in one-group approximation for delayed 
neutrons ( 350 pcm, = 10.08 s	 = ). 
In brief, both critical system with the standard feedback effect and subcritical system 
without feedback have similar asymptotic values with respect to the core power and 
temperature. However, transients are quite different: there are considerable power and 
temperature oscillations in critical reactors, while transient in subcritical systems is rather 
monotonic. This monotony of power and temperature curves during both reactivity and thermo-
hydraulic transients has already been noted in Chapter 2. The observed monotony of transients 
in the case of subcritical system (ADS) permits to restrict our analysis by the comparison of 
only asymptotic values in both cases. 
Therefore, Eq. (3.35) shows a way to compensate the feedback degradation in terms of 
equal asymptotic power levels in a “non-degraded” critical- and the corresponding “degraded” 
subcritical system after insertion of the maximal available positive reactivity.  
3.4.2. On the grace time of ADS with a positive feedback 
In Chapter 2 we have seen an important increase of the grace time in ADS when 
compared with corresponding critical system for the systems with the positive feedback 
( 0feedback > ). We found it interesting to characterize the dependence of the grace time as a 
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function of the subcriticality level. The goal of this study is not to find the exact solution of the 
problem (this seems to require some cumbersome evaluation), but to estimate the lower limit of 
the grace time in the most severe conditions.  
Let us consider the event, which consists in simultaneous insertion of all reserves of the 
reactivity ( ext ) or/and of the proton current ( extr ) under conditions where heat evacuation 
from core is completely halted and the external neutron source continues working (this situation 
is analogous to the UTOP/UTOC + ULOF/ULOHS complex accident). In this case core 
heating by the external neutron source is aggravated by continuous decrease of the subcriticality 
level caused by an unfavourable positive feedback. This decrease of the subcriticality level 
accelerates transient to core disruption, as it leads to a rise of core energy multiplication factor 
according to the well-known relationship /P S  .
It is evident, that neglecting delayed neutrons, we obtain the most pessimistic estimation 
for the grace time. In these conditions the core transient may be described by the following 
coupled system of equations (we utilize the same notation as in the previous Sections):   
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
0 0 ;
.
ext feedback ext
p
Pd P tP t T r r r
dt
dC T t P t
dt
 
 =  +  + +    ="
(3.37) 
This system of equation may be easily resolved in so-called quasi-static approximation, 
i.e. assuming, that core power is in a quasi-static equilibrium with the external neutron source. 
The physical basement for this assumption is that the characteristic time of the temperature 
change is much greater than the prompt neutron generation timef. In these conditions we may 
take approximately, that ( )/ 0dP t dt = and therefore 
( )
( )
( )( )
0 0
0
ext
ext feedback
r r P
P t
T r 
+
= 
 + 
. (3.38) 
Substituting Eq. (3.38) into Eq. (3.37) and after some rearrangements one obtains: 
( )( )
( )
0
0 0
ext feedbackp
ext
r TC
dt dT
P r r
  
=
+
. (3.39) 
Integration of Eq. (3.39) yields: 
( )
( )( ) ( )
† †
0 0
† †
0 0
0 0
t T
p
ext feedback
extt T
C
t dt r T T T dT
r r P
 
    = =     ! +   " #
  . (3.40) 
In principle, Eq. (3.40) is the solution of the considered problem. For further estimations 
one needs the explicit dependence of the core feedback on the core temperature as well as the 
core disruption temperature. Let us consider for simplicity the linearized feedback: 
 
f As stated by Reuss (2003) this approximation is valid if core is subcritical on prompt neutrons. 
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( ) ( )0feedback feedbackT T T  =  . (3.41) 
Moreover, let us assume, that the prompt criticality corresponds to the disruption temperature 
(as it was considered in Chapter 2), i.e., 
( )† 0 0feedback extT r  +  = . (3.42) 
In these conditions Eq. (3.40) reduces to 
( )
( )
2
0†
0 02
p ext
feedback ext
C r
t
P r r



 =
+
. (3.43) 
From Eq. (3.43) it follows, that the grace time for this ultimate event increases 
approximately as a square of the margin to the prompt criticality ( )0m extr  =  . Applying 
notations, introduced in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.1, we may rewrite Eq. (3.43) in the following way: 
( )
( )
2
0† 0
0
1 /1
2 1 /
ext
ext
rrt
r r

	+

 =
- +A . (3.44) 
From this expression becomes obvious that in the case of a large subcriticality level, i.e., 
when ( )0 ,ext extr r  , the grace time will be by a factor 00.5 /r -A greater than the 
characteristic heat transfer time in the system given by ( ) 1	 + .
All the methods, considered in this Chapter allow “patching up” some particular safety-
related problems. Unfortunately, utilized one by one, they do not guarantee the intrinsic safety. 
In the next Chapter we will discuss a promising comprehensive approach, which permits to 
“repair” inherently both the degraded feedback and the fraction of delayed neutrons. 
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4. A hybrid system with intrinsic improvement of the 
delayed neutron fraction and of the power feedback: 
DENNY concept 
 
Résumé - Une des options de systèmes hybrides est le système couplé, où un 
couplage intrinsèque entre l’intensité de la source externe et la puissance du cœur est 
réalisé. Ce système peut être caractérisé comme un système fonctionnant en mode 
critique où la source externe de neutrons joue le rôle d’un groupe supplémentaire de 
neutrons retardés. Des études antérieures de la cinétique et de la dynamique des 
systèmes hybrides couplés ont démontré les avantages de tels systèmes en comparaison 
avec leurs homologues critiques en matière de sûreté. Pourtant, les systèmes couplés 
héritent de certains problèmes intrinsèques aux systèmes fonctionnant en mode critique. 
Notamment une dégradation des effets de contre-réaction (par exemple l’effet Doppler) 
prive le système de ses propriétés stabilisantes.  
Dans l’objectif de remédier à ce problème une nouvelle façon de réaliser un système 
couplé est proposée (concept DENNY). Dans le cadre de cette approche il est proposé, 
contrairement aux travaux antérieurs, d’utiliser l’énergie des protons incidents (à la 
place de l’intensité) en tant que paramètre de couplage, c’est à dire de changer le mode 
de couplage. Dans ce cas on peut profiter de certaines particularités de production de 
neutrons dans une cible de spallation en fonction de l’énergie des protons incidents (Yn-
effect) et de ce fait accentuer les propriétés stabilisatrices de la puissance du cœur lors 
des accidents de réactivité non protégés.  
Une caractérisation générale du fonctionnement de DENNY est donnée. Lors de 
cette étude il a été démontré que l’influence bénéfique de l’effet Yn-effect sur la 
dynamique des systèmes hybrides couplés peut être considérable (surtout en l’absence 
d’effet Doppler). 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 In this Chapter we discus a new approach for the realization of ACS, where a significant 
improvement of the feedback effect is expected due to the modification of the accelerator-core 
coupling mode and due to the particularities of the neutron production in a spallation target. 
The goal of this new concept is to combine the intrinsic safety features of ADS and ACS with 
respect to their behavior during unprotected accidents in a single concept. This approach was 
initially proposed in Ref. (Bokov et al., 2004b) and also addressed and refined in Refs. (Bokov et 
al., 2004a, Bokov et al., 2005).  
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4.2. Generalities of hybrid systems 
As demonstrated in previous Chapters, the core subcriticality will improve the safety, in 
particularly, when feedback effects, the delayed neutron fraction or other safety related 
parameters are degraded, for example, due to presence of long-lived actinides subjected to 
transmutation. As already discussed above, there are at least two different ways of functioning 
of a subcritical core in combination with an external neutron source. In brief, this source can be 
independent on energy production in the cores (ADS), or it can depend on the energy 
production in the cores and in this way becomes “coupled” or “coordinated” by the core power 
level (ACS). Each combination opens some new opportunities related to the safety improvement. 
In terms of safety ADS is inherently more favorable (compared with the similar critical 
reactor) regarding reactivity accidents, where the core subcriticality mitigates the consequences 
of the reactivity insertion (see for example Refs. Takahashi, 1995; Wade, 2000; Schikorr, 2001; 
Slessarev and Bokov, 2004). On the other hand, a system functioning in a critical regime 
(including ACS) is intrinsically safer in the case of thermo-hydraulic type of transients (under 
conditions that those in-core feedbacks are favorable).  
In the case of ACS a “source of artificially delayed neutrons” allows increasing the 
fraction of delayed neutrons and therefore, the effective neutron lifetime artificially. If compared 
to the conventional critical reactors, this particular property of ACS can improve the reactor 
dynamics significantly. Moreover, ACS operates in a critical mode and, therefore, in contrast to 
ADS, takes advantages of favorable temperature feedbacks, which might exist in these systems. 
As we discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the drawback of this system is that in the case of the 
unfavorable in-core feedbacks, the deterministic safety can not be achieved. 
Therefore, it would be rather attractive to combine these inherent advantages of both 
ADS and ACS in a single installation. In other words, one needs to realize a system, for which 
during the unprotected transients 
(i) the intensity of an external neutron source decreases with the decrease of core power,  
(ii) the intensity of an external neutron source remains stable or even decreases with the 
increase of core power, and, finally 
(iii) conditions i) and ii) have to be intrinsic.
One of possible solutionsg to merge the above advantages is presented in the following 
Section. It is based on the physical processes taking place in the neutron production target, what 
makes our approach inherent. 
4.3. Accelerator-core coupling modes in the case of ACS 
Traditionally, it is assumed that in hybrid systems the current of a proton accelerator is 
the coupling parameter, which one can vary to change the neutron source intensity. In the case 
of ACS, at least two modes of coupling between external neutron source and core could be 
envisaged: 
 
g Other approaches to create inherent shut-down mechanisms are discussed, for example, by Eriksson and Cahalan 
(2001).  
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1. When it is supposed to modify the intensity of an external neutron source S by varying the 
proton beam current pI at a fixed nominal value of the proton energy, namely 
,0
0
out
p p out
PI I
P
= . (4.1) 
Here outP is the output power of the installation (we assume for the simplicity, that a const = ,
e const = and, therefore, the parameter 
outP denotes either electric output power or thermal 
output power), and a subscript “0” denotes nominal values of the corresponding variables.  
Hereafter this method of the “accelerator-core” coupling is designated as “I-mode” coupling.  
 
2. When any change of the output power leads to a proportional change of the proton energy p
at a fixed nominal value of the proton current, namely  
,0
0
out
p p out
P
P
=  . (4.2) 
This coupling method is denoted as “E-mode” coupling. 
 
In this work we propose to utilize the proton energy as coupling parameter (E-mode 
ACS). The difference between the E- and I-modes, we would like to make use of, is based on a 
non-linear behavior of the neutron yield nY with respect to the proton energy p variation 
(hereafter “ nY -effect”).  
Indeed, as it is shown in a number of studies (see Refs.: Andriamonje et al., 1995; 
Pankratov et al., 1996; Letourneau et al., 2000; Leray, 2000 and Refs. therein), when the energy 
of incident protons becomes higher than ~1 GeV, the neutron yield normalized per incident 
proton energy  
( ) ( )n pn p
p
Y
y =



(4.3) 
becomes nearly constant and even slightly decreases with proton energy. There are two major 
reasons for this decrease of neutron production efficiency with increase of the proton energy:  
(i) opening of new reaction channels other than neutron production,  
(ii) escape of high energy particles from the spallation target with finite geometry.  
This dependence of neutron production is illustrated qualitatively in Figure 31. The 
neutron yield nY , after proton energy passed the reaction threshold [zone (1’)], grows rather 
rapidly with energy [zone (1”)]; above a certain value of p , this dependence has a moderated 
quasi-linear behavior [zone (2)]. So, there is a value of proton energy optimump , which is optimal 
with respect to the neutron economy, i.e. the neutron yield ( ny ) per one incident proton and per 
consumed energy reaches its maximal value. Therefore, it is generally considered that there is no 
sense to increase the energy of protons further than optimump since the production of neutrons in 
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the spallation target becomes less efficient if compared with the equivalent increase of the proton 
current (i.e., the accelerator power being constant). 
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Figure 31. Dependence of the spallation neutron yield ( )n py  (solid line) and that of the source 
effectiveness ( )P Q p   (dashed line – to be defined by Eq. 4.13 below). Also see the text for details.  
Quantitatively, the nY -effect as a function of proton energy can be described by an 
empirical formula proposed by Pankratov et al. (1996) in the units of neutron yield per one 
incident proton interacting with a thick heavy metal target: 
( ) ( ) ,n p pY

 µ=  +  (4.4) 
where the parameters , 0, µ 1 0 1  can be fitted to the experimental data depending on 
the target geometry and materials. This particular dependence of the neutron yield on target 
geometry and material should not be neglected. Furthermore, one should make use of these 
particular situations. Indeed, our preliminary estimates have shown that some optimization on 
the geometry of the spallation target might strengthen further the nY -effect. More quantitative 
calculations in this context are needed. 
4.4. Principle of the operation – DENNY concept 
In this Section we propose to utilize this particularity of neutron production to form a 
quasi-linear dependence (the nY -effect) between energy production in the core and external 
neutron production in the spallation target aiming to get an auto-regulating behavior of the 
ensemble “accelerator – subcritical core”. A proposed system (E-mode coupled ACS) would have 
the kinetics of a critical system with artificial group of delayed neutrons as in the case of the 
“standard” ACS. In addition, its external neutron production would contain the supplementary 
feedback, tending to stabilize the installation power in its nominal state. 
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To elucidate this statement, let us remind that the ACS may be considered as a critical 
system with two types of neutrons contributing to the global neutron balance: “core neutrons” 
and “source neutrons”. Despite the fact that this separation of neutrons is relatively artificial, it 
reflects their origin and, therefore, corresponding neutron production feedbacks existing in each 
case. In the same context, the nY -effect can be compared to the Doppler feedback effect but for 
the external source neutrons. Similarly as the Doppler feedback effect, the nY -effect is intrinsic. 
It would be quite advantageous for the system safety to have this supplementary feedback 
acting on the entire neutron balance if the “standard” core feedbacks are degraded and can not 
play their stabilizing role indispensable for the inherent system safety. 
The advantage of the above realization of a coupled hybrid system can be illustrated by 
the “neutron production versus core power” (Figure 32a) as well as by the “core power versus 
accelerator power” (Figure 32b) diagrams for the case of unprotected accidents. We note the 
equivalence between Figure 32a for the E-mode ACS and Figure 31 for the neutron yield nY -
dependence, which is possible to make use of only in the case of E-coupling. According to the 
new concept (proposed ACS with the E-mode coupling), the power (and temperature) excursion 
would be less important than in the “standard” I-mode ACS, what is clearly seen from Figure 
32b. The system with an accelerator coupled to the core in the E-mode will be named also 
“DENNY” (after Delayed Enhanced Neutronics with Non-linear neutron Yield) in the present 
work. Below we propose the principle of DENNY functioning. 
Let us consider the E-mode ACS with a pre-defined subcriticality level 
( )0 ,0 ,01 /eff effr k k=  and a fraction 1f < of the produced core power, which is used to drive an 
external neutron source. External neutrons are created in the spallation target by incident 
protons accelerated up to the energy p . It is preferable to choose the nominal proton energy 
,0
optimum
p p>  in order to avoid an eventual instability of the DENNY power with respect to 
negative reactivity insertions (power decrease). Hence the proton energy has to be chosen as 
follows: ,0
optimum
p m= +   (region (2”) in Figure 31). Here the margin m [zone (2’) in Figure 
31] makes the system more stable with respect to negative reactivity insertions. This is valid if 
during the system operation the proton energy remains above the optimal energy, i.e. the 
condition optimump 1  is fulfilled.  
 
Figure 32. Diagrams of the intrinsic dependences of: (a) the external neutron production Q on the core 
power P , and (b) the equilibrium core power P on the accelerator power inpP for different concepts of a 
coupled hybrid system. 
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The nominal values of proton current ( ,0pI ) as well as of the fraction of accelerator feed 
power ( 0f ) are chosen in the way to sustain the power level 0P in a nominal state (Salvatores et 
al., 1996):  
( )
0 0
,0 *
,0
p
f n p
r P
I
Y


=
 
, 00 *
,0
 
( )f p a e
rf
y

  
=
 
. (4.5) 
The value of the proton current is fixed over all period of the E-mode ACS functioning. 
On the contrary, the fraction f may be adjusted to compensate eventual reactivity swing (e.g., 
due to the burn-up). In other words, for the proton energy we write:  
,0
0 0
p p
fP
f P
=  . (4.6) 
Above we explained schematically the principle of the DENNY functioning, where some 
details are omitted with a view to simplify our description (for example, we suppose that 
accelerator efficiency is identical for all proton energies, importance of source neutrons does not 
depend on proton energy, etc.). However, in order to give some quantitative illustration of the 
main principle, a simplified model of the system operation with the E-coupling is presented 
below. 
4.5. Results and discussion 
Let us study the response of the E-mode ACS on an accidental reactivity insertion in 
order to describe qualitatively the influence of the nY -effect on its kinetics. A new equilibrium 
power level P of the system after insertion of the reactivity ext can be found from generalized 
reactivity-power balance equation (Gandini et al., 1999; Gandini et al., 2000) following from the 
stationary kinetic equation: 
0 0( ) ( )/ 0ext feedbackr P rQ P P   + + = , (4.7) 
where the term  
( )
( )
( )0 ,0
( )n p
n p
Y P
Q P P
Y
=


(4.8) 
describes the external neutron source, while the proton energy p was already defined in Eq. 
(4.6). In this context the last term in Eq. (4.7) may be considered as a “source (feedback) 
reactivity”, i.e.  
0 ( )/r rQ P P= . (4.9) 
Eq. (4.7) together with the feedback model and neutron yield dependence [ ( )n pY  ]
describes equilibrium states of the E-mode ACS after reactivity-insertion transients. In this case, 
a new power level P after the reactivity transients will be determined not only by the core 
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feedback but also by the ability of the external source to produce sufficient neutrons to sustain 
this power. 
Eq. (4.7) is non-linear with respect to the variable P and can be solved numerically. 
However, linearization of Eq. (4.7) allows us to characterize the nY -effect analytically with 
respect to the infinitesimal power fluctuation. Moreover, it permits to compare the in-core 
feedbacks with the nY -effect.  
Introducing normalized power reactivity coefficients 
0
0
0
( )feedbackd PP
dP
  $     
A and  00
0
( )dr P
P
dP
  $     
B (4.10) 
we rewrite Eq. (4.7) in the linearized form:  
( )
0
0ext
P
P
   + =A B . (4.11) 
Taking into account the initial condition 0 0( )Q P P= and after some modifications, one 
obtains the following expression for the parameter B :
( )00 0 0 0
0 0
( ) 1 ( )P Q
Q Pdr P r P
dP P
 
   =  =       
B (4.12) 
with the function  
( ) ( )00
0
P Q
dQ P
P
dP
  $ (4.13) 
being a measure of the local source effectiveness, i.e. a source response due to an infinitesimal 
power change in a nominal state (i.e. 0P P= ). With respect to the global neutron balance in the 
E-mode ACS, Eq. (4.12) demonstrates that the parameter B may be considered as a coefficient, 
which is a measure of the supplementary neutron production feedback, arising in the system due 
to the nY -effect. As it follows from Eq. (4.12), the coefficient B is proportional to the nominal 
subcriticality level 0r and depends on the 0( )P Q P  functional behavior.  
A non-linear neutron production influences the equilibrium power level, and its 
effectiveness 0( )P Q P  will depend on the choice of the nominal proton energy ,0p . We may 
incorporate the choice of the nominal energy to the source efficiency by introducing the function   
( ),0,P Q p p dQdP $ H , (4.14) 
which describes the global effectiveness of the external neutron production at any proton energy 
p with the nominal energy being ,0p (see Figure 31).  
Using Eqs. (4.8) and after some simplifications, it becomes 
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( ) ( )
( )0
,0
0
, n ppP Q p p
pn p
dY
dY
      =         

 

H . (4.15) 
The nY -effect increases the asymptotical power if ,0
optimum
p p<  [region (1) in Figure 31] 
and, contrary, it reduces the power growth if ,0
optimum
p p1  [region (2) in Figure 31]. In fact, we 
can see from Eq. (4.12) that, if the condition ( ) ( ),0, / 1P Q p p Q P  = < H is fulfilled, the 
external neutron source is not able to support the increasing power, what will limit the 
consequent power growth 0P P P =  .
Let us suppose for simplicity that 0f f= . In this case the function ( )P Q p   can be 
expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )
( ),0,0
,0
,0,0
n pp
P Q p
pn p
dY
dY
 
      =         



. (4.16) 
As it follows from Eq. (4.4) and Eq. (4.16) at 
 
1
,0 (1 )p

 µ
  =     
 , (4.17) 
the function ,0( ) 1P Q p  =
 . This energy point defines the limit between the “destabilizing” area 
of the nY -effect (amplification of P , similar to positive feedback) at ,0 ,0p p<
  and the 
“stabilizing” domain of the nY -effect (suppression of P , similar to negative feedbacks) at 
,0 ,0p p1
  (see Figure 31). It is important to note that in the present case ,0p
 is equal to the 
optimum energy optimump with respect to the neutron economy: ,0
optimum
p p=
  .
In order to quantify the benefits of the proposed DENNY concept we perform a 
comparative analysis in the case of ACS with the I-mode coupling and E-mode coupling, 
resulting in a linear ( )Q P dependence and non-linear ( )Q P dependence correspondingly (see 
Figure 32a). The effectiveness of the nY -effect for the safety improvement can be described by 
the transient suppression parameter D . This parameter is defined as a ratio of asymptotic power 
values of the E-coupled and I-coupled systems after a certain reactivity insertion transient, 
namely 
( )
( )
E mode
I mode
P
P

=D . (4.18) 
If the condition 1<D is fulfilled, this signifies that the nY -effect stabilizes the system. 
Values of the parameter D at different 0r and ext for the linear model of in-core feedback are 
presented in Figure 33a. For a quantitative comparison we had to define the parameters in 
Eq. (4.4), which we took from Ref. (Pankratov et al., 1996), namely 8.2 = , 29.3µ = and 
0.75 = . According to the discussion in the previous Section we choose the nominal energy 
value ,0p = 1.6 GeV, i.e. greater than ,0p
 = 1.16 GeV for our comparative analysis, from which 
the following conclusions are drawn: 
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 stabilizing role of the nY -effect increases when both 0r and ext increase. This effect can be 
quite significant (up to 27 % at 0 15r = ) even in the case of a “good” in-core feedback 
( 488=A pcm). A further growth of ext leads to the saturation of such a tendency; 
 the augmentation of the nominal proton energy ,0p enhances the stabilizing impact of nY -
effect due to the reduction of the source effectiveness ,0( )P Q p   .
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Figure 33. Transient suppression parameter D as a function of the subcriticality level: (a) at different 
values of the inserted reactivity ext (the power feedback coefficient 488 pcm=A ), (b) at different 
values of the parameter A (the inserted reactivity = 350 pcmext ).  
Parameter D depends also on the feedback coefficient A , defined earlier in this work 
[Eq. (4.10)]. It should be reminded that this parameter reflects both the in-core feedback effects 
and thermo-hydraulics of the system. Figure 33b demonstrates that the impact of the nY -effect 
on power stabilization increases when the absolute value of the feedback coefficient A decreases. 
This dependence of the transient suppression parameter D on the parameter A is expectable. 
Indeed, if 0A , i.e. in-core feedback effects are absent, the nY -effect becomes the only 
feedback effect, exiting in the system. 
A coupled hybrid system, as mentioned already in Section 4.4, may be considered as a 
critical system with two types of neutrons contributing to the neutron balance: “core neutrons” 
and “source neutrons”. Though this separation of neutrons is artificial, it reflects their origin 
and, therefore, shows the corresponding feedbacks existing in each case. In the same sense, the 
Yn-effect together with core subcriticality can be compared with the Doppler feedback effect with 
respect to the external neutron source. This last assumption needs more explanations. Indeed, 
the Doppler-effect is both intrinsic and instantaneous feedback effect, leading to a limitation of 
both the asymptotic reactor power and asymptotic temperatures. 
As for the Yn-effect, it is also based on the intrinsic physical phenomenon: dependence of 
the neutron production in a finite spallation target upon the energy of the incident particle. 
However, to guarantee that the Yn-effect is intrinsic, at least two conditions have to be fulfilled: 
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(I) the system has to be engineered in such a way that it leads to an increase of the 
proton energy but not of the proton current (as described above); 
(II) the system has to remain subcritical in any situation, i.e. subcriticality level has to 
be greater than the maximal value of the inserted reactivity. 
For further clarification, let us consider time intervals shorter than the characteristic 
time of energy transfer from the core to the external neutron source ( ) 1t 	 +  . During these 
short periods of time the intensity the external neutron source remains unchanged, i.e. the 
prompt kinetic response of the coupled system on the reactivity insertion is the same as for an 
ADS. If (II) is valid, then any prompt reactivity insertion will result (similarly as due to the 
Doppler-effect) in a limited prompt jump of the reactor power (as discussed in Section 3.4) with 
a magnitude depending only (without any in-core feedbacks) upon the ratio “inserted 
reactivity/”margin to core criticality”. In this context, the Yn-effect together with core 
subcriticality can be considered as an intrinsic and instantaneous feedback, i.e., analogues to the 
Doppler-effect. 
In fact, the Yn-effect leads to the moderation of the asymptotic reactor power, if 
Conditions (I) and (II) are fulfilled. Therefore, it would be quite advantageous for the system 
safety to have this complementary feedback when “standard” core feedbacks are degraded. 
4.6. Conclusions 
In the present Chapter a new approach for the realization of an Accelerator Coupled 
hybrid System (ACS) was proposed. The concept, nominated as the DENNY system (Delayed 
Enhanced Neutronics with Non-linear neutron Yield), is based on the particularity of the 
neutron production forming a quasi-linear dependence between energy production in the core 
(coupled to the proton accelerator via its energy) and the external neutron yield nY in the 
spallation target ( nY -effect). This particular dependence provides an auto-regulating behavior of 
the ensemble “accelerator – subcritical core”. A proposed system has the kinetics of a critical 
system with artificial group of delayed neutrons as in the case of the “standard” ACS. In 
addition, its external neutron production contains the supplementary feedback, able to stabilize 
the installation power in its nominal state. 
We showed that a significant improvement of the feedback effect due to this particular 
coupling between the accelerator and subcritical core (denoted as E-mode coupling) could be 
achieved. The proposed nY -effect can be compared to the Doppler feedback effect but for the 
external source neutrons. Similarly as the Doppler-effect, the nY -effect is intrinsic. Finally, our 
qualitative estimates show that the implementation of this concept could compensate eventual 
feedback degradation in the cores dedicated to transmute nuclear waste. Further and more 
quantitative analysis in this context is urgently needed. These studies should equally include the 
feasibility estimates to answer if the E-mode ACS could be realized in practice. 
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5. Preliminary safety study of the REBUS-3700 concept 
 
Résumé – Les études présentées dans ce Chapitre sont consacrées au concept de 
Réacteur à Neutrons Rapides à sel fondu, fonctionnant en cycle fermé, avec une 
alimentation en uranium naturel ou appauvri (concept REBUS-3700). Dans la première 
partie du Chapitre, nous formulons les exigences et les critères auxquels un système du 
futur doit répondre ; en particulier les aspects ressources naturelles, sûreté, économie et 
non-prolifération. La deuxième partie décrit brièvement des paramètres principaux de 
fonctionnement. Dans la troisième et principale partie de ce Chapitre une étude 
préliminaire des potentialités de la sûreté déterministe de REBUS-3700 a été réalisée. 
Ce réacteur, fondé sur le cycle U/Pu, est caractérisé par un coefficient très important de 
contre-réaction ce qui est le souci principal du point de vue de sa sûreté. L’objectif de 
l’étude est d'évaluer le potentiel de la sûreté déterministe du concept REBUS, ainsi que 
le rôle éventuel de la sous-criticité dans le renforcement de la sûreté. L’étude est base sur 
l’analyse du bilan quasi-statique de la réactivité. Cette étude a abouti à certaines 
recommandations concernant le fonctionnement du réacteur (par exemple : chauffage 
externe du sel lors du démarrage du réacteur, contrôle de la puissance du réacteur par le 
débit du sel, etc.), afin de diminuer les réserves de réactivité existant dans le réacteur. 
Elle a démontré le potentiel excellent du REBUS (configuration critique) en ce qui 
concerne la sûreté déterministe, si on évite la solidification du sel primaire. 
 
5.1. Introduction  
This Chapter is devoted to a preliminary safety study of fast spectrum molten salt 
reactor REBUS-3700 (Mourogov and Bokov, 2004a,b). Before starting the safety analysis of this 
reactor we will characterize the system in detail. We will formulate goals of this concept, the 
principle characteristics, and its operation. It should be noted that some reactor characteristics 
and operation principles were not considered as a “framework” nor “initial conditions” for safety 
study. On the contrary, the goal of this work was not merely to characterize the safety potential 
of the reactor, but also to “condition” its design and operation principles in order to meet in 
maximal extent the inherent safety requirements. Fortunately, the molten salt technology offers 
a wide range of means, which help to approach the inherent safety. In this context the core 
subcriticality was considered as an extra tool to achieve this objective. 
5.2. Goals of the concept 
The REBUS concept aims to meet the common requirements (mentioned already in the 
first Chapter), which have to be applied to the future nuclear systems. In the case of REBUS 
concept these requirements are formulated as follows. 
98 
Sustainability. Utilisation of the entire resource potential. The reactor has to be 
characterized by breeding gain more or equal to zero. In this case, the available depleted 
uranium and plutonium stocks become sufficient to cover several hundred years of operation of 
the world nuclear parkh.
Safety. Reactor has to satisfy the requirements of deterministic safety to a maximal 
extent. This goal has to be ensured by the inherent features of reactor and not by using active 
control systems. 
Economy. Taking into account that the economical assessment applied for the future 
system, being in the initial stage of its development (and, hence, having a great number of 
uncertainties), could not offer yet reliable results, it is considered, that a future nuclear system 
must have a reactor design and fuel cycle configuration as simple as possible.  
Non-proliferation. An effort has to be realized to reduce proliferation risk, including three 
principal measures: (i) elimination of uranium-plutonium separation on any fuel cycle stage; 
(ii) utilisation only depleted or natural uranium as supplied material; (iii) exclusion of the 
transport stage for irradiated or fresh fuel. 
5.3. Description of the System 
As demonstrated in Ref. (Mourogov and Bokov, 2004a) the combination of fast neutron 
spectrum and of molten salt reactor technology allows designing a nuclear power installation (see 
Table XII) with very attractive characteristics in respect to the above requirements. REBUS 
operates at the nominal power of 3700 MW(th) in a closed U-Pu cycle and supposed to be used 
in prospective NP, as its principal component. The fuel is based on the uranium- and 
transuranics chlorides dissolved in the sodium chloride, i.e. (U,TRU)Cl3+NaCl. As demonstrated 
by Taube (1978), this choice permits to obtain a sufficiently hard neutron spectrum. 
The attractive breeding characteristics together with on-line reprocessing allow reactor 
feeding only by the natural uranium. In REBUS on-line reprocessing is organized in such 
manner that long cooling time for spent fuel is not necessary any more. The reprocessing 
consists in fission product replacement by depleted uranium without any correction of trans-
uranium content in the fuel. A “rich” neutron budget in fast spectrum allows reducing the 
reprocessing rate of the fuel. In the proposed reactor, the total core mass inventory is 
reprocessed in 3000 days (approximately 73 kg/FPD). The core breeding ratio is approximately 
1.0, what provides a small reactivity swings during the operation. As a result, the corresponding 
reactivity margin can be comparable with the delayed neutron fraction. The reactor breeding 
could be increased by using fertile blanket. 
 
h In fact, in current situation the LWR reactors use less than 1 % of uranium energetic potential. Moreover, their 
operation inevitably reduces to a transformation of natural uranium into depleted one in addition to plutonium 
accumulation. One may suppose that this situation will probably last as long as possible. Therefore, an important 
inventory of depleted uranium (~107t) and plutonium (~104 t) will be accumulated in the second half of 21 century in 
the world. Therefore, one may suppose that the next generation reactors could be operated in the closed U-Pu fuel 
cycle. 
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Table XII. Parameters of REBUS-3700 (from Mourogov and Bokov, 2004). 
Parameters Values 
Thermal Power, MW(th) 3686 
Diameter/Height, m 3.8/3.25 
Specific power, kW/l 100 
Fuel 45%(85.2%U+14.8%TRU)Cl3 + 55%NaCl 
inT / outT , °C 650/730 
Salt velocity (core), m/s 1.117 
Volume of salt in-core/out-of-core  2/1 
Masse of salt in the system, t 221 
Fuel flow, kg/s 45.1 10+
Matter of structure  Alloy TZM (99% Mo) 
The so-called external cooling design was chosen for studies. We remind that the molten 
salt playing the role of the fuel and of the heat carrier circulates with the help of pumps from 
core to heat-exchanger. Advantage of this type of design is simplicity of exploitation and of 
maintenance. In addition, in absence of the structure materials there are no structure-related 
feedbacks. A drawback of this design is a decay of delayed neutron precursors out of core. We 
remind that this leads to a decrease of the delayed neutron fraction as well as to insertion of 
reactivity in the case of the fuel flow change.  
Another concern of REBUS-3700 is eventual fuel freezing at temperatures lower than 
600°C. Here we have to do the following remarks concerning this menace:  
(i) as we will see below, reactor is temperature-controlled, so any temperature decrease will lead 
(via reactivity feedbacks) to power growth, tending to compensate this perturbation;  
(ii) in present study we do not take into account residual power which is also subject to reduce 
the menace of the fuel solidification;  
(ii) salt solidification is not a severe accident itself (under condition that the salt homogeneity is 
preserved), nevertheless it can lead to some economical penalties. Anyway, some special 
engineering measures have to be done in the future reactor design in order to prevent salt 
solidification in the reactor. 
Another concern is positive reactivity insertion when fuel, overcooled in a heat-
exchanger, enters into the core. It should lead to undesirable significant fluctuations of core 
power and core temperature. 
The high salt boiling temperature of approximately 1400°C gives a comfortable margin to 
the nominal core temperature (730°C at the exit from the core). Therefore, we may suppose that 
like in the case of MSR analyzed in previous Chapters the disruption criterion is based on the 
salt boiling temperature, hence † 1400 CT = ° .
One more important characteristics of the reactor which we make us of in our analysis is 
the physics properties of the coolant in the secondary loop. It is assumed that a secondary 
cooling loop to be filled with the same molten salt as in the MSBR concept (92% 
NaBF4+8%NaF) with fusion temperature of 385°C (Novikov and Ignatiev, 1990).  
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5.4. Safety Analysis 
The principal difficulty for a complete safety study of REBUS-3700 consists in a shortage 
of the detailed description of the reactor design, which is not available in this stage of reactor 
concept development. Therefore, the present study will be sometimes restricted to the 
considerations based on general description of system properties (core dimensions, thermal 
feedbacks, fuel flow, etc.). 
5.4.1. Reactivity coefficients and reactivity effects  
The neutronics studies demonstrated that the system is characterized by a strong 
negative temperature feedback effect due to the elevated thermal salt expansion coefficient and 
large leakage. As a result, the salt expansion feedback effect is two orders of magnitude greater 
then Doppler effect (see Table XIII). Nevertheless, it should be noted that there exist a 
significant uncertainty concerning the salt heat expansion coefficient, which leads to some 
complications in our analysis.    
Table XIII. Reactivity coefficients and reactivity effects in the REBUS-3700 core (from Ref. Mourogov 
and Bokov, 2004).  
Coefficients Value 
Salt thermal expansion, pcm/°C 
Doppler, pcm/°C 
Doppler constant DK , pcm 
-42 
-0.39 
-404 
Effects  
Neptunium, pcm 
Fuel mass fluctuation, pcm 
Circulation stop, pcm 
52 
116 
83 
Total, pcm 251 
Fraction of delayed neutrons  ( * ), pcm 346 (263) 
Within the framework of deterministic approach to safety analysis we have to consider 
an event, consisting in simultaneous insertion of total excess reactivity existing in the system. 
For this purpose the analysis of phenomena, leading to reactivity variation, is carried out. An 
optimisation of core parameters and reactor operation principles is performed with the objective 
to minimize the excess reactivity. Effects contributing into excess reactivity of REBUS-3700 in 
equilibrium are summarized in Table XIII. Other reactivity effects play somewhat less important 
role because:  
 analysis of neutronics at equilibrium demonstrated that reactivity swing due to fuel burn-up 
can be compensated by breeding of fissile materials and fuel continues reprocessing; 
 core poisoning by fission products (essentially Xe and Sm) is negligible, since the neutron 
absorption by these nuclei is low in fast spectrum; 
101 
 core power level can be governed by fuel flow in the primary loop (see Section 5.4.4.2); fuel 
can be externally heated and instilled into core at nominal temperature. Hence, none 
reactivity reserve for core heating is necessary. 
Finally, we note that the sum of all reactivity effects (excess reactivity) is 251 pcm and 
therefore does not exceed the effective fraction of delayed neutrons of 263 pcm. 
5.4.2. Reactor model 
The safety study was based on a simplified reactor model containing three distinct 
elements: (1) core, (2) primary and secondary (3) salt in the heat-exchanger (see Figure 34). 
Every element was characterized by set of physical parameters: the mass of fuel, the specific 
heat capacity, the density, input and output temperatures etc. Reactor neutronics (and, 
consequently, heat production in the core) is described by point kinetics model (see below). In-
core and out-of-core precursors decay as well as core feedback effects (Doppler and salt 
expansion) are taken into consideration. Relatively rapid salt expansion feedback effect (our 
estimations show that the relaxation period may be of the order of a few tens of milliseconds) 
was assumed being instantaneous. Advective model of heat-transfer from core to heat-exchangers 
and Newton model of heat-transfer in the heat-exchanger is adopted. Complete mathematical 
description of the model will be presented in subsequent Section. 
 
Figure 34. Schematic representation of the reactor model. 
5.4.3. Reactivity balance equation for the circulating-fuel system 
For the safety analysis of REBUS-3700 we will apply so-called reactivity balance method 
(Refs. Wade, 1986; Wade and Chang, 1987; Wade and Fujita; 1989, Gandini et al. 1999; 
Gandini et al. 2000). This approach consists in the analysis of a quasi-static balance of the core 
reactivity, assuming that the criticality has been reached asymptotically. It is implied that the 
system is in equilibrium state if the criticality condition ( 1effk = ) is fulfilled. Note that 
sometimes asymptotic states can not be reached or do not exist: these situations can be easily 
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recognized, as in these cases some parameters have non-physical values (e.g. negative core power 
or negative core temperature).  
For systems with circulating fuel the reactivity balance equation has to be slightly 
modified in order to take into account the effective reactivity appearing due to the variation of 
fuel flow. Point kinetics equations for the system with circulating fuel have to take into account 
the precursors decay beyond the active core region. In this Section we will describe dynamics of 
the considered reactor with the help of the following model: 
( ) *
1
( )
( ) ( ),
( ) ( ) ( )exp( ) ( )
( ) ,   1,
gN
i i
i
i i i core i out i
i g
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dP t t
P t W t
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dW t P t W t W t
W t i N
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  	
 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  = +         =  + =     "
)
(5.1) 
where  is the reactivity; P is the core power; iW describes a contribution of delayed neutron 
precursors of thi -group with the fraction i and the corresponding decay constant i	 ;
1
gN
i
i
 
=
=) is the total fraction of delayed neutrons, * is its corrected value (see below);  is 
the prompt neutron generation time, core and out are time intervals when the fuel is “in core” 
and “out of core” correspondingly.  
Steady-state limit of Eqs. (5.1) gives the following relationships for stationary power ( )P
and stationary precursor concentrations ( )iW in the core: 
*
1
0,
1 exp 0, 1,
gN
i i
i
out i
i i i i g
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  + =   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(5.2) 
where parameter D is the salt flow; coreV and outV are the volumes of salt in the core and 
outside the core correspondingly. Here it is applied that in steady state /core coreV D = and 
/out outV D = . Introducing the out-core decay factor  
1
1 1 exp outi i
i core
D V
V D
 	
	
      $ +   !      " #
, (5.3) 
and after some transformations we obtain:  
*
1
0
gN
i i
i
P P
   
=
 + =
 ) . (5.4) 
Supposing a non-trivial solution ( 0P 5 ) and taking into account the initial condition: 
 * ,0
1
gN
i i
i
  
=
=) , (5.5) 
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we can combine two terms of Eq. (5.4):  
*
1 1
g gN N
i i i i
i i
    
= =
 + = ) ) , (5.6) 
where ,0i i i   =  .
The effective fractions ,0i i  and decay constants i	 for six groups of delayed neutrons in 
the case of REBUS-3700 are summarized in Table XIV.  
Table XIV. Parameters of delayed neurons for REBUS-3700 (from Mourogov and Bokov, 2004). 
No 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total/effective 
i (pcm) 8.14 68.25 57.13 125.83 63.52 22.96 346 
,0i i  (pcm) 5.44 45.84 39.68 89.86 61.25 20.63 263 
i	 (s-1) 1.33210-2 3.04910-2 1.17810-1 3.13110-1 9.13310-1 2.9711 0.108 
The total reactivity of the core is the sum of the steady state (nominal) reactivity 0 , of
the “externally” inserted reactivity ext and of the reactivity due to feedback effects feedback ,
namely 0 ext feedback   = + + . In the nominal state the reactor is supposed to be critical, i.e. 
( )0 ,0 ,01 / 0eff effk k =  = . Finally, we obtain the following reactivity balance equation for the 
core with circulating fuel : 
0ext precusors feedback   + + = , (5.7) 
where ext is the external reactivity insertion; feedback is the reactivity emerging due to in-
core thermal feedback effects;  
1
gN
precusors i i
i
  
=
 = ) (5.8) 
describes the effective reactivity, appearing in the case of the fuel flow change. Below we discuss 
every term of Eq. (5.7) in detail. 
 
The external reactivity insertion 
The external reactivity insertion term ext in Eq. (5.7) represents either some specific 
in-core phenomena leading to the reactivity variation (e.g., introduction of fresh fuel from 
reprocessing unit) or erroneous run out of the control rods. 
 
Reactivity, appearing due to fuel flow change 
To simplify description of the effective reactivity, appearing in the case of fuel flow 
change ( precusors ), let us apply one-group approximation for delayed neutrons. In this case 
precusors   =  with the term  being the fraction of delayed neutrons and the term 
being variation of the correcting factor expressed as follows 
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, (5.9) 
and introduced to take into account the part of delayed neutrons decaying out of the active core 
region. The parameter D is the salt flow and 0/d D D$ is the normalized salt flow ( 0D is the 
nominal value of the salt flow). 
From Eq. (5.9) follows the upper and the lower limits for the factor  :
( )
0
lim 1max
d
d 

= = and ( ) ( )lim /min core core outd d V V V ,= = + . As a result, the maximal 
reactivity insertion due to the fuel stop maxprecusors will never exceed the value 
( )/maxprecusors out core outV V V   + .
Reactivity due to in-core thermal feedback 
The term feedback in Eq. (5.7) is the reactivity emerging due to the in-core thermal 
feedback effects. In order to describe this phenomenon, one has to introduce some model of the 
heat transfer in the reactor. In the steady-state conditions the heat energy balance yields the 
following set of equations:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
,
.
s
p out in
s
p in out in k
c D T T P
c D T T H T T
  =   =  "


(5.10) 
In Eq. (5.10) P is the reactor power; outT , inT are the primary salt mean temperatures in the 
core and in the heat-exchanger correspondingly; kT is the temperature of secondary salt in the 
heat-exchanger; H is the heat-transfer coefficient;  is the salt density; ( )spc is the salt specific 
heat capacity. (Note that here and in further sections we use a dash over variable to denote its 
asymptotic value.) From Eq. (5.10) the equilibrium values of the core input and of the core 
output temperatures are 
( )( ) 11 sout k pT T P H c D
 = + +   , /in kT T P H= + . (5.11) 
A “complete” thermal feedback effect should be the sum of two terms, corresponding to 
the Doppler feedback effect and the salt thermal expansion feedback effect, i.e. 
( ) ( )0 0( ) ln /feedback D expansionT K T T T T  = +  , (5.12) 
where ( )/2out inT T T= + is the mean core temperature. Here, as for other fast neutron spectrum 
cores, a conventional logarithmic dependence is applied. In our simulation the feedback due to 
the fuel expansion is supposed to be instantaneous. For the purpose of simplicity, leading to the 
analytical expressions, in this section we apply a linear model for the in-core feedback, i.e.:  
feedback feedback T  =  . (5.13) 
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Here we take into account that for the system under consideration the salt expansion-related 
feedback coefficient expansion is by two orders of magnitude (see also Table XIII) stronger than 
the Doppler coefficient Doppler . Therefore this latter can be neglected to a first approximation, 
i.e. feedback Doppler expansion expansion   = + ( .
Introducing for convenience the following dimensionless parameters (here subscript “0” 
designates a nominal value of the corresponding parameter):  
0
0
feedbackPA
H

= ,
( )
0
02
feedback
s
p
P
B
c D

= 

,
0
H
h
H
= ,
0
P
p
P
= , (5.14) 
as well as the parameter feedbackC = , we can express the feedback term in Eq. (5.7) as follows:  
1 1feedback k
p p
C T A B
h d

       =  +  +          
. (5.15) 
The reactivity balance equation (5.7) becomes 
( ) ( ),0 01 1 ( ) 0ext k k p pC T T A B dh d   
            +  =       . (5.16) 
The reactivity balance equation in the form of Eq. (5.16) will play the major role in our 
analytical studies, as it describes implicitly the dependence of the equilibrium reactor power on 
external impacts. These external effects are introduced in our model by means of the parameters 
,f h , kT and ext .
Resolving Eq. (5.16) together with Eqs. (5.11) one obtains the expressions for asymptotic 
states of the system after some reactor parameters have been changed. In our analysis the main 
attention will be paid to the asymptotic core output temperature, expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )( )
( ),0
2 ext
out out k
AB h d Ad BhBh
T T T
Ad Bh C Ad Bh
   + +  +
=  +
+ +
, (5.17) 
which is expected to be maximal. The equilibrium core input temperature (what corresponds to 
the output temperature of the heat-exchanger) is described by the following expression: 
( ) ( )
( ),0
ext
in in k
AB d h AdBh
T T T
Ad Bh C Ad Bh
   +  +
= + +
+ +
. (5.18) 
We can also obtain the equilibrium value of the core power: 
( )
0
k extA B C TP P hd
Ad Bh
   + +    + =
+
. (5.19) 
An asymptotic mean temperature of core is determined by the values of externally 
inserted reactivity and of the total feedback coefficient: 
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( )
0
extT T
C
   +
= + , (5.20) 
i.e. the reactor mean temperature is feedback controlled. 
Table XV. Parameters of the main configuration of REBUS-3700 utilized for transient analysis (from 
Mourogov and Bokov, 2004). 
Parameter Value 
core power 0P 3686 MW(th) 
core output temperature ,0outT 730°C 
core input temperature ,0inT 650°C 
heat-sink temperature kT 630°C 
fuel flow 0D 12.48 m
3/s 
thermal feedback coefficient C 42 pcm/°C 
power feedback coefficient ( ),0 ,0in kA C T T=  848 pcm 
power feedback coefficient ( ),0 ,0 / 2out inB C T T=  1695 pcm 
correcting factor 0 0.76 
heat-transfer coefficient ( )0 0 ,0 ,0/ in kH P T T=  184.3 MW/°C 
In next Sections we carry out the quasi-static analysis of the following unprotected 
transients: Unprotected Transient Over-Power (UTOP), Unprotected Loss of Flow (ULOF), 
Unprotected Loss of Heat Sink (ULOHS) etc. The parameters of REBUS-3700 utilized for safety 
analysis are summarized in Table XV. 
5.4.4. Quasi-static Analysis of Unprotected Transients 
5.4.4.1. Unprotected Transient Over Power 
The asymptotic core output ( outT ) and input ( inT ) temperature, as well as the core power 
(P ) after an accidental reactivity insertion ext are described by the expressions, following from 
Eqs. (5.17)-(5.20) with 0kT = and 1d h= = :
( )
( ),0
2
out out ext
A B
T T
C A B

+
= + 
+
,
( ),0in in ext
A
T T
C A B
= + 
+
,
0 1
extP P
A B
  = +   +
, 0
extT T
C
= + . (5.21) 
Note that there are significant uncertainties with respect to some parameters, namely 
there is a significant uncertainty with respect to the salt heat expansion coefficient, and 
consequently, to the corresponding feedback coefficient feedback . In order to examine the 
sensibility of after-transient equilibrium states on this parameter, let us replace in Eq. (5.16) the 
parameters ,A ,B C by the corresponding perturbed parameters ,A A- = ,B B- = C C- = ,
where the parameter  is a correction factor. As it follows from Eq. (5.16), this procedure is 
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equivalent to rescaling of non-feedback terms /ext ext     and /   with parameters 
,A ,B C being non-perturbed. In other words, to estimate the sensibility of obtained results on 
feedback , it is sufficient to replace in Eqs. (5.17)-(5.20) the terms ext and   by their 
rescaled values /ext  and ( )/   correspondingly. Note that the last statement is valid if 
the term ext does not depend on the parameter feedback . It is the case of REBUS-3700 since it 
is supposed that there are no reactivity reserves devoted to the core heating. 
Figure 35 presents dependences [Eqs. (5.21)] of the asymptotic core power and of the 
asymptotic core input- and output temperatures as a functions of the inserted reactivity ext .
This result demonstrates that even all available excess reactivity is inserted, the maximal salt 
temperature does not exceed 740°C. The reactivity ext , necessary to reach the upper 
temperature limit, has to be nearly two orders of magnitude greater than the total excess 
reactivity available at nominal regime (see also Table XIII). Therefore, even if the reactivity 
feedback coefficient feedback is somewhat overrated and/or the excess reactivity ext is 
underestimated, the system has a sufficiently great margin to the eventual core disruption 
temperature.  
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Figure 35. Equilibrium core power (P ), input 
( inT ) and output ( outT ) temperatures as a 
function of the inserted reactivity. The value of 
the excess reactivity is also indicated.  
Figure 36. Equilibrium values of a normalized 
core power ( p ), input ( inT ) and output ( outT )
temperatures as a function of the normalized 
fuel flow. 
5.4.4.2. Unprotected Loss Of Flow 
In the case of the Unprotected Loss Of Flow (ULOF) event it is assumed that some 
pumps fail, leading to the decreased fuel flow. This event is twofold dangerous in the case of 
circulating fuel systems: a reduction of the heat evacuation would be accompanied by a certain 
reactivity insertion due to the increased fraction of delayed neutron precursors decaying in the 
core. Equally, an increase of the pump strength and, consequently, of the fuel flow may also lead 
to some undesirable consequences (e.g. positive reactivity insertion due to core overcooling), so 
this event has to be analyzed too. 
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The ultimate ULOF event would be a simultaneous failure of all pumps. In this case the 
salt flow would fall to the natural circulation value. Neither the natural convection limit of the 
salt flow, nor the maximal pump strength, nor the characteristic times of these events are 
available. Therefore, a parametrical study is carried out for the fuel flow varying in a 
“reasonable” range, i.e. from zero ( )0d = to three nominal values ( )3d = . The following 
expressions describe the asymptotic states of the system when the fuel flow is changed:   
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ),0 ,0
1 2 1 ( )
,out out in in
AB d Ad B d AB d Ad d
T T T T
C Ad B C Ad B
    + +   + = + = +
+ +
,
( )
0
( )A B d
P P d
Ad B
 + + 
=
+
,
( )
0
d
T T
C
 = + . (5.22) 
Note, that a halt of the fuel circulation ( 0d  ) leads to the limited values of the core power 
and, equally of the core temperature: 
( )0
,00
2 1
lim 754out outd
A
T T C
C
 

+ 
= + = ° , 0
0
lim 630in kd T T C = = ° , 0lim 0d P = . (5.23) 
The case of the infinite flow ( )d  , , even if this limit has no physical meaning, 
supplies an upper asymptote for the after-transient reactor power. In this case the reactor power 
is limited to: ( ) ( ){ }0 0 0lim 1 / / / 3core core outd P P B A V V V A P ,  = + + +  (  . The limit for the 
core temperatures is lim lim 689out ind dT T C, ,= = ° .
Figure 36 illustrates the above results. One can observe that a modification of the fuel 
flow leads to a monotonous change of the core input and core output temperatures, as well as of 
the core power. These results show that neither flow slowing down nor flow acceleration in the 
case of a single ULOF event may lead to unacceptable values of the core temperature. 
5.4.4.3. Unprotected Loss Of Heat Sink 
In this scenario it is supposed that the heat evacuation from the primary loop decreases 
drastically due to the decreased parameter h . In the present theoretical study we do not reveal 
the specific mechanism leading to this heat-transfer decrease (it can be, for example, an 
accidental draining of the secondary cooling loop) – it is assumed that our model describes an 
ensemble of such phenomena. The reactivity balance analysis gives the following dependences of 
the reactor temperatures outT , inT and of the core power on the parameter h :
( )
( ),0
1
out out
AB h
T T
C A Bh
= 
+
;
( )
( ),0
1
in in
AB h
T T
C A Bh
= +
+
; 0T T= ; 0
A B
P P h
A Bh
+=
+
. (5.24) 
This event is also the case, where only parametric study could be realized because of the 
lack of required data. Figure 37 illustrates the dependences related to Eqs. (5.24) for REBUS-
3700. Moreover, the above analytical results allow us to assess the upper and lower limits for the 
core variables. Hence, if the heat evacuation from primary loop decreases down to zero-level 
( 0)h  + , it leads to the following values of the above parameters:  
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,0 ,0 00 0
lim lim 690out out in inh h
B B
T T T T T C
C C+ +
     =  = = + = = °         and  0lim 0h P+ = . (5.25) 
Note that this case has to be treated with some precautions, since the reactivity balance 
equations (5.2) and (5.16) assumes a non-trivial solution (non-zero reactor power – see Section 
5.3.1 for detail). So, strictly speaking, the solutions given by Eqs. (5.25) are not compatible with 
the initial assumption. Nevertheless, if one supposes a small but finite value of h , the results 
given by Eqs. (5.25) remain valid. 
If h  , , then the parameters P , outT and inT have the following limits 
0 0lim 3h
A B
P P P
A,
 + = =  
, ,0lim 750out outh
A
T T C
C,
= + = ° and  ,0lim 630in inh
A
T T C
C,
=  = ° . (4.25) 
Our estimates of the equilibrium power and temperature, presented in Figure 37, 
demonstrate that in the reasonable range of the variation of parameter h ( 0 3h< < ), the 
reactor temperatures remain acceptable. This result let us conclude that ULOHS is “harmless” 
for the safety of REBUS-3700. 
It has to be emphasized that the above analysis of the ULOHS events did not take into 
account the residual heat. Anyway, some adequate measures in the design are mandatory to 
guarantee a reliable residual heat evacuation. A potential solution is mentioned by Gat (1997), 
where the author recommends draining the fuel, by gravity, into dump tanks that are assured to 
retain subcriticality and have sufficient natural cooling to assure cooling of the fuel. 
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Figure 37. Equilibrium values of the normalized 
core power ( p ), input ( inT ) and output ( outT )
temperatures as a function of normalized heat 
transfer coefficient.  
Figure 38. Reactivity balance analysis of the 
UOVC-event. Normalized core power ( p ), input 
( inT ) and output ( outT ) temperatures are 
presented as a function of  kT .
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5.4.4.4. Unprotected Over-Cooling 
Over-Cooling (UOVC) represents an event where the heat-sink temperature decreases 
radically, resulting in the decreased temperature of the salt entering the core. This event 
contains at least two menaces: (i) the salt solidification in the heat-exchanger and (ii) the 
insertion of an important positive reactivity when the overcooled fuel enters the core. The 
primary salt solidification would be quite undesirable event, as it may bring to loss of salt 
homogeneity, leading to a number of complex physicochemical phenomena.  
In the case of the REBUS-3700 system it is supposed that the initiator of the overcooling 
event is a decrease of the secondary salt temperature ( kT ) in the heat-exchanger. The magnitude 
of this eventual temperature drop depends on the particularities of the reactor design. However, 
it may be supposed that the solidification temperature of the secondary salt of 385°C (for details 
see Ref. Mourogov and Bokov, 2004) would be the lower limit for kT -reduction. Indeed, one can 
presume that if the secondary salt is frozen, the heat transfer in the secondary loop falls 
drastically, what “stabilizes” the temperature of the secondary salt in the heat-exchanger. 
Moreover, our model is not valid if solidification of the primary or secondary salt occurs. 
Therefore, in our further considerations those domains of parameters, where the primary or/and 
the secondary salt is frozen, are “forbidden”. 
Let us start our quantitative analysis with the reactivity balance method. The reactivity 
balance equation predicts a linear dependence of the reactor temperatures and of the reactor 
power on kT (see Figure 38): 
,0out out k
B
T T T
A B
=  
+
, ,0in in k
B
T T T
A B
= + 
+
, 0T T= , 0 1 k
C
P P T
A B
 =     +
. (5.26) 
As one can see from Figure 38, the solidification of the primary salt in the heat-
exchanger happens if the temperature of the secondary salt falls from ,0 630kT = °C down to 
550kT ( °C. In this case the core output temperature still remains acceptable ( 780 CoutT  ° ).  
The analysis of further overcooling requires a much more powerful model taking into 
account other in-reactor phenomena. On the other hand, we may suppose that the salt 
solidification in the heat exchanger would lead to a halt of the salt circulation in the core. The 
mean core temperature being “fixed” by the thermal feedback effects, the maximal core 
temperature would not exceed 780°C. Nevertheless this scenario is based on a very rough vision 
of the in-core phenomena and should be considered with a precaution.  
Note that if the secondary salt temperature is allowed to decrease below 550°C, the 
solidification of the primary salt becomes possible (i.e. reactor has no intrinsic capability to resist 
this menace). Anyway, a special engineering effort has to be done in order to prevent the 
overcooling of the secondary salt (or radically decrease the probability of this event). However, 
as it was already stated, our model does not include the residual heat generation. This latter 
could play an important role in preventing the salt solidification hazard. 
Another serious menace, which attracted our attention, is a risk of the prompt criticality 
during the reactor start-up (i.e. at “zero”-power level) due to the fuel overcooling. Indeed, since 
the reactivity feedback effect is very strong, an overcooling of the in-core salt by 7°C below the 
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nominal value would lead to prompt criticality. On the other hand, if the reactor has non-zero 
power, one may expect that it is capable to compensate the reactivity growth. Indeed, the mean 
(effective) neutron life time  
( ) ( )
6
1 2
0 ,0
1
1 2.24 10 seff i i i
i
   	 
=
=  + + = ×)    
is smaller than the characteristic time of the heat transfer in the primary loop (equal to ~5 s, 
according to our estimations). Therefore an insertion of some positive reactivity would soon lead 
to the power and, consequently, to the temperature growth, introducing a negative reactivity 
(characteristic time is of the order of tens of milliseconds), which tends to compensate the initial 
perturbation. Numerous simulations of the UOVC-event, carried out for REBUS-3700 in 
nominal state (supposing the feedback being prompt), confirm this hypothesis.  
At the start-up, when the core power is nearly zero and the reactor is critical with 
account of delayed neutrons (core is filled in with the molten salt heated up to the nominal 
temperature of 690°C) there is a risk to achieve a prompt criticality before the compensation 
mechanism, described above, starts working. So, this scenario, i.e. the UOVC-event at “zero-
power” start-up state may be considered as the most dangerous one.  
An ultimate overcooling event would be inflow of the chilly salt, previously cooled in the 
heat-exchanger to ~600°C, into the core being initially at zero-power. Unfortunately, this 
transient can not be simulated within the framework of the model, which we make use of. 
Nevertheless, it seems that this event has to be a principal concern for future safety studies. 
5.5. Conclusions and outlook 
In this Chapter the preliminary safety analysis of REBUS-3700 was carried out. Principal 
concerns for the reactor safety are indicated and an exhaustive examination of phenomena, 
leading to the reactivity variation in the reactor core, was done. It was demonstrated that at the 
equilibrium the magnitude of the excess reactivity may be decreased down to the value, 
comparable with the effective fraction of delayed neutrons.  
The safety analysis was performed in the framework of the so-called reactivity balance 
method, i.e. of the quasi-static analysis of dependences of core power and core temperature on 
external parameters (e.g. inserted reactivity, fuel flow etc.) during unprotected transients: 
Unprotected Transient Over Power (UTOP), Unprotected Loss of Heat Sink (ULOHS), 
Unprotected Loss Of fuel Flow (ULOF), Unprotected Overcooling (UOVC), as well as of their 
combinations).  
Above studies demonstrate an excellent resistance of REBUS-3700 to majority of single 
and combined unprotected events, except unprotected overcooling. This latter can result in 
solidification of the primary salt, if the temperature of secondary salt falls below 550°C. This 
accident has to be considered as the most menacing and for that reason some special measures 
are necessary in the reactor design to prevent the overcooling of the primary salt. 
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Finally, in the context of results of this preliminary safety study we may conclude that 
REBUS-3700 does not require any support of the external neutron source to improve its safety 
characteristics. 
We add that the reactivity balance method is quite effective for preliminary safety study. 
Nevertheless, even if quasi-static analysis predicts admissible values of asymptotic core power 
and core temperature, it does not guarantee that they remain within the viability domain during 
transients. Therefore, simulations of transients, and, in particular, unprotected transients, 
remain the mandatory work in future safety study.   
We note also that some improvements of our model are indispensable for future safety 
studies. Namely, more detailed reactor design would allow diminishing most of the design-related 
uncertainties. In order to properly describe some space-time effects, the point reactor model has 
to be replaced by 2D or 3D description. A coupled model of neutron, thermo-hydraulic and 
chemical phenomena would be quite helpful. It would allow, for example, a more adequate 
description of the feedback effect due to salt expansion. Moreover, more precise data, concerning 
physical properties of fuel are needed. The most important of them (with respect to their impact 
on reactor safety) are: the salt thermal expansion coefficient and the sound velocity in the salt. 
Finally, extra studies, in order to determine the source term and the residual heat generation, 
are also necessary.  
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6. External Neutron Sources: revision of candidates 
 
Résumé – Dans ce Chapitre nous réexaminerons le potentiel des sources externes 
de neutrons basées sur un des réactions nucléaires autres que la spallation, notamment 
la réaction photo-nucléaire et la fusion thermonucléaire, en prenant en compte leurs 
performances, leurs aspects économiques et leurs réalisabilités technique.  
Des études antérieures ont montré que des accélérateurs d’électrons sont d’une part 
moins pénalisants économiquement mais, d’autre part, moins performants pour la 
production de neutrons (en comparaison avec des accélérateurs de protons). Des 
estimations faites lors notre étude montrent que, si les performances des accélérateurs 
d’électrons en tant que source externe de neutrons ne sont pas suffisantes pour des 
applications industrielles, cela reste une option intéressante pour la réalisation d’un 
prototype (faible puissance) de système hybride.  
Le concept WISE, basé sur l’utilisation consécutive de combustible uranium 
naturel et thorium, est particulièrement intéressant pour la production d’énergie 
d’origine nucléaire. Cependant, l'utilisation de Th naturel dans un cycle « once - 
through » conduit à des performances, du point de vue de la production de neutrons, 
relativement faibles et nécessite une source de neutron considérable afin de maintenir la 
puissance du cœur sous-critique. Traditionnellement, des réactions de spallation ont été 
considérées comme source possible pour un ADS, bien qu'une fraction importante de la 
puissance doive être dépensée pour alimenter les accélérateurs. Des sources externes de 
type fusion relativement petites et économiquement peu pénalisantes, peuvent permettre 
d'obtenir les nouveaux avantages du concept WISE, et constituer, probablement, une 
alternative réelle aux sources de neutrons de spallation. 
 
6.1. Realization restrictions for hybrid systems 
In previous Chapters we discussed various ARTEN-concepts, foreseen for different 
objectives and thus demanding different characteristics with respect to the parameters and 
performance of the external neutron source. Therefore, a realization of the coupled subcritical 
system with the only goal to compensate eventual decrease of delayed neutron fraction would 
require a low subcriticality level, and consequently, a rather weak external neutron source. 
Indeed, we showed that in some cases even small subcriticality levels, say, of the order of 
300 pcm may improve the safety of ACS significantly. In this context one may look for less 
performing external neutron sources (in terms of neutron production) but with more attractive 
economics and “easier” feasibility.  
We remind briefly that in order to build a hybrid system one should take into account all 
possible constraints which may have either physical or economical or technical realization 
nature.  
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Physical constraint is evident and consists of a physical possibility to create a sufficient 
number of external neutrons that nuclear waste transmutation or/and energy production is 
feasible in terms of neutron balance, incineration efficiency, safety requirements, etc.  
Economy of the entire nuclear cycle and of the installation, in particular, should be in a 
good shape as well. In the case of energy production it is clear that the total installation 
efficiency should not be too much penalized by the operation of the external neutron source.  
Finally, technical realization feasibility has to be taken into account as well. For 
example, one cannot preview the operation power of particle accelerator much higher than it is 
today technically possible. Similarly, the energy deposition by the incident particle beam in the 
neutron production target will also impose comparable limitations.  
Traditionally, spallation reactions have been considered to design such a potential 
neutron source in the case of Accelerator Driven Systems (ADS). Typical values found in the 
literature are as follows: high-energy high-intensity proton beam (1 GeV protons of a few tens of 
mA, i.e. a few tens of MW of the primary beam power) interacts with the liquid PbBi target, 
resulting in 20 25nY 	 ÷ neutrons produced per incident proton. More recent design studies 
show that both economic and technologic problems still exist in this particular case (high costs 
of accelerator, resistance of the target window, corrosion of construction materials in the liquid 
Pb-Bi environment, an important fraction of the elaborated power has to be spent to feed a 
powerful accelerator, feasibility of coupling of accelerator and core environments, etc.). 
Therefore, our goal was to re-examine other potential neutrons sources, namely based on 
photonuclear reactions and thermonuclear fusion. 
6.2. Photoneutron source as a candidate for applications in 
subcritical systems: comparison with spallation reactions 
6.2.1. Introduction 
Spallation neutron sources, though very effective in neutron production, are large, 
expensive and presently would involve certain difficulties in their routine operation (e.g., beam 
trips). Contrary, an electron driver, although much less effective in neutron production, is rather 
cheap and compact machine, which would also bring advantages in terms of reliability 
(Bernardin et al., 2001; Ridikas et al., 2002; Ridikas et al., 2003). 
6.2.2. Analysis. Inter-comparison: photoneutron sources versus spallation sources  
Let us consider charged electrons or protons as potential incident particles to produce 
external neutrons. For quantitative evaluations of the above restrictions in the case of a coupled 
hybrid system one needs to introduce a fraction of produced electric energy f necessary to run 
an accelerator providing with an external neutron source: 
inp
e
out
e
f = 

, (6.1) 
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where inpe is the electric energy consumed to produce and to accelerate one incident particle, 
out
e
being the mean electric energy produced by the system per incident particle. Both oute and 
inp
e
can be expressed in terms of energy (per incident particle) deposited in the system (core and 
neutron production target taken together), i.e. with /inpe p a=  and 
out
e b e pG =  we obtain 
1
e a b
f
G 
= . (6.2) 
In this notation p is the incident particle energy, e is the reactor electric efficiency; a is the 
accelerator efficiency, bG is the energy multiplication coefficient of a subcritical core, given by 
(Salvatores et al., 1996) 
( )
*
1
eff n f
b
peff
k Y
G
k


 
 = +   



, (6.3) 
where  is the fraction of the particle energy deposited in the system, f is the energy released 
per fission,  is the mean number of fission neutrons, * is the importance of source neutrons, 
nY is the mean neutron yield per incident particle, and effk is the multiplication factor of the 
system. 
Finally, in the coupled hybrid system the intensity of the external neutron source, 
required to sustain the reactor power thP can be expressed as follows:  
th th
n out
th b p
P PI
G
= =
 
. (6.4) 
For qualitative estimates let us choose a molten salt AMSTER-like core (see Chapter 3 
for details). The following parameters were employed for the analysis: 2500P = MW(th), 
0.44e = (Lecarpentier, 2001), 
* 1.2 = , 200f = MeV, and 1= . A number of fission 
neutrons were evaluated from Ref. (Blinkin and Novikov, 1978), namely 2.505 = . We suppose 
that the efficiency for both electron and proton accelerator is 0.5a = . It is suitable to use the 
ratio  
( ) ( )/n p n p py Y=   , (6.5) 
which one can consider approximately constant for incident particle energies higher beyond some 
threshold value (Letourneau, 2000). Based on the simulations using the multi-particle transport 
code MCNPX (Waters, 2003), for electrons we obtain  
( ) 46 10eny
= + neutron/MeV/electron  
for a thick photonuclear target (238U surrounded by natPb). Indeed, this value remains nearly 
constant for electron energies ( ) 150ep > MeV. For a thick spallation target built of liquid Pb-Bi 
we obtain  
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( ) 22.5 10pny
= + neutron/MeV/proton.  
Similarly like for electrons, this value is not changing for proton energies ( ) 1000pp > MeV. 
Consequently, for the parameter bG we obtain  
2
( )
0
5.760 101ebG r
+= +  and  ( )
0
1.921pbG r
= + .
We note that two different scenarios were considered (see Ref. Bokov et al., 2003):  
(i) the concept of an industrial hybrid system, based on sub-critical core with the ~2500 
MW(th) power and being a net energy producer, and  
(ii) the concept of a prototype hybrid system, based on subcritical core with the ~200 MW(th) 
power, and not necessarily net energy producer. 
The results of the above formulation are summarized in Figure 39, where the use of 
proton and electron accelerators is quantitatively compared. Protons, being more efficient in 
neutron production than electrons, would use ~40 times smaller fraction of available energy f
for a chosen subcriticality level (Figure 39a). In both cases nearly the same external neutron 
source intensity will be needed to produce the same output energy thP (Figure 39b). The small 
difference (compare solid and dashed curves) is due to different beam power deposited in the 
production target, which is much higher for electrons. Therefore, to obtain the same total outlet 
power, which also includes the beam power deposited in the neutron production target, with 
electrons one would need smaller neutron source intensity (by ~15 %). In the same Figure 39b 
we distinguished the industrial and prototype system requirements since different realization 
constraints might be applied for these two cases. 
In the case of the hybrid MSR, compared to the critical MSR, the total system efficiency 
decreases from ( ) 44 %MSRe = down to the value: 
( ) ( ) ( )1hybrid MSRe e f =  . Let us suppose that the 
minimal acceptable efficiency of hybrid MSR is the actual value of the efficiency of present 
Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR): ( ) 33 %PWRe ( . Therefore, in terms of economical 
restrictions the maximal available fraction of the total produced energy by hybrid MSR is 
( ) ( )1 / 25 %PWR MSRmax e ef  =  = . This is valid for the industrial solution, while a prototype-
demonstrator system does not necessarily need to be a net energy producer. In other words, maxf
can be as high as 100 %. 
 As it was discussed by Ridikas et al. (2003), with today’s electron machine and 
production target technology one could possibly reach neutron source intensities up to 
( ) 172 10enI + n/s, e.g. 150 MeV electrons at 50 MW beam power. In the case of 1 GeV protons,
50 MW beam would result in ( ) 188 10pnI + n/s. Higher continuous neutron source intensities 
will be hard to reach even in the near future. For the above values, the electron machine would 
be nearly by a factor of 10 cheaper (Bernardin et al., 2001; Ridikas et al., 2003), more compact, 
more reliable (e.g. beam trips) and easier to realize in terms of radioprotection requirements 
(e.g. shielding against high energy proton and neutron fluxes). 
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Figure 39. Fraction ( f ) of energy, consumed by accelerator (a), and the intensity of external neutron 
source (b) as a function of the subcriticality level. Proton and electron accelerator options are presented as 
solid and dashed lines correspondingly. Industrial and prototype options stand for 2500 MW(th) and for 
200 MW(th) AMSTER-type subcritical cores respectively. 
6.2.3. Results and conclusions 
According to the technical realization and economical criteria as discussed above we may 
draw the following conclusions: 
with the electron machines one could reach the subcriticality level of  
 approximately 100 pcm in the case of the industrial hybrid reactor and  
 approximately 2000 pcm in the case of the prototype hybrid reactor considered in this 
study (see Figure 39 for details).  
The use of proton accelerator, being more efficient in neutron production, is much more 
flexible in this respect. For example, the proton accelerator would use less than 10 % of the 
available produced energy to reach subcriticality level as high as 3000 pcm. 
Nevertheless, we note that the electron-option should not be neglected in the case when a 
design of a hybrid-demonstrator is planned. This solution would be certainly a cheaper option if 
compared to a proton driven external neutron source. On the other hand, it is clear that for 
industrial hybrids much more external neutrons are needed than it is achieved using electron 
accelerators.  
6.3. Thermo-nuclear fusion as a candidate for external 
neutron source in hybrid systems 
6.3.1. Introduction 
Fission-fusion hybrid systems have been intensively studied a long time ago with 
orientation on different goals: utilization and multiplication of the fusion energy, breeding of 
fission materials for conventional fission reactors, enhanced breeding of tritium, etc. In these 
(a) (b) 
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concepts, fusion was called to play the leading role in energy production, while fission played the 
subsidiary role. 
Unfortunately, today the high costs of fusion energy, as well as its cumbersome designs 
still do not allow using them in practice. In addition, its practical economics still remains rather 
questionable. Meanwhile, some innovative hybrid concepts like the Energy Amplifier by Prof. C. 
Rubbia (1995), or the “mobile” fuelled WISE (Slessarev et al., 2001), etc. have an extraordinary 
potential to satisfy current requirements of nuclear energy production for long term if reasonable 
neutron sources are found. The WISE (Waste-free, Intrinsically Safe, and Efficient) concept, 
based on the sequential application of, first, natural uranium and, afterward, thorium fuel (in 
the form of molten salt, liquid metals, etc.), seems to be particularly suited for the future NP for 
several reasons: there is no longer the necessity of fuel enrichment and of irradiated fuel massive 
reprocessing, a considerable reduction of long-lived toxic wastes, significant protection against 
weapons material proliferation, enormous fuel reserves, etc. However, the use of “poor” natural 
Th-fuel as well as of the “once-through” fuel cycle makes neutronics of the WISE-core 
particularly weak and it requires a considerable external neutron source to support subcritical 
cores. 
As discussed above, traditionally spallation reactions have been considered as candidates 
for a realization of a potential neutron source in Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS), although in 
the case of the WISE concept an important fraction of elaborated power should be spent to feed 
the corresponding powerful accelerators. Spallation by protons is evidently not the single way to 
support this innovative fuel cycle. For example, a small-size current fusion designs (in which 
unsatisfactory elevated cost of energy production or a negative net energy yield do not allow 
utilize it in practice) may be used for the external neutron production in hybrid systems. The 
appearance of WISE stimulates to revise the attitude to such “non-economical” fusion design, 
which would play now a subsidiary but still very important role of the external neutron source. 
In this context, the realization of WISE with all their advantages could compensate the 
economic penalty for their utilization.  
6.3.2. Fusion reactions 
Let us consider the potential of thermo-nuclear fusion to supply a subcritical hybrid core 
with a sufficient amount of neutrons. One notes that neutron production is also accompanied by 
energy production. To assess the effectiveness of this neutron production by fusion, a special 
parameter will be used, namely fusion being the energy released per fusion neutron produced in a 
fusion reaction. In addition, one has to take into account the fusion neutron importance *
(which reflects the difference between released fusion neutrons and the “averaged” neutron 
worth in a fission blanket) as well as the “parasitic” neutron captures in a wall, which separates 
the fusion reaction domain and the subcritical blanket. For the corresponding correction, one 
can use the parameter wa as the coefficient showing the neutron loss in the walls: it is the ratio 
of all produced fusion neutrons to all neutrons entering the fission blanket. 
There are several schemes of fusion reactions (Harms and Heindler, 1982) which can be 
applied.  
I. “Pure D-D” fusion reactions present altogether (after summing all two channels): 
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4D  3He T n p +7.3 MeV+ + + .
These reactions produce one fast neutron per fusion of about “fission energy” (with energy 2.4 
MeV). After transportation through the “first wall”, which separates fusion and fission domains, 
a fraction of such neutrons (about 20 %) is lost (Shmelev, 2000). Once in the hybrid core, their 
importance * does not exceed 1.2. Hence: = 7.3fusion MeV/neutron, 
II. “SCAT-D” multi-channel reactions: 
5D  3He 2n p 24.9 MeV+ + + + .
These reactions produce one hard neutron (14.1 MeV) with its assessed importance * 1.8fusion =
(Shmelev, 2000) and a second neutron similar to those released in D-D reactions. On average, 
for both neutrons: * 1.5 = ; = 12.45fusion MeV/neutron. 
III. “D-T” reaction (T breeding is required as one of fuel components): 
D T n 17.6 MeV+  + + .
This reaction produces one hard neutron (14.1 MeV) with expected importance * 1.8 = (i.e. 
the number of all incoming neutrons can be multiplied by this factor to take into account all 
secondary reactions as (n,2n); (n,3n), etc. (Shmelev, 2000). The neutron balance can be 
considered in two ways discussed below. 
 Approximately one neutron is consumed for tritium (T) breeding: T is produced by 
exothermic (4.8 MeV) reaction on 6Li. However, breeding requires one thermal neutron with 
importance close to unity ( * 1b = ). Thus, one can evaluate the neutron “effective” 
importance as * 0.8b  
 =  = . Hence, ( )17.6 4.8 22.4fusion = + = MeV/neutron .
 In the case, where 7Li is used for T-breeding (Harms and Heindler, 1982), no neutron 
consumption is foreseen for breeding: 7 fLi n n T-+  + + , where fn and n- are a fast and 
thermalized neutrons respectively. The neutron importance is close to 1: * 1 = . In this case 
the breeding reaction is endothermic, therefore 17.6 2.5 15.1fusion =  = MeV/neutron. 
6.3.3. Neutron analysis. Inter-comparison: ADS versus a fission-fusion hybrid 
Installations, using all mentioned above fusion reactions, produce in practice less electric 
energy than they consume, although are approaching gradually to the “break-even-point” due to 
enormous international efforts of scientists. Nevertheless, even with such a “negative” energy 
balance, these schemes can already be rather effective to replace, for example, proton sources in 
hybrids, when external sources have to be very powerful, in particular, for natural Th fuelled 
WISE system (Slessarev et al., 2001). 
Below we introduce a general energy balance scheme in the case of fusion-fission hybrid 
systems. A fusion device consumes some electrical energy for its needs ( inpeE ) and produces 
output energy fusionE in the form of kinetic energy of charged and neutral particles (see Figure 
40).  
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Figure 40. Energy transfer diagram in the Fusion-Fission Hybrid reactor. 
Let us denote G the ratio of the total output electric energy to the total consumed 
electric energy. The parameter G plays a role of the power gain in the fusion installation. 
Denoting outeE the total output electric energy of fusion reaction and /
out fusion
e eE E =   the 
efficiency of its transformation to the electric energy, one writes: 
fusion
e inp
e
EG
E
=

   , (6.6) 
where 1G 1 corresponds to the “positive” and 1G < corresponds to the “negative” energy 
balance of a fusion installation. Referring to one produced “fusion” neutron, one can express G
in the following way:  
fusion
e inp
e
G =  



. (6.7) 
Note, that with 1G  , there is no practical sense to use “pure” fusion for energy 
production. However, this situation could still have some significance if the fusion device is used 
as a supplementary neutron source for a hybrid system, if such a system opens an attractive 
perspective for NP. 
The thermal energy, which is produced in a subcritical core (blanket) when this core has 
received one fusion neutron, consists of the energy released from fusion reactions plus the total 
energy released from fission reactions in the core: 
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( )
*
1
efffusion
th f
weff
k
ak


= +

   , (6.8) 
where effk is the core multiplication coefficient,  is the average number of neutrons released 
per fission; * is the importance of fusion neutrons; f is the fission energy; wa is the ratio of all 
produced fusion neutrons to all neutrons entering in the blanket. Denoting AK the coefficient of 
multiplication (amplification) of fission energy in the subcritical blanket: 
( )1
eff
A
eff
k
K
k 
=

(6.9) 
and taking into account the efficiency of transformation of core thermal energy to electrical 
energy e th e=  one obtains that  the fraction of total electrical energy, which has to be spent 
for the reproduction of one fusion neutron and to sustain the energy production, can be assessed 
now as 
1
inp
e e
out
fe
e Afusion
w
f
G K
a



= =   +   
 





. (6.10) 
Estimations show that for “WISE”-like cores (with 0 9effk .( ) one can neglect the first 
term in the denominator, so one gets: 
1 1inp fusione e w
out
e e f A e f A n
af
K K zG

 
= = =
  
 
 
  
, (6.11) 
where nz is the effective fusion neutron yield in a blanket per consumed electric energy or 
electric energy cost of neutron production, based on a fusion reaction. In this notation nz is 
defined as follows: 
n fusion
e w
Gz
a



=


 
. (6.12) 
This means that the fraction of power consumed by the supplementary source is inversely 
proportional to the effective neutron yield of this source and, equally, to the coefficient of power 
amplification of the blanket. 
Now we are ready to establish a direct comparison for the energy consumption of the 
supplementary neutron sources, based on fusion reactions with well-known ADS systems, where 
neutrons are produced by proton beam due to spallation reaction. One can carry out similar 
assessment of energy, which is required for production of neutrons via spallation. As a result, the 
fraction of total electrical energy, which has to be spent to sustain energy production in ADS, 
can be evaluated (see previous Section) as follows: 
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After neglecting the first term in the denominator, one obtains, similarly to the case of the 
fusion source: 
*
1 1inp pe
out
e e a A f n e A f n
f
K Y K z   
= = =

  
, (6.14) 
where the “effective” spallation neutron yield nz per consumed electric energy is defined as  
*
n a nz y = , with  /n n py Y=  . (6.15) 
Table XVI shows the fractions of energy consumption in the case of neutron sources 
based either on fusion or spallation reactions. It is evident that fusion produces many more 
neutrons per unit power than spallation. So, one can obtain the simple formula for the inter-
comparison of the spallation/fusion fractions of energy in a hybrid required to support energy 
production by fission: 
*
n
fusion
n e w a n
zf G
z a yf

  

= =
 
  
. (6.16) 
The inter-comparison of nz -values demonstrates that the effectiveness of fusion for 
neutron production (when 1G  ) is significantly higher when compared with spallation. In 
addition, it rises when the G increases (see Table XVI), as a lower fraction f is necessary to 
feed the external neutron source (fusion installation).  
Table XVI. Required supplementary energy consumptions ( f , %) in subcritical hybrids supplied with 
fusion or spallation reactions. ( 0.9effk = , 0.45e e a  = = = , 2.5 = )
Sources of supplementary neutrons  
in different Hybrid Systems 
Effective neutron  
yields nz (MeV)
-1 
f , %, 
FUSION ( 1.2wa = ) 1G = 1G = 1/ 3G = 1/10G =
D-D (WISE-Fusion) 0.30 1.0 3.0 10 
SCAT-D (WISE-Fusion) 0.22 1.4 4.2 14 
D-T, breeding on Li-6 (WISE-Fusion) 0.07 4.1 8.2 41 
D-T, breeding on Li-7 (WISE-Fusion) 0.12 2.5 7.5 25 
SPALLATION     
Spallation by proton 
1 GeVp = , lead target, 20nY = ,
* 1.3 = (Slessarev et al., 2001) 
0.0117 26%f =
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It is important to note that the consumed power of the fusion sources is surprisingly 
small in most of the cases. So, for D-D reactions, the proportion between power of fusion source 
and the core of WISE is expected to be of order of 1 % if 1G = . Certainly, the fraction of the 
fusion part will grow if less effective fusion reactions or less beneficial economy of fusion sources 
( 1/ 3G  ) are used.  
6.3.4. Conclusion 
The neutron abundance of fusion reactions (particularly D-D reactions) per consumed 
energy unit could make such sources more attractive when compared with the spallation neutron 
sources. For example, fusion sources are preferable (when compared with the spallation source) if 
their electric energy consumption does not exceed the total thermal energy production by a 
factor of about 0.1G 1 .
The closer the point 1G = the more beneficial fusion sources become. Even for hybrids 
with significant core subcriticality (e.g., the WISE concept with Th-fuel), the required power 
(for the external neutron production) can be assessed as small as 3 % of the total blanket power 
if the D-D fusion source with 1/ 3G = is employed. The weakest potential is expected in the 
case of the D-T reaction (with the T-breeding on Li-6). 
It seems that the external neutron sources, based on fusion reactions, offer a possibility 
to profit from the new advantages of hybrid concepts. However, these neutron sources should be 
relatively small that the hybrids are not too much penalized economically. We conclude that 
fusion reactions could be considered as a promising alternative to the spallation-type neutron 
sources taking into account the technical feasibility and economics of the near future fusion 
installations with 1G  .
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7. Conclusions 
 
Des systèmes nucléaires innovants peuvent, dans certains cas, souffrir d’une dégradation de 
leurs propriétés importantes pour leur sûreté, notamment la diminution de la fraction de neutrons 
retardés et la dégradation des effets de contre-réaction. De ce fait, il devient crucial pour la réalisation 
de tels systèmes de garantir leur fonctionnement sûr.  
Les systèmes hybrides (comprenant le cœur sous-critique et la source externe de neutrons) sont 
étudiés pour remédier à ces problèmes de sûreté. Pour cela, la source de neutrons doit être 
suffisamment performante et puissante, ce qui entraîne de considérables contraintes, à la fois 
économiques et technologiques. Des études antérieures ont démontré que si la sous-criticité est un 
moyen très efficace d’améliorer la sûreté, son rôle reste annexe. Ainsi, pour répondre aux exigences de 
la sûreté déterministe, certaines démarches d’optimisation des propriétés du cœur doivent également 
être effectuées (par exemple : la diminution des réserves de réactivité). Dans le cadre d’une approche 
déterministe pour l’analyse de la sûreté (utilisée dans nos études), tous les accidents potentiels causés 
par des impacts internes ou externes dus à des erreurs humaines ou à des défaillances techniques 
doivent être protégés en utilisant des propriétés intrinsèques des composants du réacteur. Il faut que le 
système ait la possibilité intrinsèque d’autoprotection, c’est à dire qu’aucun de ces événements ne 
conduise à des conséquences graves (comme le rejet de radioactivité dans l’environnement nécessitant 
une évacuation de la population). Les réacteurs à sel fondu sont connus pour être particulièrement 
propices à la sûreté déterministe, où le retraitement en ligne ainsi que d’autres propriétés intrinsèques 
diminuent considérablement les initiateurs d’accidents graves. C’est pourquoi, des réacteurs hybrides 
à sel fondu (WISE, AMSTER, RSF, REBUS) sont pris comme des systèmes de référence dans nos 
études. 
Une réflexion qui concerne la place de la sous-criticité dans l’amélioration de la sûreté est l’idée 
clé de toutes les études. Ce rôle étant fortement dépendent du mode de fonctionnement du système 
(critique ou sous-critique, couplé ou découplé, etc.), du pilotage (par l’accélérateur ou par des barres de 
contrôle), et de l’approche (déterministe ou probabiliste). Une prise en compte de tous ces aspects 
parait nécessaire pour donner une réponse exhaustive à ce problème. Une tentative préliminaire de 
synthèse est effectuée. L’étude a inclus aussi bien des estimations analytiques que des simulations 
numériques de la cinétique et de la dynamique des systèmes. La réponse dynamique des systèmes aux 
perturbations externes (transitoires) non protégées prend une place essentielle lors de nos études. 
Ces études ont démontré que la sous-criticité permet d’adoucir les transitoires, d’augmenter le 
temps de grâce, même si le coefficient de contre-réaction est défavorable. Les résultats montrent que 
même un petit niveau de sous-criticité (2-3 dollars) peut significativement améliorer la sûreté. Les 
deux types de réalisation de système hybride : l’ADS (source externe de neutrons est indépendante de 
la puissance du coeur) et l’ACS (système sous-critique avec couplage « taux de fission – intensité de la 
source externe de neutrons») peuvent améliorer la sûreté. Le couplage thermo-hydraulique entre un 
cœur sous-critique et une source de neutron de spallation produit un groupe supplémentaire de 
neutrons retardés. L’étude a aussi montré que deux moyens : une optimisation thermo-hydraulique et 
la sous-criticité peuvent compenser la dégradation de l’effet Doppler et la réduction de la fraction des 
neutrons retardés. De plus, il est démontré qu’on peut profiter de certaines particularités de 
production de neutrons dans une cible de spallation en fonction de l’énergie des protons incidents (Yn-
effect) et de ce fait accentuer les propriétés stabilisatrices de la puissance du cœur lors des accidents de 
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réactivité non protégés (concept DENNY). Une caractérisation générale du fonctionnement de DENNY 
est donnée. Lors de cette étude il a été démontré que l’influence bénéfique de l’effet Yn-effect sur la 
dynamique des systèmes hybrides couplés peut être considérable (surtout en l’absence d’effet Doppler). 
Une étude préliminaire des potentialités de la sûreté déterministe du Réacteur à Neutrons 
Rapides (RNR) à sel fondu (concept REBUS-3700) a été réalisée dans le cadre de ce travail de thèse. 
L’objectif de l’étude était d'évaluer le potentiel de la sûreté déterministe du concept REBUS, ainsi que 
le rôle éventuel de la sous-criticité dans le renforcement de la sûreté. L’étude est basée sur l’analyse du 
bilan quasi-statique de la réactivité. Cette étude a abouti à certaines recommandations concernant le 
fonctionnement du réacteur (par exemple : chauffage externe du sel lors démarrage du réacteur, 
contrôle de la puissance du réacteur par le débit du sel, etc.), afin de diminuer les réserves de 
réactivité existant dans le réacteur. Elle a démontré le potentiel excellent du REBUS (même dans la 
configuration critique) en ce qui concerne la sûreté déterministe, si on évite la solidification du sel 
primaire. 
Enfin, le potentiel des sources externes de neutrons basées sur les réactions nucléaires autres que 
la spallation, notamment la réaction photo-nucléaire et la fusion thermonucléaire, a été réexaminé en 
prenant en compte des aspects tels que leurs performances, leurs aspects économiques et leurs 
réalisabilités technique. Des estimations faites lors de notre nouvelle étude montrent que, si les 
performances des accélérateurs d’électrons en tant que source externe de neutrons ne sont pas 
suffisantes pour des applications industrielles, cela reste une option intéressante pour la réalisation 
d’un prototype (faible puissance) de système hybride. Des sources externes de fusion relativement 
petites et économiquement peu pénalisantes, peuvent permettre d'obtenir les nouveaux avantages de 
nouveaux concepts, notamment du concept WISE, et constituer, probablement, une alternative aux 
sources de neutrons de spallation. 
 
The safe operation of nuclear installations is one of crucial conditions for the future of 
Nuclear Power. The safety is a complex problem, which is interconnected with other aspects of 
the Nuclear Power such as economical competitiveness, waste minimization, long term 
sustainability, etc. Therefore, the safety issues have to be considered from the very beginning of 
the development of nuclear reactor concepts, and the corresponding measures have to be 
anticipated in the design. The inherent safety approach (which supposes that safety functions 
have to be achieved by use of inherent, based on nature laws, properties of reactor components) 
is one of the most radical means to meet this condition. Among others, the molten salt reactors 
are known to be particularly suitable for inherent safety due to its intrinsic properties, namely 
low internal pressure, low fuel-coolant inflammability, small reactivity margin due to on-line 
reprocessing, etc. However, on the way to the intrinsic safety other inherent properties as 
positive thermal feedback effect due to graphite-moderator can bring some unacceptable 
problems. A novel option aiming to handle the above problems may be the artificial 
enhancement of system neutronics: an external neutron source added to the core permits the 
system to operate with subcritical core (so-called hybrid systems). In the context of inherent 
safety approach two types of the hybrid system realization may be distinguished: in the first one 
the intensity of the external neutron source may be independent of core power (independent-
source systems, e.g. Accelerator-Driven Systems - ADS), and in the second one the external 
neutron source depends intrinsically on core power (coupled-source systems, e.g. Accelerator-
Coupled Systems - ACS). 
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The main goal of this thesis work was to investigate the role of core subcriticality for 
safety enhancement of advanced nuclear systems, in particular, molten salt reactors, devoted to 
both energy production and waste incineration/transmutation. The inherent safety is considered 
as ultimate goal of this safety enhancement.
An attempt to apply a systematic approach for the analysis of the subcriticality 
contribution to inherent properties of hybrid system was performed in this thesis. Starting with 
simulation of the kinetics and the dynamics of subcritical systems during unprotected (by the 
active safety tools) transients the obtained results were able to characterize the inherent 
behavior of the systems considered in this work. These results were used as a staring point for 
proceeding towards the above main goal. Some general relationships, connecting the thermo-
hydraulic characteristics of the reactor, the temperature and power feedback coefficients, the 
subcriticality level, excess reactivity/current, etc., were looked for. These relationships provided 
a combination of above parameters, which could guide towards the acceptable/improved 
behavior of nuclear systems under consideration during unprotected transients. The results of 
this research, listed below, prove that in many cases the subcriticality may improve radically the 
safety characteristics of nuclear reactors, and in some configurations it helps to reach the 
“absolute” intrinsic safety.  
I. In the present work a comparative analysis of the dynamics of different types 
(independent-source systems and coupled-source systems) of hybrid systems was carried out for 
the first time. The general conclusion is that the subcritical regime improves the safety potential 
significantly, leading to the considerable increase of the grace time up to several hours. This 
effect was observed for some examined systems even for small subcriticality levels of 1-3 dollars. 
In any case, a proper choice of subcriticality level makes all analyzed transients considerably 
slower, and monotonic, i.e. the maximal temperature/power values are achieved asymptotically. 
It was also shown that the weakest point of the independent-source systems with respect to the 
deterministic safety is thermo-hydraulic unprotected transients, while in the case of the coupled-
source systems the excess reactivity/current insertion events remain a point of concern.  
II. In the case of the independent-source systems (e.g. ADS) it was demonstrated that 
the added subcriticality may compensate the degradation of the core feedback effects. Thus, in 
the case of systems characterized by a small (when compared with conventional critical reactors) 
but negative feedback coefficient an appropriate choice of subcriticality level permits to 
compensate this feedback degradation in terms of the asymptotic power level. In the case of the 
positive feedback coefficient, subcriticality allows improving the safety characteristics in terms of 
significant expansion of the grace time. The corresponding relationships were obtained and 
provided in this thesis work. 
III. In the present thesis work the safety potential of coupled hybrid systems (DEN 
concept) was investigated in detail. Our analysis demonstrated that this concept was able to 
improve considerably the inherent safety potential of a nuclear reactor under condition that the 
system has favorable negative feedbacks. With the help of a simple mathematical model, 
describing the coupling of the subcritical core and of the external neutron source, we 
demonstrated that the latter may be treated as a supplementary group of delayed neutrons. As 
shown, this similarity between “natural” and “artificial” delayed neutrons is not absolute: some 
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new opportunities arise and they have to be taken into account when the kinetics of the coupled 
hybrid system is considered. The modified inhour equation, which takes into account the ability 
to modify source reactivity, was deduced and an analysis of its roots was performed. An 
asymptotic reactor period, in the case of source performance variation, was obtained as a 
solution of this modified inhour equation. The above analysis allows one to conclude that the 
kinetic response of the coupled hybrid system to a variation of source performance is 
intrinsically different if compared to a variation of core reactivity. This is true in particular 
when large (if compared with the effective fraction of delayed neutrons) source equivalent of 
reactivity is introduced. Namely, there is no analogue of prompt criticality, accompanied by 
drastic decrease of the reactor period. These results allow us to give a practical recommendation: 
it is preferable (from the point of view of reactor kinetics) to have reactivity reserves in the form 
of the source reactivity. In this case an erroneous insertion of these reserves will not lead to 
drastic decrease of the reactor period. 
IV. The synthesis of above results yielded in a new concept of coupled “accelerator - 
subcritical blanket” hybrid, incorporating the observed intrinsic safety-related advantages of 
both independent-source (ADS) and coupled-source (DEN) systems. This concept, named as the 
DENNY system (Delayed Enhanced Neutronics with Non-linear neutron Yield), is based on the 
particularity of the neutron production, forming a quasi-linear dependence between energy 
production in the core and the external neutron yield in the spallation target. This particular 
dependence provides an auto-regulating behavior of the ensemble “accelerator – subcritical 
core”. The proposed system has the kinetics of a critical system with artificial group of delayed 
neutrons. In addition, its external neutron production contains the supplementary feedback, 
stabilizing the installation power in its nominal state. This effect can be compared to the 
Doppler feedback effect but for the external source neutrons. Similarly as the Doppler-effect, it is 
intrinsic. Finally, our qualitative estimates showed that the implementation of this concept 
could compensate eventual feedback degradation. 
V. The preliminary safety analysis of the innovative molten salt fast reactor (REBUS-
3700) was carried out. Principal concerns for the reactor safety were indicated and an exhaustive 
analysis of phenomena, leading to the reactivity variation in the reactor core, was done. It was 
demonstrated that at the equilibrium the magnitude of the excess reactivity may be decreased 
down to the value, comparable with the effective fraction of delayed neutrons. The safety 
analysis was performed in the framework of the so-called reactivity balance method, i.e. the 
quasi-static analysis of dependences of core power and core temperature on external parameters 
(e.g. inserted reactivity, fuel flow etc.) during unprotected transients. These studies 
demonstrated an excellent resistance of REBUS-3700 to majority of single and combined 
unprotected events, except unprotected overcooling. This latter can result in solidification of the 
primary salt, and has to be considered as the most menacing; for that reason some special 
measures are necessary in the reactor design to prevent the overcooling of the primary salt. In 
the context of obtained results it was concluded that this reactor does not require any support of 
the external neutron source to improve its safety characteristics. 
VI. The results of our analysis have demonstrated that in many cases the requirements 
concerning parameters of the external neutron source may be modified when compared to these 
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ones in the “traditional” ADS concepts. This opens a perspective to alternative solutions for 
external neutron source realization. In this thesis work the potential of two candidates: (i) 
thermonuclear installation and (ii) photoneutron source were re-examined. As demonstrated, the 
photoneutron-option should not be neglected in the case when a design of a hybrid-demonstrator 
is planned. This solution would be certainly a cheaper and more reliable option if compared to a 
proton driven external neutron source. On the other hand, it is clear that for industrial hybrids 
much more external neutrons are needed than it is achieved using electron accelerators. The 
external neutron sources, based on fusion reactions, could be considered as a promising 
alternative to the spallation-type neutron sources taking into account the technical feasibility 
and economics of the near future fusion installations. 
 
Finally we add that in general, the subcriticality, when applied in a proper way, becomes 
a valuable tool for safety enhancement. At the same time, our studies also demonstrated that a 
more general approach still needs to be developed. This global approach must explore 
fundamentally a new feature of subcritical systems - the possibility to control reactor power by 
means of the external neutron source, including all issues following this possibility. Indeed, one 
needs to demonstrate not only what kind of control, i.e. the traditional (via reactivity) or novel 
(via intensity of the external neutron source), is more advantageous from the safety point of 
view; the economics and feasibility should be equally analysed in this respect (e.g., decreased 
requirements for the external neutron source intensity). In addition, it is obvious, that this 
strategy will depend on the type of hybrid system considered (coupled source or independent 
source). In this context, our preliminary considerations permit to expect that DENNY-concept 
provides some quite promising features in this regard, which certainly should be explored in 
more detail. The second direction of the future studies might be the identification of the 
innovative cores, permitting to reach, with a help of subcriticality, the inherent safety.   
Summary of principal findings of this thesis work: 
 For the first time an inter-comparison of the deterministic safety potential of coupled- 
(DEN) and independent-source (ADS) systems, as well as of the corresponding critical 
reactors, is carried out; the intrinsic differences of system behaviour during unprotected 
events are demonstrated. 
 It is shown that in the case of the independent-source system (e.g., ADS) the subcriticality 
may compensate to some extent the degradation of the core feedback effects in terms of 
asymptotic power after excess reactivity insertion or/and in terms of the significantly 
expanded grace time. 
 The dynamics and the kinetics of the coupled subcritical systems (DEN) are investigated in 
detail. It is demonstrated that this concept has many novel attractive features, which allows 
improving considerably the nuclear reactor safety.  
 In order to overcome the identified inherent drawbacks of the ADS and ACS concepts a new 
promising approach to realize a coupled hybrid system with a manifest improvement of the 
inherent safety potential (DENNY concept) is proposed and analyzed. 
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 A preliminary deterministic safety study of the novel fast reactor concept (REBUS-3700) is 
carried out with a goal not only to characterize its safety potential, but to “condition” from 
the very beginning its design and operation principles in order to meet the inherent safety 
requirements. It is shown that REBUS-3700 has an excellent resistance to majority of single 
and combined unprotected events. 
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9. Appendix. Solution of the kinetic equation for coupled 
hybrid system in one-group approximation 
9.1. Inhour equation for the coupled hybrid system 
As well known, an asymptotic period  of the reactor kinetic response to reactivity 
perturbation is described by the characteristic equation, called the inhour equation or Nordheim 
equation (Refs. Hetrick, 1971; Ash, 1979; Rozon, 1992). For the mathematical model of the 
coupled hybrid system in the form of Eqs. (3.15), the modified inhour equation may be written 
as a characteristic equation with respect to the variable s (Bokov, 2005):  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
gNr
i
ext
i i
s
s s s
 	  
	 	 	
+ + +
+ +
=
 
  + = + + + + +  
) . (A.1) 
It differs from the “ordinary” inhour equation for a critical reactor by two extra terms 
(the last terms on the left- and on the right-hand sides of the equation). Moreover, the structure 
of the equation has also changed. The last term on the right-hand side of this equation does not 
depend on ( )r . It represents, as expected, the supplementary group of delayed neutrons. In 
other words, at ( ) 0r = , Eq. (A.1) collapses to an eventual inhour equation but with an extra 
group of delayed neutrons. On the contrary, in the “ordinary” inhour equation there is no 
analogue for the term ( )( ) /r s 	  	+ + ++ . Hence, one can suppose, that its solution will differ 
not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. 
An analytical study of this modified inhour equation would be relatively cumbersome. 
Nevertheless some preliminary remarks concerning its solution may be made. Rearrangement of 
Eq. (14a) in order to bring it into a form more appropriated for subsequent analysis gives: 
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) . (A.2) 
The signs of the roots of the above characteristic equation give important information 
about the asymptotic behavior of the solution of Eq. (3.15). From the Descartes Rule of Signs 
(Meserve, 1982), it follows that if condition ( )( ) 0r  + + < is fulfilled, then the characteristic 
equation [(A.1)-(A.2)] has no positive real roots. This result is expected, as it follows from the 
physical meaning of the parameter ( )r , namely perturbation of the source reactivity. Hence the 
condition ( )( ) 0r  + + < signifies that in accordance with Eq. (3.8) one obtains that 1effm <
and the chain reaction in the system has to decay with time. 
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9.2. Approximation of one group of delayed neutrons 
9.2.1. The one-group kinetic equation for coupled hybrid system 
A simple analytical solution of Eq. (3.15) may be obtained in the one-group 
approximation for delayed neutrons. Moving to the effective concentration W of an “average” 
emitter of delayed neutrons with total fraction ( ) . and effective decay constant ( )	 . , one 
obtains the coupled system of kinetic equations: 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )1 ;
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dt
d W P W
dt
   	
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.
.
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
(A.3) 
Note that in Eqs. (A.3) the source variation term is renormalized: ( )( ) ( )r r   += . As
was noted in Section 3.3, + and 	+ are free parameters and their values may be optimized 
with the objective of:  
(i) increasing the margin to prompt criticality;  
(ii) slowing down eventual transients by increasing the mean neutron life time 
1 1
1
g gN N
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i i i
 
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For these purposes + and ( ) 1	 + have to be increased as much as possible, and in most 
practical situations the artificial group (term / 	+ + ) prevail over natural groups of delayed 
neutrons. Consequently, in this context one may neglect the contribution of the natural delayed 
neutrons and one may take:  
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Under these conditions the modified inhour formula Eq. (A.2) reduces after some 
rearrangement to the quadratic equation: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2 ( ) 0rs s	   	   . . . . +  +   + = (A.6) 
9.2.2. Properties of the roots of the modified inhour equation in the one-group 
approximation 
Before writing the solution of Eq. (A.6), we analyze in detail the properties of its roots. 
Representing for convenience Eq. (A.6) in the form: 22 1 0 0a s a s a+ + = and taking into account 
that  2 0a =  > one obtains according to the Descartes sign rule:  
(i) If 1sgn( ) 1a = and 0sgn( ) 1a = , the above equation has no positive roots. The physical 
meaning of these conditions is as follows: the core is subcritical on prompt neutrons 
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( ( ) ( )  	. . < +  ) and the total neutron multiplication factor is less than “one” (i.e. 
( )( ) 1( )1 1reffm   
.=   < ) correspondingly. 
(ii) If 1sgn( ) 1a = and 0sgn( ) 1a =  then Eq. (A.6) has one positive root and one negative root. 
In this case the reactor core remains subcritical on prompt neutrons, but the overall neutron 
multiplication factor effm is greater than “one”. 
(iii) If 1sgn( ) 1a =  then the condition 0sgn( ) 1a =  is fulfilled automatically, and Eq. (A.6) has 
one positive root and one negative root. Indeed, as follows from the definition of ( )r :
( ) 1
01 1
r f     and ( )( )r  . +1 . Therefore condition 1sgn( ) 1a =  signifies that 
( ) ( )  	. . > +  , what leads to ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 0r r     	. . . + > + +  >  , i.e. to the following 
condition 0sgn( ) 1a =  .
A straightforward calculation of the determinant 21 2 04a a a= D of Eq. (A.6) proves that 
0>D if ( ) 1r 1 , i.e. for the all possible values of parameter ( )r . Consequently, Eq. (A.6) has 
neither complex, nor double roots.  
In brief, case (i) corresponds to reactor power decreasing with time, whereas cases (ii) 
and (iii) correspond to solutions increasing with time. 
9.2.3. The solution of kinetic equation for coupled hybrid system in one-group 
approximation 
Let us use the following notation for convenience: 
( ) /q  .$  . (A.7) 
With this notation and supposing that there is no in-core reactivity variation (i.e. 
0 = ) Eqs. (A.3) may be rewritten in the following way: 
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To solve the above system of equations it is useful to apply the Laplace Transformation 
method. We will denote the Laplace Transform for some arbitrary function of time ( )F t as 
follows: ( ) ( )[ ]Fˆ s F t= L . Then, the Laplace transform of Eq. (A.8) yields in 
( ) ( )
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where 0 ( 0)P P t= = and 0 0( )W W t t= = . These equations may be solved algebraically for ˆ( )P s
with some rearrangement  
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where  
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )2 ( )
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(A.11) 
are the roots of the characteristic equation (A.6), which, applying the notations Eq. (A.7), may 
be rewritten in the following way 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 0rs s q q	  	. .+ +  + = . (A.12) 
Making use of the notation ( ) /u q	 .= and ( ) ( )2( ) ( ), 1 4r rR u u u = + +  , one can 
rewrite above expression Eq. (A.11) in the following way  
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Applying the inverse Laplace Transformation 1 ˆ( ) ( )P t P s  =   L to Eq. (A.9) one obtains 
the solution of Eqs. (A.8): 
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where j are given by expression Eq. (A.13).  
If at 0t = the system was in equilibrium, then the initial condition yields in 
0 0 /W P u= . After some rearrangement, the solution of Eqs. (A.8) can be written in the form: 
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where the coefficients j/ are given by 
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Analyse Comparative du Fonctionnement et de la Sûreté de Systèmes Sous-critiques et de 
Réacteurs Critiques Innovants 
 
L’objectif de ce travail de thèse est d’examiner le rôle de la sous-criticité du cœur, en tant que moyen pour 
améliorer la sûreté des systèmes nucléaires innovants, notamment des réacteurs à sel fondu, dédiés à la 
production d’énergie et/ou à la transmutation/incinération des déchets nucléaires. La sûreté intrinsèque 
est considérée comme l’objectif ultime de cette amélioration. Une tentative d’appliquer une approche 
systématisée pour l’analyse de la contribution de la sous-criticitité au comportement intrinsèque des 
systèmes hybrides est effectuée. Les résultats de cette étude prouvent que la sous-criticité améliore bien la 
sûreté des réacteurs nucléaires, et même, dans certaines configurations, permet d’attendre la sûreté 
intrinsèque. Dans tous les cas, un choix approprié du niveau de sous-criticité rend les transitoires plus 
lents et monotones. Il est montré que le point faible pour des systèmes hybrides avec une source 
indépendante de neutrons sont les transitoires thermo-hydrauliques non protégés tandis que pour des 
hybrides avec des sources couplées ce sont les transitoires de réactivité. Pour surmonter les inconvénients 
intrinsèques à ces deux types de systèmes hybrides, un nouveau principe de réalisation des systèmes 
hybrides couplés est proposé (concept DENNY). De plus, des approches, qui permettent de remédier à 
certains problèmes de sûreté, sont proposées. Une analyse préliminaire du potentiel de sûreté intrinsèque 
pour un réacteur à sel fondu avec spectre rapide (concept REBUS) est effectuée. Enfin, le potentiel des 
sources alternatives de neutrons basées sur des réactions thermonucléaires et photo-nucléaires est examiné. 
 
Mots clés : réacteur nucléaire, sûreté, systèmes hybrides, dynamique, cinétique, sel fondu, spallation, 
photo-nucléaire, thermonucléaire, feedback, neutrons retardés. 
 
Comparative Analysis of Operation and Safety of Subcritical Nuclear Systems and Innovative 
Critical Reactors 
 
The main goal of this thesis work is to investigate the role of core subcriticality for safety enhancement of 
advanced nuclear systems, in particular, molten salt reactors, devoted to both energy production and 
waste incineration/transmutation. The inherent safety is considered as ultimate goal of this safety 
improvement. An attempt to apply a systematic approach for the analysis of the subcriticality 
contribution to inherent properties of hybrid system was performed. The results of this research prove 
that in many cases the subcriticality may improve radically the safety characteristics of nuclear reactors, 
and in some configurations it helps to reach the “absolute” intrinsic safety. In any case, a proper choice of 
subcriticality level makes all analyzed transients considerably slower and monotonic. It was shown that 
the weakest point of the independent-source systems with respect to the intrinsic safety is thermo-
hydraulic unprotected transients, while in the case of the coupled-source systems the excess 
reactivity/current insertion events remain a matter of concern. To overcome these inherent drawbacks a 
new principle of realization of a coupled sub-critical system (DENNY concept) is proposed. In addition, 
the ways to remedy some particular safety-related problems with the help of the core sub-criticality are 
demonstrated. A preliminary safety analysis of the fast-spectrum molten salt reactor (REBUS concept) is 
also carried out in this thesis work. Finally, the potential of the alternative (to spallation) neutron sources 
for application in hybrid systems is examined. 
 
Key words: nuclear reactor, safety, hybrid systems, dynamics, kinetics, molten salt, spallation, 
photonuclear, thermonuclear, feedback, delayed neutrons. 
